EXPERTS QUESTION STRENGTH OF COLOMBIAN REBEL GROUP

But Drug Aid Makes Guerrillas A Threat, U.S. Says

BOGOTA, Colombia - It is billed in Washington as one of the most
well-trained and equipped guerrilla forces in the world, having used
drug-trafficking profits to finance a series of devastating victories
recently against the Colombian army.

But according to specialists in guerrilla warfare here and in the
United States, something doesn't quite add up about the military and
financial might being attributed to the 15,000-member Revolutionary
Armed Forces of Colombia, known as FARC.

Although the military prowess of Latin America's largest and
longest-surviving guerrilla group has been proved repeatedly in the
last year, there is a growing consensus here that estimates of its
strength and links to drug trafficking are nowhere near what Colombian
and U.S. officials are asserting.

"There are those in Washington who say the 'narcs' are FARCs and the
FARCs are narcs. But the evidence suggests that's not the case," said
Matthew Baker, chief analyst of the Austin-based risk-analysis firm
Stratfor. "I've talked to members of the U.S. Special Forces who have
been there, and they're just not seeing it in the field."

International human rights groups, including Amnesty International and
Human Rights Watch, have accused U.S. officials of exaggerating rebel
links to drug traffickers in order to justify an expanded military
involvement.

U.S. officials say they do not accuse all or even most FARC members of
involvement in the drug trade. Some government estimates suggest that
only around 20 percent of FARC members provide protection for drug
facilities and farmers.

In the name of fighting drug traffickers and their guerrilla-support
network, however, the Clinton administration will earmark $289 million
in military-related aid to Colombia this year, making it the
third-largest recipient of U.S. direct foreign assistance in the
world, behind Israel and Egypt.

That figure is dwarfed, U.S. and Colombian officials say, by the
largess being funneled to the FARC by international drug traffickers,
who allegedly are paying high prices for rebel protection of their
laboratories, clandestine airstrips and crop fields in southern Colombia.

"There's been a great debate over narco-guerrillas and whatever," said
White House drug czar Barry McCaffrey during a visit here last August.

'Heavily involved'

"The facts of the matter are that the FARC is heavily involved in
protecting, transporting and in some cases operating drug labs," he
added. "It's given them such an enormous source of wealth that
arguably their firepower, their pay scales, their intelligence
services are more sophisticated than that of the forces that guard
this democracy. And that's a problem."

The FARC's military dominance of Colombia's countryside was
underscored last week when President Andres Pastrana, joined by U.S.
Ambassador Curtis Kamman and hundreds of other dignitaries, traveled
to the guerrilla heartland to personally appeal for peace. Mr.
Pastrana already has ceded to the rebels a chunk of Colombian
territory more than twice the size of El Salvador.

In another nod to the FARC, U.S. officials met with senior rebel
leaders in Costa Rica last month to discuss the peace process, despite
what Washington asserts is the FARC's role in international drug
trafficking and terrorism.

U.S. and Colombian government estimates of the amount of money being
earned by the FARC from the drug trade have varied widely. Recent
Colombian news media reports have mentioned figures as high as $1
billion a year. Late last month, the Washington Post, citing U.S. and
Colombian intelligence sources, said the FARC was earning $500 million
a year from Colombia's cocaine and heroin trade.

"Those figures are not believable," said Colombian military analyst
Rafael Nieto. "I have no doubt there are strong links between the FARC
and drug traffickers. But I don't believe there is a 'Cartel of the
FARC,' as some suggest."

Little evidence

Despite having scored various military victories in the last year, Mr.
Baker said, there is little in terms of hard battlefield evidence to
suggest that the FARC is reaping huge profits from the drug trade.

Weapons that the army and national police have captured from the
guerrillas indicate the FARC is relying heavily on improvised devices
such as handmade rocket-propelled grenades or "poor-man's bombs"
crafted from dynamite wrapped around natural gas cylinders.

Although senior commanders were seen carrying modern automatic assault
rifles during peace talks that convened last week in the rebel-held
town of San Vicente del Caguan, the FARC rank-and-file more commonly
uses Soviet-era AK-47s or even older carbines, some with wooden stocks.

The combat boots worn by the rebels typically consist of knee-high
rubber galoshes.

And while senior Colombian military officers say the FARC pays its
fighters around $300 a month, or $100 more than an army conscript
receives, government intelligence indicates the FARC is relying
increasingly on forced conscription. That would suggest, analysts say,
that the rebels are not having success luring new recruits with the
promise of higher pay from drug profits.

"The fact that the rebels are using improvised weapons is extremely
significant," said a Stratfor analysis published in November. "There
is no good reason to use improvised weaponry unless there is nothing
else available. Improvised weapons are often unreliable, dangerous to
use, and less accurate when compared to standard military hardware."

The FARC's heavy reliance on such weaponry, the report added, "could
indicate that estimates of FARC income have been greatly exaggerated
or have recently fallen off. In either case, this would suggest that
the reported relationship between the FARC and narcotics traffickers
may not be as strong as is suspected."

Funds used elsewhere

One of the most prominent proponents of the "narco-guerrilla" concept,
former Colombian army commander Harold Bedoya, agreed that the FARC is
not plowing its drug-related income into the purchase of more
sophisticated weaponry for its fighters.

"They don't need sophisticated arms. They're winning the war without
them," he said. "They don't need to use their drug money to pay higher
salaries, because they force any peasant boy over the age of 12 into
service at the point of a gun. They take their drug money and invest
it outside the country, where nobody can find it."

Another analyst, Juan Manuel Charry, said a more plausible explanation
for recent FARC battlefield victories is not drug money but rather the
overall level of combat experience among the group's commanders and
fighters. He noted that FARC commander Manuel Marulanda, 68, has been
involved in guerrilla warfare for more than 40 years. Other top
commanders have received extensive training in Russia and Cuba.

In addition, Mr. Charry added, the FARC has selected remote jungle
areas to launch its attacks, limiting the army's ability to respond
quickly. FARC rank-and-file members, he said, tend to be recruited
from the areas where they are fighting. They are better acquainted
with the territory and have far more time to carry out jungle training
than the average army conscript.

"In my opinion, the guerrillas and the narcos are not one in the same.
They coexist only," he said. "Yes, the guerrillas impose taxes on
people involved in the drug trade, just like they impose taxes on
anyone else under their control. But these are peasant farmers, who
might make a few hundred dollars a year out of growing coca or opium.
If you collect money from them, that doesn't necessarily make you
rich, and it doesn't make the FARC an international drug mafia."