COCAINE AND THE HIGH COST OF HELICOPTERS

White House, Congress Feud Over Extent of U.S. Anti-Drug Support for Colombia

SAN JOSE DEL GUAVIARE, Colombia—On a government airstrip here in the
sweltering heart of a no man's land roamed by Marxist guerrillas,

drug traffickers and right-wing death squads sits a row of six UH-1H
helicopters, the primary weapon Colombian police have to combat both the
flow of drugs to the United States and the spread of lawlessness here.

But the helicopters can't fly. They are part of an aging fleet of 36 "Hueys"
provided to Colombia by the United States -- most of which have been
grounded over the past two months because of mechanical problems, seriously
eroding the ability of police to find and destroy cocaine and heroin
laboratories, detect clandestine airstrips and interdict drug shipments
flowing northward.

"Virtually all our interdiction activities have been halted, from moving
troops to destroying labs and landing strips," said a senior official of
Colombia's anti-drug police. "There are 140 troops here with nothing to do.
The narcos are moving more stuff than ever because they know we can't do
anything about it. This situation is unprecedented for us."

Helicopters are vital to drug interdiction because there are no roads
through the jungle, distances are vast, detection of laboratories from the
ground is virtually impossible and access by river is slow and dangerous.
But virtually all 36 Hueys here have been grounded by structural flaws
brought on by age; most were used by U.S. forces in the Vietnam War. In the
past 10 days, 15 have undergone emergency repairs that allow them to resume
flying temporarily, State Department officials said, but for how long is
unclear.

In addition to stalling interdiction activities, the grounding of the
helicopters has fanned an acrimonious debate between the White House and
congressional Republicans over the kinds of anti-drug aid that the United
States should be giving Colombia, which produces 80 percent of the world's
cocaine and a growing portion of its heroin.

The dispute has led to a congressional freeze on $36 million that the
administration wanted to spend in Bolivia and Colombia to pay for drug
eradication and crop substitution efforts. Senior administration officials
say the freeze will undercut programs that have helped sharply reduce the
cultivation of coca leaf -- the raw material for making cocaine -- in both
Peru and Bolivia.

The debate is one element of a broad battle involving the White House,
Congress and the Pentagon over what role the United States should play in
Colombia. Not only do drug traffickers exercise considerable economic and
political influence here in southern Colombia, but some are closely allied
with Marxist guerrillas of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, while
others are closely allied with right-wing paramilitary groups that operate
with the tolerance and support of the army and have little regard for human
rights.

The Clinton administration is trying to walk a fine line, aiding the
Colombian police and army in combating drug trafficking without becoming
involved in the government's counterinsurgency efforts -- a line senior
administration officials concede is often blurred at best. Many in Congress,
especially on the Republican side, are pressing the administration to take a
more active role in Colombia's anti-guerrilla campaign and increase aid to
the military and police because there is now little distinction between
rebel forces and drug suppliers.

Rep. Benjamin A. Gilman (R-N.Y.), who chairs the House Committee on
International Relations, has been demanding that the administration upgrade
Colombia's police helicopter fleet by spending the $36 million on three
UH-60 Black Hawk helicopters because they can carry more troops, fly higher
and are less susceptible to ground fire than the Hueys. Non-binding language
urging the purchase was included in the fiscal 1997 budget.

The State Department argues that the older Hueys can be upgraded and
repaired much more cheaply and that the Colombian police do not have the
training or budget to maintain the Black Hawks.

"A Huey costs $1.4 million [to buy] and $925 an hour to fly," said a senior
administration official. "That is versus $8 million for a Black Hawk with an
operating cost of $2,250 an hour. Black Hawks are not cost effective, and
the Colombians don't need that much capability."

Earlier, Barry McCaffrey, the Clinton administration's anti-drug policy
chief, said that the administration opposes buying the Black Hawks because
"this massive diversion of scarce resources would result in a 75 percent cut
in U.S. support to Bolivia and huge decrements for our counter-drug programs
in the Caribbean, Mexico and Peru. The cost of procuring and operating three
Black Hawk helicopters would degrade our ongoing anti-drug efforts in
Colombia and undermine regional success against the cocaine trade."

On Friday, the State Department notified Congress and Gilman that it would
not purchase the Black Hawks. Gilman, in a letter sent Monday to Thomas R.
Pickering, undersecretary of state for political affairs, accused the
administration of "trying to fight the war on drugs on the cheap" and said
that upgrading the existing fleet of Hueys had been promised by the
administration for the past two years but never carried out.

"It makes no sense to merely upgrade 40-year-old equipment that is already
grounded or not operating and cannot survive crashes or ground fire as well
as the Black Hawk," Gilman wrote. "Let's get serious and fight this scourge
with the tools and equipment our good friends . . . want and need to fight
our fight, at its source."

On Monday, Gilman exercised his power as committee chairman to place a hold
on the $36 million, meaning that if the money is not spent on Black Hawks,
it cannot be spent at all.

There is no end in sight to the stalemate. "The tragedy is that nothing is
flying in Colombia, and if the State Department would have upgraded when we
asked them to they could be flying now," said a Republican congressional
aide. "This administration is quickly losing any and all credibility
fighting the war on drugs in Colombia."

"We have offered Gilman briefings on our alternative proposals, which he has
not accepted," an administration official countered. "The situation in
Colombia is very serious. We will try to work with others on the Hill who
are more supportive of our position."

Colombia's Anti-Drug Drive Bogs Down

Cocaine producers in Colombia recently have been able to move drugs and
other material practically unimpeded because aging U.S.-provided police
helicopters have been grounded due to mechanical problems and there are not
enough funds for new ones.

The cultivation area for coca leaf in Colombia has grown steadily over the
past few years . . .

(This graphic was not available)

. . . and last year Colombia became the largest producer of coca leaf, the
raw product for cocaine.

Peru 36.5%

Bolivia 24.3%

Colombia 39.2%

SOURCE: Drug Enforcement Agency

© Copyright 1998 The Washington Post Company