AMERICA'S DRUG PROBLEM AND ITS POLICY OF DENIAL

For almost 100 years, Americans have considered other countries the primary
source of their drug problems. When the first drug laws were adopted in the
early decades of this century, the public associated drugs with immigrant
groups and minorities: opium with Chinese laborers in the west, cocaine
with blacks, and marijuana with Mexican immigrants in the southwest. These
drugs were seen as foreign threats to the social fabric, undermining
traditional moral values and political stability. Today this link between
foreigners and illicit drugs continues to influence United States
international drug policy, prompting the government to use diplomacy,
economic assistance, coercion, and military force to try to stop drugs from
entering the country.

Americans strongly support government efforts to cut off foreign drug
supplies. More than two-thirds of the respondents in a 1997 poll by the Pew
Research Center for the People and the Press considered drug control to be
a "top priority" goal of United States foreign policy; only protecting
American jobs and preventing the spread of nuclear weapons received higher
scores. Similar views have prevailed in other surveys. A 1995 Chicago
Council on Foreign Relations nationwide poll found that 86 percent of
Americans consider "stopping the flow of drugs" one of the country's most
important foreign policy goals. The close connection in the public mind
between international initiatives and drug abuse, which is often
experienced as an intensely local problem involving families, schools, and
communities, gives this issue particular resonance in public views of
foreign policy.

SUPPLYING AMERICA'S DEMAND

America's drug habit has historically been supplied from foreign sources:
cocaine and marijuana from Latin America and the Caribbean; heroin from
Southeast Asia's Golden Triangle (Burma, Laos, and Thailand) and South
Asia's Golden Crescent (Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iran). However, in
recent years a substantial percentage of illicit drug consumption in the
United States has been met by illegal domestic production. In particular,
many of the drugs gaining popularity among teenagers--marijuana,
methamphetamines, and LSD--are produced at home as well as imported.

While much of the marijuana the country uses continues to be imported
through Mexico and the Caribbean, domestic production now supplies an
estimated one-third to one-half of America's consumption. Although a
complete nationwide survey of illegal marijuana cultivation has never been
made, government officials report major cultivation areas in states as
diverse as New York, Kentucky, California, and Hawaii. Increased indoor
cultivation, which allows for more selective hybridization, has accelerated
the trend toward higher-potency marijuana. In 1996, the THC
(tetrahydrocannabinol) content of high-grade "sinsemilla" (seedless)
marijuana ranged from 12 to 24 percent, according to the Drug Enforcement
Administration (DEA), compared to less than 2 percent THC in marijuana
cultivated in the early 1970s. Even as potency has increased, marijuana
prices, after rising during the 1980s, have in the 1990s fallen back to
levels of the early 1980s. Depending on its quality, marijuana now sells
for roughly the same as in 1982--as little as $40 per ounce, although
prices for high-quality "boutique" marijuana strains can reach $900 per
ounce.

The historic view that America's drug problems are predominantly foreign in
origin is thus harder to sustain, given increasing domestic illegal drug
production, not only of marijuana, LSD, and amphetamines but also of newer
"designer" psychoactive drugs such as MDMA (known as Ecstasy). Nonetheless,
United States drug policy continues to concentrate on trying to reduce the
foreign supply of drugs, both through efforts to reduce drug cultivation in
other countries and to interdict drug traffic before it crosses America's
borders. Unfortunately, the strategy of trying to reduce United States drug
use by attacking drug supplies overseas is fundamentally flawed.

CERTIFICATION: THE "TOUGH" APPROACH

Emblematic of this focus on foreign sources is the United States
government's annual "certification" process. Imposed by Congress on the
executive branch in 1986, the concept of certification reflects a worldview
that still classifies countries into producer, consumer, and transit
categories. The intent of Congress was to put teeth into United States
efforts to compel cooperation as well as to make the president accountable
for enforcing a more vigorous international drug policy.

The certification legislation requires the president to identify annually
those countries that are "significant direct or indirect sources" of
illicit drugs "significantly affecting the United States." Inclusion on
this list, which currently comprises 30 countries, automatically triggers
certain sanctions unless the president decides to "certify" the country.
Those deemed to have fully cooperated in drug control efforts are
certified. Those deemed less cooperative are decertified, which results in
the termination of United States assistance (except for humanitarian and
drug control funds), United States opposition to multilateral development
loans for that country, and the stigma of being branded a drug-trafficking
nation. This may carry negative economic repercussions beyond the
aid-related sanctions included in the law; The Wall Street Journal reported
in August 1997 that Colombia's decertification had contributed to an
atmosphere of uncertainty, causing investors to put off new projects.

A "national interest" waiver is used to justify suspending the penalties
for a country that would otherwise have been decertified--a way to improve
performance without actually cutting off assistance. Congress has the
authority to overturn presidential decisions by passing a joint resolution
within 30 days, but has never done so.

Under Presidents Ronald Reagan and George Bush, the certification process
was predictable and went largely unnoticed. Decertification was reserved
for countries like Iran and Syria, with which the United States had limited
or no relations, as well as Burma and Afghanistan, which together produce
90 percent of the world's illicit opium. Lebanon was consistently granted a
national interest waiver. In 1988 and 1989, Panama was added to the
decertification list, just before the United States intervened militarily
to remove President Manuel Noriega for his involvement in drug trafficking.

Under President Bill Clinton, certification has become more rigorous. In
1994, Nigeria, a key trafficking country and a significant source of oil
for the United States, was decertified for the first time. Also, Bolivia
and Peru, the world's largest coca producers, joined a growing list of
countries given a national interest waiver. In 1995, Colombia, a major
source of cocaine and heroin; Paraguay, a cocaine transit country; and
Pakistan, a prime producer of heroin, were added to the waiver list.

By 1996, certification had emerged as a major source of tension between the
United States and its Latin American neighbors. The administration
decertified Colombia for the first time because of alleged links between
President Ernesto Samper and the drug cartels, which were believed to have
contributed to his presidential campaign. Colombia was again decertified in
1997; Mexico, however, was certified, despite revelations of extensive
drug-related government corruption that, as some observers noted,
paralleled the situation in Colombia.

Critics both in the United States and Latin America argued that the
certification process harmed relations with Mexico and Colombia without
producing any measurable benefits. Moreover, a double standard appeared to
influence the ultimate decisions. In 1996, trade between the United States
and Colombia totaled $9 billion, while United States-Mexico trade reached
$130 billion. Additionally, Mexico shares a border with the United States,
making Mexican cooperation on a range of issues such as crime, immigration,
and environmental protection essential to Washington.

Media coverage of the certification decisions was intense, especially in
Latin America, where the decisions were widely viewed as demonstrations of
United States imperialism. The idea of being formally judged by the United
States remains objectionable to many countries. During the 1997
certification debate, the Mexican government rejected the concept of
certification, pointing out that the United States is responsible for its
own drug problem and has no right to pass unilateral judgment on other
countries when it does not also judge its own performance. Although
Congress did not overturn the administration's 1997 decision to certify
Mexico, some members of the House of Representatives have indicated that a
similar decision in 1998 will be met with stiff congressional opposition.

In practice, the consequences of decertification vary widely, depending on
a country's reliance on United States and international aid. For major
producer countries such as Burma, which is already isolated from the
international community (and subject to United States sanctions on
investment), the material consequences of decertification are virtually
zero. However, for some countries, such as Bolivia, Haiti, Laos, and
Cambodia, annual United States and multilateral bank aid amounts to a
significant proportion of their gdp, making them especially vulnerable to
the threat of decertification.

Relative vulnerability is only one part of the equation as to whether
United States pressure will affect cooperation; even more important is the
government's capacity to address illicit drug production and trafficking,
as well as the sheer scale of the problem. The degree of United States
leverage does not determine whether pressure will compel action. For
example, the United States has considerable influence over a country like
Haiti, but the Haitian government is so weak, particularly in the area of
law enforcement, that it is largely incapable of producing drug control
results, regardless of United States pressure.

A CERTIFIED FAILURE?

What impact has certification had in its 11-year history? From the United
States perspective, the primary measure of the success of drug control
efforts overseas would be reductions in foreign opium, coca, and marijuana
cultivation as well as declining availability of foreign drug supplies
coming into the United States. Reductions would presumably lead to higher
domestic drug prices. However, worldwide opium production has doubled in
the past decade, while coca production has nearly doubled.

The price and purity of drugs in the United States market are also
traditional measures of drug control success. Reductions in supplies should
make drugs more expensive and less pure (as dealers dilute purity to
maintain profit margins). This in turn should prevent new drug use and
drive addicts to go "cold turkey" or find treatment. However, since 1981,
heroin's average retail price has fallen by more than half while its purity
now approaches 50 percent, compared to only 16 percent in 1986. During the
same period, the price of cocaine has dropped by almost half.

Administration officials point to some successes from the certification
process: increased numbers of arrests of major traffickers in Colombia
following decertification; reorganization of the antinarcotics police in
Mexico after indications of widespread corruption made decertification a
strong possibility in 1997; more vigorous efforts to reduce coca
cultivation by the Bolivian government following national interest waivers
in 1994 and 1995. However, these examples of government action that may
have been influenced by the certification process have not produced
measurable results in terms of reduced drug availability in the United
States, the ultimate goal of United States international drug control
efforts.

The certification process also has negative consequences for other United
States interests. Focusing on one aspect of often complex bilateral
relations can distort the management of foreign policy. In Latin America,
where the process has been especially acrimonious, relations with half a
dozen countries are dominated by United States narcotics control concerns.
The unilateral nature of certification--where the United States passes
judgment on other countries--undermines the administration's position that
the nations of the Western Hemisphere should look to the United States as a
partner in a broader effort to establish a community of democracies.

In the past year, momentum has been building for finding alternatives to
the current certification process. Both the administration and the
Organization of American States (OAS) are exploring new multilateral
approaches to determining whether countries are fully cooperating in
international drug control efforts. Discussion of these new approaches is
on the agenda for the April 1998 Summit of the Americas meeting in
Santiago, Chile. A more comprehensive system that would include an
assessment of United States efforts along with those of other drug
producing, consuming, and transiting countries, could be administered
through an independent organization, perhaps linked to the OAS or the
United Nations. This would broaden the approach beyond its current
unilateral context as well as encourage political recognition of the global
nature of the drug problem.

A KEY TO LASTING PROGRESS

The United States is the world's largest drug market in terms of revenue.
According to the National Household Survey on Drug Abuse, 22 million
Americans reported using illicit drugs at least once in 1996, while 12
million used drugs regularly (once a month or more). During the past five
years, drug use among teens, especially of marijuana, has climbed
dramatically.

What progress has been made in the past decade has come from reduced
demand, which has declined in the face of increasing supplies of ever
cheaper drugs. Between 1986 and 1992, marijuana and cocaine use dropped by
half, reflecting the power of health concerns and negative social attitudes
toward drugs (accelerated by the sudden cocaine overdose death of sports
star Len Bias in 1986). However, public perceptions of the dangers of drugs
have changed, and both adults and teens are more tolerant of drug use than
they were five years ago. Reversing this trend will require intensive
prevention and education efforts that build on the research of the past
decade.

Extensive studies have found that school prevention programs can reduce
drug use by half and new alcohol use by a third among young teens. These
programs, built on social-learning theory, teach children to recognize the
internal and external pressures that influence them to smoke, drink, and
use drugs. Children also learn how to resist these pressures through
role-playing in the classroom. The cost of these programs ranges from $15
to $25 per pupil, including classroom materials and teacher training.
Program results are stronger when prevention includes families, media, and
the community in a comprehensive attack on alcohol, tobacco, and drug use.
Anti-drug ads by the Partnership for a Drug Free America have intensified
negative attitudes toward illegal drugs, particularly in markets where the
ads appear frequently.

Treatment has also proved effective in reducing drug abuse and drug crime.
National studies that have followed tens of thousands of addicts through
different kinds of programs report that the single most important factor in
measuring a program's success is length of time in treatment. One-third of
those who stay in treatment longer than three months are drug-free a year
after leaving treatment. The success rate jumps to two-thirds when
treatment lasts a year or longer. Programs that provide intensive, highly
structured treatment with supportive follow-up services, such as job
training and housing referral, report even better results.

Treatment is less expensive than the alternatives. An untreated addict can
cost society an estimated $44,000 annually, compared with an average of
$19,000 for a year of residential treatment or $2,500 for an outpatient
program. A 1994 statewide study in California found that $1 invested in
alcohol and drug treatment saved taxpayers $7.14 in future costs. Drug
courts, which divert nonviolent drug offenders from prison to
court-supervised treatment, are also cost-effective. Studies report that
drug courts cut recidivism by half among treated offenders at a small
fraction of the cost of incarceration, which runs about $30,000 a year.

Treatment is also more cost-effective than supply reduction efforts.
According to a 1994 RAND Corporation study, $34 million invested in
treatment reduces cocaine use in the United States as much as $783 million
spent for foreign source country supply control programs or $366 million
spent for interdiction. Domestic enforcement produces equivalent results
for about seven times the amount invested in treatment; $246 million in
domestic enforcement reduces cocaine use as much as $34 million in treatment.

MORE MONEY, FEWER RESULTS?

In the past decade, the government's drug control spending has more than
tripled, climbing from $4.7 billion in 1987 to $16 billion in 1997. Most of
this growth has supported domestic drug enforcement and international
interdiction, which account for more than half the total $105 billion spent
on federal drug control since 1989.

The single largest enforcement expenditure is for prisons. Increasing
prison costs stem not only from climbing drug arrests but also from
mandatory federal minimum sentences that have resulted in longer prison
stays for drug offenders. More than 1.7 million people are behind bars in
America. More than two-thirds have serious drug problems, yet intensive,
rigorous treatment is available for less than 10 percent of these
offenders. In 1997, the federal drug budget spent more for prisons than for
prevention.

Although President Clinton has clearly articulated the importance of
reducing the demand for drugs in the 1997 and 1998 National Drug Control
Strategy reports, federal spending priorities have remained essentially
unchanged. Efforts to cut off supplies of drugs through interdiction and
enforcement continue to dominate the government's drug budget, accounting
for two-thirds of total spending.

Despite impressive seizures at the border, on the high seas, and in other
countries, foreign drugs are cheaper and more readily available today than
two decades ago. Domestic production of illegal drugs such as marijuana and
methamphetamines is increasing, further reducing the potential impact of
interdiction on United States drug use. United States foreign supply
reduction efforts have also caused problems of their own, especially in
Latin America, where narcotics control dominates the diplomatic agenda with
the United States. The unintended consequences of these programs have
sometimes been severe, including political unrest among peasant farmers who
rely on drug crops for their livelihood; human rights abuses as governments
try to suppress drug cultivation; increased corruption among police and
military forces; and expanding roles for the military in drug enforcement
and internal security in countries where democracy is still fragile.

Ultimately, the costs incurred--both in the United States and overseas--in
pursuing the supply-side drug strategy will not produce the promised
benefits of reduced drug availability and higher drug prices. The largest
drug profits are made within the United States at street-level sales, not
in foreign poppy or coca fields or on the high seas. The total cost of
cultivating, refining, and smuggling cocaine to the United States accounts
for less than 15 percent of domestic retail prices. Recent anecdotal
evidence from the southwestern United States suggests that smuggling costs
may have increased as a result of intensified border interdiction: Mexican
traffickers are said to be offering as much as half their cocaine shipments
in exchange for safe passage. Still, the value of drugs at that point is
only a fraction of their retail price on American streets. As one DEA
official explained, "The average drug organization can afford to lose as
much as 80 percent of its product and still be profitable."

MAKING DEMAND THE FOCUS

The nation's drug control strategy should shift from a primary focus on
reducing drug supplies to reducing the demand for drugs through prevention,
education, treatment, and community anti-drug coalitions. Law enforcement
has a critically important role to play; studies indicate that street-level
enforcement is more effective in driving up drug prices and has the added
benefit of making neighborhoods safer. In the international arena, greater
emphasis should be placed on attacking the growing power of the drug
cartels that challenge the integrity of political, financial, and judicial
institutions in this country and abroad. The United States should
concentrate on efforts both to strengthen democratic governments and to
combat money laundering, drug-related corruption, and violence through
bilateral and multilateral initiatives. For too long, United States drug
policy has been driven by the need to appear "tough" on drugs, regardless
of results. The United States should leave behind the distinction between
"tough" and "soft" approaches to drug abuse and concentrate its attention,
research, and resources on determining what actually works.

Copyright © 1998 by Current History, Inc.