[continued from part 1]

The law has helped fuel a bonanza for special operations forces. Not only
have they escaped the military downsizing of the 1990s, they now have a
larger force -- 47,000 people -- than at any time in their history. Their
diverse skills and flexibility have made them a model for other troops
dispatched around the globe during a decade dominated by nontraditional
missions involving peacekeeping, drug interdiction and humanitarian crises,
from Bosnia to Haiti to Somalia.

The increasing importance of special operations forces in the field has
coincided with the decline in civilian foreign aid and U.S. diplomatic
presence in some regions and the military's withdrawal from many permanent
overseas bases. Increasingly, American soldiers have taken on jobs that
once belonged almost exclusively to civilian diplomats, spreading U.S.
influence, discreetly forging new alliances and cultivating contacts among
foreign leaders.

"Our CINCs are being told they have to shape the environment and we're well
suited for that," said Brig. Gen. John Scales, until this summer deputy
commander of the U.S. Army's Special Forces Command.

JCETs still provide a way to train U.S. troops. For example, the 1st
Special Forces Group based in Okinawa, Japan, accommodates Japanese
political sensitivities by practicing parachuting in Thailand. Reluctance
by U.S. cities to allow training in urban warfare tactics has led to JCETs
in Singapore, Lithuania and India. Since the art of jungle tracking has
been all but lost among U.S. forces, they now train in Malaysia or the
upper jungles of Irian Jaya in Indonesia. When the Air Force's 352nd
Special Operations Group, based in England, has needed to practice flying
low and without lights at night, they have gone to mountainous Morocco.

But most of the training exercises made possible by Section 2011 appear to
have more ambitious goals, with implications across a broad range of U.S.
foreign policy.

In once communist or Soviet-aligned countries such as Kazakhstan,
Madagascar, Mongolia, Russia and Uzbekistan, JCETs have been used as
ice-breaking "first dates" with former adversaries. Plans are in the works
for the first such exercises involving U.S. and Chinese troops next year.

In the Persian Gulf, when the Pentagon wanted to beef up ground troops
without attracting attention during the confrontation with Iraq earlier
this year, it nearly doubled the number of special operations forces
participating in "Iris Gold," a nearly continuous JCET in Kuwait. The 234
U.S. troops then became part of the planned operation against Iraq.

In Laos, Cambodia, Namibia, Mozambique, Zimbabwe and Chad -- where the
United States was perceived as either a hostile or aloof power during the
Cold War -- special operations forces have given courses on the relatively
neutral subject of removing land mines. Because the troops are forbidden by
law from actually removing mines, they may be less helpful to the host
countries than civilian technicians. But the exercises are valued as a foot
in the door for more traditional military alliances with countries still
skittish about U.S. ties, according to U.S. officials.

"There is definitely a political card played with these JCETs," said Wayne
A. Downing, commander of U.S. Special Operations Command from 1993 to 1996.
"They are a direct instrument of U.S. foreign policy. They may be the most
direct and most involved, tangible, physical part of U.S. foreign policy in
certain countries."

Staving Off Instability

In October 1997, in a housing project under construction by the Lippo Group
conglomerate about 18 miles outside Jakarta, 12 U.S. Army Special Forces
troops diagramed a straightforward mission: Find the enemy somewhere in a
warren of plywood rooms, blow a hole in the wall and kill or capture as
many as possible while trying not to shoot each other.

The participants in the staged drama were 60 troops from Indonesia's
special forces unit, Kopassus, and the Jakarta area military command, Kodam
Jaya. Using the U.S. Army's "laser tag" equipment and, for atmospherics, a
couple of Puma and Super Puma helicopters, American commanders were
teaching the Indonesians how to plan and conduct close-quarters combat and
other of the finer points of urban warfare.

"We just show them how we do it and they adopted what they want," said a
U.S. defense analyst in Indonesia who has taken part in many bilateral
exercises. The analyst, who was interviewed in the presence of the U.S.
Embassy's public affairs officer but asked not to be named, said that only
with some exercises could he make the case that training U.S. troops was
the main goal.

No type of JCET training is in greater demand around the world today than
instruction in "foreign internal defense," a concept refined in successive
battles against communism that has survived the end of the superpower
struggle. It remains "our bread and butter," said Maj. Thaddeus McWhorter
of the U.S. Army Special Forces Command.

The internal defense training also illustrates perhaps more clearly than
any other type how JCETs can be used in the service of other agendas,
including domestic concerns in the countries where the training occurs.

Instruction in "fid" has contributed to some of the most celebrated
episodes in the history of the special forces, including a 1967 mission to
Bolivia to train and equip a new Bolivian Ranger Battalion. Several days
after that exercise ended, the Bolivian unit, with the help of the CIA,
captured and executed the Argentine revolutionary Ernesto "Che" Guevara,
"putting an end to the insurgency and completing a classic example of a
foreign internal defense mission," according to a U.S. special operations
publication.

Today, in countries including Indonesia, Bangladesh, Fiji, Madagascar,
Malaysia, Singapore, Honduras, Panama and Argentina, where armed domestic
opposition is negligible or nonexistent, U.S. forces are teaching armies
how to track down opponents, surprise them in helicopter attacks, kill them
with more proficiency or, in some cases, how to lead house-to-house raids
in "close quarters combat" designed for cities.

Instead of communism, the enemy described in current exercises is often
internal unrest that could threaten a government. "We are setting the
conditions for stability by insuring security," said a high-ranking officer
at the U.S. Pacific Command. "The threat of instability, that is the major
threat."

The purpose of exercises focusing on "fid" -- far from the training of U.S.
troops mandated by Section 2011 -- is "to organize, train, advise, and
assist" a foreign military so that it can "free and protect its society
from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency," according to Field Manual
31-20, "Doctrine for Special Forces Operations," issued in April 1990 and
still in use.

Promoting stability has sometimes placed U.S. troops in the midst of
internal disputes. In May 1997, the 3rd Special Forces Group was in Sierra
Leone teaching light infantry skills to 300 troops of the president's honor
and security guard when other officers carried out a coup. Members of the
3rd Group, who ended up helping evacuate U.S. Embassy workers, said
recently that none of the soldiers they were training was involved in the
coup. But Johnny Paul Koromah, the brother of the commander of the camp
where they were staying, was its instigator and took power as a result.

In Sri Lanka, U.S. military training is described in a fiscal 1999 report
to Congress by the State Department as an effort to "train key military
leaders in human rights principles and procedures." In fact, in "fid"
exercises the Green Berets and SEALS have trained the Sri Lankan army in
long-range patrolling, tactical reconnaissance, rapid reaction air and sea
attacks and maritime operations that are aimed at depriving Tamil rebels of
easy access to supply bases in Tamil Nadu across the Palk Strait in India,
according to Defense documents and interviews. At least 500 Sri Lankan and
115 U.S. troops were involved in the 1996 and 1997 exercises. More have
taken place this year.

While traditionally "fid" training "implies an active insurgency," in the
words of a senior Army Special Forces officer, this is not always the case
on the ground. In September 1996, 106 U.S. troops went to Panama on a
foreign internal defense exercise that included maritime operations, light
infantry training and live fire exercises. Months before, 84 U.S. special
operations forces trained 97 Ecuadorans in riverine operations, aerial
supply, close air support and airborne operations described as a "FID" in
defense documents.

In the case of Indonesia, where, according to intelligence officials, no
external military threat exists and where the internal insurgency amounts
to several hundred poorly armed guerrillas, the Indonesian military viewed
as "subversive" the many students, church people and political activists
opposed to the 31-year military rule of President Suharto, who stepped down
in May.

U.S. military personnel in Indonesia insisted they do not teach Indonesians
how to suppress domestic opponents. But the kind of training exercises they
undertake focuses on mock internal enemies, and some Indonesian officers,
asked about what they are learning from the Americans, hold this view.

Five months after last year's urban warfare exercises near Jakarta, U.S.
special operations forces went to Serang, on the northwest part of the
island of Java, with another Kopassus unit, where they helped set off
claymore mines and grenades and taught troops how to rappel from
helicopters and conduct quick extractions. At Chamara, on the Javanese
coast, they organized a mock sea-launched assault on a communications
center. U.S. troops were instructed in tracking and countertracking tactics
by Indonesians who specialize in jungle warfare.

U.S. military officials said the exercises are an important part of an
American effort to rebuild a strong regional presence diminished after the
U.S. closed its bases in the Philippines in 1992. They also described them
as a chance to plant U.S. military traditions in the most powerful
institution in the world's fifth most populous country.

The training "exposes Indonesian officers to the American system," said
Salim Said, an Indonesian political scientist. "It wouldn't suddenly change
this country, but it will help expose them to a democratic system.
Democracy is a culture."

In interviews, Indonesians emphasized the practical application and status
connected to the exercises -- several officers with the closest American
ties are at the top of the institution.

"Our real opponent is the internal riot," said a three-star Indonesian
general interviewed in Jakarta this spring as the student-led riots were in
full bloom. The United States "teaches us how to stop civilian
disturbances."

Rights by Example

When the Indonesian program came to light amid civil unrest that led to
Suharto's downfall, members of Congress summoned administration officials
for closed-door briefings to explain the origins and purpose of the
training, and the reasons they had not been informed.

Cohen postponed a planned Indonesian exercise but did not cancel the
program. He pledged to improve reports to Congress about the missions and
to have SOLIC approve all training on a quarterly basis.

Holmes, who as the head of SOLIC has responsibility for all special
operations missions, described the quarterly reviews, which have not yet
begun, as "not an approval process," but "a final check." This is being
done, he said, because "we're good listeners" and Congress has asked for
increased oversight, not because he or the Defense Department believes
there is a problem with the program.

Holmes said he is satisfied that the U.S. ambassadors and the regional
commanders in chief are properly coordinating the exercises with U.S.
foreign policy goals in mind. Putting himself, the National Security
Council or senior State Department officials into the mix "isn't necessary
because we have confidence in the judgment and management of the program."

But although responsibility for the program falls to the CINCs, they often
do not even share a common definition of the term JCET, making accounting
haphazard at best.

In the case of Colombia, for example, the U.S. Southern Command responded
to an initial Washington Post inquiry by saying there were no JCETs in the
country last year. Later, the command said that 29 exercises involving 319
U.S. troops had actually taken place. Nevertheless, the Defense
Department's official report to Congress for 1997 lists just three JCETs in
Colombia involving 143 American troops.

When pressed to justify deployments that appeared to hold little direct
benefit for U.S. troops, officials advance a variety of explanations. In
some cases they maintain that by training foreign troops, U.S. forces were
learning how to train foreign troops, one of their main official missions.

That explanation, they said, includes missions such as in El Salvador,
where the 7th Special Forces Group provided near-continuous basic training
to Salvadoran Army recruits in areas of the country previously in guerrilla
hands. The training was scaled back recently after U.S. officials
eventually concluded that it was too time-consuming and brought little
benefit to U.S. troops.

Officials point out that special operations forces also collect valuable
information on everything from topography to the backgrounds of foreign
leaders during exercises. They learn about a country's edible and poisonous
plants, insects and animals, about water currents and prevailing winds,
about what twigs in a forest crack under a human footfall. They improve
their language skills and knowledge of foreign cultures, and can evaluate
the readiness of foreign troops, special operations officials say.

U.S. troops return from trips with "stacks of maps, stacks of photos," said
one Pentagon official. Reports describe landing sites and other information
that could be used in an evacuation of U.S. personnel or in humanitarian
relief operations.

However, clearly detailed accounts of the missions are not shared with
Congress, the public or senior foreign policymakers. Although the Pentagon
files annual reports to lawmakers about JCETs, Defense Department officials
acknowledged that the reports, which were declassified for the first time
this year, are vague and difficult to decipher. In March, before the
Indonesia controversy, Pentagon officials requested that Congress repeal
the reporting requirement, calling it "unduly burdensome."

The resistance to greater oversight has extended to the handling of human
rights issues.

At the request of Congress and the civilian Pentagon leadership, many
training exercises include some instruction on the treatment of prisoners
of war and noncombatants and on U.S. and international standards of human
rights. However, military officials argue that evaluating units for human
rights violators -- as is required under other programs -- would be
counterproductive, and perhaps endanger the missions.

"Because we're dealing with [individual military] units and you can't tell
the host nation who they can have in those units," said a senior SOLIC
official who asked not to be named. In some countries, even mentioning
human rights sometimes "puts the program at risk."

In practical terms, said Brig. Gen. John Scales of the U.S. Army Special
Forces Command, "You can't go in there and give them training on human
rights; it's by your example" that they learn.

For the past two months, Defense officials have insisted that JCETs will
not be affected by restrictions imposed on all other defense programs by a
new law, sponsored by Sen. Patrick J. Leahy (D-Vt.), prohibiting U.S. aid
to any unit of a foreign security force that has been implicated in gross
human rights violations.

But that view may soon be changing.

In response to questions raised by The Washington Post, State Department
spokesman Jamie Rubin said Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright intends
to require U.S. ambassadors to use their authority over the scheduling of
U.S. military activities to ensure that foreign troops with whom the U.S.
military plans to train are vetted for human rights abuses.

"As a general rule," Rubin said in an interview yesterday, "we believe that
programs in which American military forces engage with units of other
military governments serve an important purpose" as part of U.S. engagement
strategy around the world.

"What we need to do is make sure . . . they are not assisting units that
are gross violators of human rights," Rubin said. "Secretary Albright is
determined to do all we can at the embassy level to make sure" that such
assistance does not take place.

It remains unclear how these efforts to increase civilian oversight would
work or whether the Pentagon will accept them. But in response to initial
proposals that Holmes, the Pentagon civilian who oversees special
operations, have greater input into the process, former special operations
commander Downing said they would hobble the program.

"That really scares me," he said. "That means the bureaucrats will get back
in and do their thing. The people who should have control are the people
who actually do things."

Researcher Robert Thomasson and The Washington Post's News Research Center
staff contributed to this report.

Copyright 1998 The Washington Post Company

Checked-by: (Joel W. Johnson)