Testimony of BARRY R. MCCAFFREY, Director, Office of National Drug Control
Policy, Before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the Senate Caucus
on International Narcotics Control, On the WESTERN HEMISPHERE DRUG
ELIMINATION ACT, September 16, 1998

Introduction

Chairmen Coverdell and Grassley, Caucus and Committee members, thank you
for the opportunity to testify on U.S. drug interdiction efforts. All of us
at the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) appreciate your
longstanding support and interest in all aspects of drug control policy, as
well as the guidance and leadership of the Caucus and the Committee. We all
appreciate this opportunity to share our views of the Western Hemisphere
Drug Elimination Act.

As you know, goals 4 (Shield America's air, land and sea frontiers from the
drug threat) and five (Break drug sources of supply) of the ten-year 1998
National Drug Control Strategy focus on reducing the availability of
illegal drugs within the United States. The Strategy's mid-term goal is to
reduce illegal drug availability by 25 percent by the year 2002; our
long-term goal is to reduce availability by 50 percent by the year 2007.

In March, we submitted to you a detailed set of Performance Measures of
Effectiveness. The nucleus of the system consists of twelve targets that
define specific results to be achieved under the Strategy's five goals.
Eighty-two supporting performance measures delineate mid-term and long-term
outcomes for the Strategy's thirty-two supporting objectives. Our basic aim
is to reduce drug use and availability by 50 percent in the next ten years.
These measures of effectiveness were developed in full consultation with
all federal drug-control program agencies. The Strategy's mid-term Goal 4
objective is to reduce by 10 percent the rate at which illegal drugs
successfully enter the United States by the year 2002. The long-term
objective is a 20 percent reduction in this rate by the year 2007. The
Strategy's mid-term (5-year) objective for goal 5 is a 15 percent reduction
in the flow of illegal drugs from source countries; the long-term (10-year)
objective is a 30 percent reduction. ONDCP also submitted for the Congress'
consideration the first-ever five year federal drug control budget. It is
our view that the Strategy, the Performance Measures of Effectiveness, and
the Budget Summary outline a credible program for reducing drug use and its
consequences and drug availability.

An Update on Cocaine-Control Efforts in the Western Hemisphere

Potential cocaine production declined significantly in 1997. Our source
country strategy has achieved greatest success in Peru, contributing to a
disruption of the Peruvian cocaine economy. Peruvian coca cultivation
declined by 27 percent last year, and is down 40 percent in the last two
years. Bolivia has achieved modest decreases in coca cultivation and
potential cocaine production over the last two years. However, these gains
have been partially offset by surging coca cultivation in Colombia.
Colombia now has more hectares of coca under cultivation than any other
country. The area under cultivation has increased by 56 percent in the past
two years. Nonetheless, total Andean cultivation declined seven percent and
estimates of total potential cocaine production declined by 15 percent --
from 760 to 650 metric tons in 1997. This is the lowest figure this decade.
An analysis of the situation in each of the three South American cocaine
producing countries follows:

Bolivia. Bolivia eradicated 3,934 hectares in the first six months of 1998,
compared to 2,858 for the same period in 1997. This promising outcome
underscores the Banzer administration's resolve to confront the coca trade.
Earlier this year, President Banzer released a national strategy entitled
Con Dignidad that establishes the objective of eliminating illicit coca
cultivation within five years. The Government of Bolivia estimated in their
anti-drug strategy that the total financing requirement to meet their
objective of completely withdrawing from the coca-cocaine circuit between
1998 and 2002 would require 952 million dollars to support alternative
development, eradication, prevention and rehabilitation. Thirty-five
thousand Bolivian families currently depend on the illegal cocaine trade
for their livelihood. It is unlikely that the international community will
provide Bolivia the support its government believes is required to attain
this ambitious objective.

Colombia. As a result of surging coca cultivation, Colombia now grows more
hectares of coca than Peru or Bolivia. Colombia also continues to be the
world's leading producer of cocaine HCl, processing much of Peru's coca
base. It will be difficult to achieve a decrease in cocaine production in
Colombia in the short term. The current conditions (weak government,
security forces not in control of substantial areas of the country,
increasingly stronger guerrilla and paramilitary forces, weak legitimate
economy, broken judicial system, and official corruption) are conducive to
drug trafficking and will take time to reverse. The new Pastrana
administration has stated its commitment to tackling these issues, but it
would not be realistic to expect a complete turn around in a short period
of time.

ONDCP believes that we will see continued expansion of coca cultivation,
especially in areas outside of the Colombian Government's effective
control. The aggressive aerial eradication campaign being conducted by the
Colombian National Police with the help from the U.S. State Department will
only slow this expansion. Colombian trafficking organizations appear to be
determined to offset declines in Bolivian and Peruvian coca production with
increased domestic production. The recent national narco-guerrilla
offensive and the resulting significant military defeats suggest that
Colombian security forces will not be able to conduct effective anti-drug
operations in regions where guerrilla forces are dominant and control the
ground.

Peru. Through June, Peru's manual eradication program had met 75 percent of
its 1998 target of 4,800 hectares. The overall impact on production has
been limited because efforts have focused on semi-abandoned fields in
national forests. Peruvian Drug Czar Marino Costa Bauer stated in June that
record-low coca leaf prices combined with continuing eradication efforts
would result in the virtual elimination of illicit coca cultivation in Peru
within five years. However, it would seem unlikely that coca leaf prices
will remain low if demand in consumer nations exceeds the available supply.

1997 saw significant cocaine seizures in the transit zone. Drugs coming to
the United States from South America pass through a six-million square-mile
area that is roughly the size of the continental United States. This
transit zone includes the Caribbean, Mexico, Central America, the Gulf of
Mexico, and the eastern Pacific Ocean. Event-based estimates suggest that
perhaps 430 metric tons of cocaine passed through the transit zone in 1997,
and 85 metric tons were seized there; 60 percent more than in 1996. 1997
was the third consecutive year of increased transit-zone seizures. Coast
Guard supported cocaine seizures in 1997 totaled 47 metric tons. U.S.
interdiction operations in the Caribbean focused on Puerto Rico with good
results. Thirteen metric tons of cocaine were seized in the Puerto Rico
area. Interdiction operations contributed to a reduction in the flow of
cocaine to the island, forcing traffickers to divert shipments to the
Dominican Republic and Haiti. Drug-related crime in Puerto Rico plunged by
37 percent.

1998 cocaine seizures are on a par with 1997's levels. An estimated 127
metric tons of cocaine were seized worldwide (excluding U.S. internal
seizures) during the first six months of this year. This amount is slightly
less than the corresponding 1997 figure of 131 metric tons. Transit zone
seizures were about 45 metric tons compared to 43 metric tons during the
same time in 1997. Seizures in Central America totaled 19 metric tons,
nearly double the ten metric tons seized during the same period in 1997.
Mexican seizures of 15 metric tons are below last year's corresponding
figure of 24 metric tons. Seizures in the Caribbean totaled about 14 metric
tons, up from 9 metric tons for the same period in 1997. Within the arrival
zone, U.S. law enforcement agencies have seized 36 metric tons, compared
with 24 tons during the same time in 1997.

Trafficking trends: January - June 1998. Peru continues to export most of
its coca base to Colombia for processing into cocaine HCl and subsequent
smuggling to consumer nations. Traffickers are exploiting the plentiful
waterways in northern Peru to move cocaine base. They are also prepared to
revert to the use of aircraft as the primary means of transportation should
we let up on the successful airbridge denial campaign. The movement of
cocaine HCl from processing locations to international departure points
within Colombia is mostly undetected. An estimated 232 metric tons were
smuggled out of South America destined for the United States:

Mexico/Central America corridor. Fifty-two percent (121 metric tons) of the
cocaine destined for the United States is estimated to have been routed
along this corridor. Fifty-four metric tons were seized along this
corridor, 34 in the transit zone and 20 in the arrival zone. Sixty-seven
metric tons were estimated to have entered the United States via this
corridor.

Caribbean corridor. Thirty-two percent (74 metric tons) is estimated to
have passed through the Caribbean. Fourteen metric tons were seized along
this corridor, 11 in the transit zone and 3 in the arrival zone. Sixty
metric tons were estimated to have entered the United States via this
corridor.

Direct Transportation. Sixteen percent (37 metric tons) is estimated to
have proceeded directly from South America to the United States. Thirteen
metric tons were seized in the arrival zone. Twenty-four metric tons were
estimated to have entered the United States via this corridor.

In summary, an estimated 232 metric tons of cocaine departed South America
in the first six months of this year. Forty-five metric tons were seized in
the transit zone, while 36 were seized in the arrival zone. An estimated
153 metric tons were smuggled into the United States during this period.
One third of the cocaine destined for the United States was interdicted in
either the transit or the arrival zones. This interdiction performance is
consistent with that of previous years, but it is not good enough. We need
to do better.

Smuggling techniques continue to change in response to interdiction
efforts. Traffickers continue to move cocaine via a wide variety of modes
and conveyances and to adapt their methods and routes to avoid detection
and apprehension.

Mexico/Central America corridor. Containerized commercial cargo is a common
method for smuggling cocaine into the Duty Free Zone in Colon, Panama.
Cocaine is transported in smaller quantities in both commercial and private
vehicles along the Pan-American Highway in Central America to reduce the
risk of detection. Cocaine is also introduced throughout Central America
via maritime commerce. Seizure data along the U.S. - Mexico border suggests
that cocaine is evenly distributed between commercial cargo and private cars.

Caribbean corridor. Traffickers mostly use non-commercial aircraft and
non-commercial maritime vessels to smuggle cocaine into Caribbean islands.
Haiti has become a more prominent transshipment point despite our efforts
to develop capable law enforcement agencies. "Go-fast" boats travel with
virtual impunity between Colombia and Haiti. Airdrops off the southern
Haitian coast are common. Cocaine passing through Haiti either is smuggled
directly to the United States and Western Europe or is routed through the
Bahamas, the Dominican Republic, or Puerto Rico. Traffickers also use small
aircraft and go-fast boats to deliver cocaine to Puerto Rico. There are
reports that traffickers track U.S. Coast Guard movements and select the
time and location of deliveries to avoid interdiction. Recent interdiction
operations illustrate how traffickers are operating.

On July 9th, the USS John L. Hall (FFG 32) intercepted two go-fast boats
off the coast of Panama and seized 2,000 pounds of cocaine.

On July 24th, the Coast Guard Cutter Gallatin conducted a consensual
boarding of the coastal freighter Apemagu and discovered numerous
suspicious items. The Apemagu was escorted to Guantanamo Bay where a
detailed search found 1500 pounds of cocaine.

On August 4th, a Coast Guard aircraft from Air Station Miami tracked a
42-foot go-fast boat with three 200HP outboard engines as it rounded the
eastern corner of Cuba and proceeded through Cuban territorial seas toward
Long Island, Bahamas. Two helicopters from Operation Bahamas Turks and
Caicos detected the boat near Long Island and dropped off law enforcement
agents who seized the vessel, a vehicle that linked up with it, 1600 pounds
of marijuana and an undetermined amount of cocaine.

On August 14th, the USS John L. Hall detected and intercepted a 35-foot
speedboat off the coast of Panama and recovered forty-one bales of cocaine
jettisoned by the speedboat's crew.

Also on August 14th, the Coast Guard Cutter Valiant located and boarded a
suspected drug smuggling boat (the Isamar) off the coast of Haiti,
detecting numerous indicators of drug smuggling. Valiant's boarding team
requested and received permission to remain onboard the Isamar until it
docked in the Miami River. A joint Coast Guard, Customs, DEA, and FBI team
boarded the vessel in the Miami River and found 5,100 pounds of cocaine.

Direct Transportation. Commercial cargo (both air and maritime) and air
passengers (human mules) are frequently used to smuggle cocaine and heroin
from South America to the United States. Traffickers route mules through
third countries (e.g. Argentina and Chile) to minimize U.S. Customs'
attention and avoid fitting "profiles." Cargo containers and agricultural
shipments are commonly used to conceal cocaine in commercial vessels.

Interdiction and Deterrence studies. In the Classified Annex of the 1997
National Drug Control Strategy, ONDCP tasked the USIC to conduct an
Interdiction Study to determine what resources are required to attain the
Strategy's interdiction goals. In response, USIC and the interagency have
assessed requirements in both the source and transit zones to accomplish
goals specified in Presidential Decision Directive 14, the National Drug
Control Strategy, and the USIC Interdiction Guidance for 1998 which
identifies Southeastern Colombia as the center of gravity for the cocaine
industry. ONDCP, Customs, and the Coast Guard are conducting a study of the
deterrence value of interdiction operations in the source, transit and
arrival zones. Our intent is to develop models to assist commanders as they
decide where and when to employ interdiction assets.

The need for improved capabilities in the arrival zone. We face
considerable drug-control challenges along our air, land, and sea
frontiers. The Administration has made considerable strides strengthening
enforcement along the Southwest border and the Southern tier which
represents a significant drug-control challenge along the nation's air, sea
and land borders. From 1993 to 1997, the Administration increased funding
by over 40 percent for the Coast Guard, Customs and Immigration and
Naturalization Service to support border enforcement activities along the
Southern tier. This funding translated into more than 2,400 additional
Customs and INS inspectors, 2,800 new Border Patrol agents and
force-multiplying enforcement technology such as x-rays and border sensors
and cameras. Despite the great strides this Administration has made to
strengthen our border, we estimate that only 20 percent of the cocaine
crossing the border is seized.

Analysis of the Western Hemisphere Drug Elimination Act

The focus that members of Congress and their professional staff have
devoted to this Bill reflects our shared commitment to ensuring our
supply-reduction programs are effective. The Bill contains many useful
ideas and budgetary initiatives. However, we have serious concerns with
certain aspects of the Bill, including:

The legislation's primary goal of reducing the flow of illegal drugs into
the United States by not less than 80 percent by December 31, 2001 is
completely unrealistic. It is unlikely that the amount of cocaine departing
South America for the U.S. market will decline appreciably before December
2001. Given that historically combined interdiction rates for cocaine in
the transit and arrival zones have averaged about 33 percent, it is
unlikely that this figure can be changed so dramatically in the next three
and a half years. Consequently, reducing the flow of cocaine by 80 percent
is not feasible. Furthermore, much of the equipment the legislation would
authorize would not be fielded for several years and could not be deployed
in time to work towards this objective. It is impossible to develop over
the next four years political, criminal justice, and law enforcement
institutions that are capable of standing up to the pressures exerted by
drug trafficking international criminal organizations in all major source
and transit countries. Absent such essential partners, the United States
cannot unilaterally achieve this success rate. Legislating this goal would
place an empty slogan instead of realistic strategy in front of the
American people.

Interdiction success is not the main determinant of illegal drug
consumption. The reason that 50 percent of high school seniors smoke
marijuana before graduation is not because foreign drugs are flooding the
United States. Societal acceptance of illegal drug use, low risk
perception, peer example, and drug availability -- much of it from domestic
sources -- are all contributing factors. Marijuana usage accounts for about
90 percent of all juvenile illegal drug use. We are responding to this
problem appropriately with the National Youth Anti-Drug Media Campaign, by
addressing shortcomings in the Safe and Drug-free Schools program, by
supporting community anti-drug coalitions, and by expanding treatment
availability. In the end, we will solve the drug problem in America
principally by decreasing demand for a drugged lifestyle. Supply reduction
is also crucial, but only by taking a multi-pronged and balanced approach
to the nation's drug problem can we hope to succeed.

The specific legislative enhancements proposed by this Bill are not tied to
a coherent strategy. The Bill fails to develop an overarching concept. It
is neither linked to the existing drug threat nor tied to a clear strategic
vision or operational concept. Instead, it mandates a series of tactical
resource allocation decisions. The drug-control budgets, which the
Executive Branch has submitted for congressional consideration, are tied to
the goals, objectives, and performance measures elaborated in the ten-year
National Drug Control Strategy. In sum, this Bill is micro-management of
drug tactics based on a shallow analysis of the problem and our available
tools.

The legislation lacks flexibility. The Bill would impose inflexible
requirements. Its provisions are too specific. For example:

"2 Schweizer observation/spray aircraft (to be piloted by pilots under
contract with the United States)."

"Acquisition of concertina wire and tunneling detection systems at the La
Picota prison of the National Police of Colombia."

"Forward deployment of 5 riverine operations maintenance platforms."

"Establishment of a third drug interdiction site at Puerto Maldonado, Peru."

"2 mobile x-ray machines ...for placement along the Chapare highway." The
locations of such machines should not be specified by statute but left to
the discretion of commanders on the ground.

"...operation and maintenance of 1 J-31 observation aircraft."

Wisely, the Congress never thought to tell General Norman Schwarzkopf where
to deploy his armored forces during operation Desert Storm or when and how
to attack. It would be inappropriate for the Congress to interfere in
decisions that are properly those of duly appointed leaders, law
enforcement officials, U.S. diplomatic personnel, unified commanders, the
Secretary of State, and other responsible officials within the Executive
Branch. This legislative approach would be bad government.

The Bill proposes authorizations that are far in excess of expected
appropriations and the President's budget without specifying where these
funds will come from. The Bill would authorize $2.6 billion in
appropriations in addition to those already authorized for fiscal years
1999-2001. To date, Congress has not appropriated funds for many of the
Administration's pending anti-drug abuse requests.

The legislation infringes on the authority of the President and the
Secretary of State. The bill infringes on the President's appointment
powers and the Secretary of State's flexibility in personnel matters and
intrudes upon well-established procedures for providing foreign military
assistance.

Transferring the Bureau of International narcotics and Law Enforcement
Affairs from the State Department to the Drug Enforcement Administration is
a bad idea. The underlying assumption is that certain foreign assistance
activities of the Sate Department could be better carried out by a law
enforcement agency. This assumption is neither substantiated nor soundly
based.

Consolidation of all joint interagency task forces (JIATF) would reduce
effectiveness. We are streamlining the existing interdiction command and
control structure and have reviewed the National Interdiction Command and
Control Plan. Planning is underway to consolidate JIATF East (based in Key
West) and South (based at Howard Air Force base, Panama) as it becomes more
likely that all U.S. military forces will be withdrawn from the Republic of
Panama next year. Closure of JIATF West (based in Alameda, California would
disrupt DoD support to law enforcement agencies involved in heroin control
efforts in Asia and cocaine interdiction efforts in the eastern Pacific.
Closure of the El Paso based Joint Task Force 6 would also disrupt military
support of drug-control operations along the Southwest border. ONDCP has
presented specific recommendations regarding accountability and
coordination of drug-control efforts along the Southwest border to the
President's Drug Policy Council.

Conclusion

We share the Congress' view that drug availability in the United States can
and must be substantially reduced. All of us at ONDCP appreciate your
support of our balanced National Drug Control Strategy and major
initiatives associated with it such as the National Youth Anti-Drug Media
Campaign, the Drug-Free Communities Act, and the High Intensity Drug
Trafficking Area program. However, the goals proposed by the Western
Hemisphere Drug Elimination Act are unrealistic. This is a "ready, fire,
aim" approach. The ten-year Strategy developed in consultation with the
Congress contains realistic goals. It proposes reducing drug availability
in the United States by 25 percent by 2002, and by 50 percent by 2007 (1996
is the base year for comparative purposes).

ONDCP believes that the Western Hemisphere Drug Elimination Act should not
contain tactical-level directives to those who have legal responsibility,
experience, and training for deciding where, when, how, and why to employ
equipment and personnel to accomplish the goals of the United States
Government. ONDCP respects the role of Congress to provide oversight. We
understand that Congress must examine specific aspects of the
administration's drug-control efforts anywhere in the world. Please be
assured that we also view this Bill as representing a clear communication
of congressional concern with international aspects of drug-control policy
and U.S. hemispheric efforts. ONDCP will evaluate such congressional
thinking respectfully and use your ideas to adjust our own actions.

The Administration has submitted a FY 1999 drug control budget that
includes 1.8 billion dollars for interdiction efforts -- an increase of
more than 36 percent since FY 1996. Proposed operating expense funding for
the Coast Guard is 19 percent higher than in FY 1996. The 526 million
dollars requested for DoD support of interdiction is 27 percent increase
over FY 96 spending. We would welcome the opportunity to explain in greater
detail how each agency is organizing its programs to attain the objectives
established in the National Drug Control Strategy and to debate the
sufficiency of funding for any aspect of our supply-reduction campaigns.

Checked-by: Richard Lake