COLOMBIA'S INTERNAL SECURITY

For more than 40 years, the Colombian government has been in conflict with
left-wing guerrilla forces. While some of these groups have withered away
or demobilised and joined the mainstream political process, the
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), Colombia's largest rebel
group, has become stronger and presents a serious threat to the government.

The FARC's success has been attributed in part to the emergence of a new
leader, Jorge Briceno, known as 'El Mono Jojoy', partly to the
ineffectiveness of the previous administration under President Samper, but
mainly to the FARC's links with Colombian drug cartels and the money it
receives from protecting cartel operations.

The FARC's success against Colombia's armed forces led the new president,
Andres Pastrana, to concede the creation of a demilitarised zone in the
rebel's heartland. This was a FARC precondition to the holding of peace
talks with the government.

During negotiations between Pastrana's government and FARC leaders on 11
January, the two sides presented their respective 10-point agendas for a
peaceful settlement to the continuing conflict.

The FARC proposal calls for a political solution to the conflict. It seeks
a military doctrine based on the defence of Colombia's borders rather than
internal repression together with a reduction in the size of the armed
forces and a greater respect for human rights.

As well as a revision of Colombia's military treaties, FARC wants a 10-year
moratorium on the country's debt, and insists that a solution must be found
to the "phenomenon of production, marketing and consumption of narcotics
and hallucinogens". FARC does not want this solution to be exclusively
military; instead, one that addresses issues of demand from large states
such as the USA.

The government's proposals similarly call for the unconditional protection
of human rights, highlighting the need for hostage-taking to cease. To
eradicate drug trafficking, special legal standards would be needed
together with agrarian reforms to help substitute illegal crops.

Against this background of negotiations, the FARC's attacks continue and
the country's security forces are considering new ways to deal with the
dual threats of guerrilla insurgents and drug-trafficking cartels.

Bogota has seen insurgent groups such as FARC, and the smaller National
Liberation Army (ELN), extend their operations over nearly 40% of the
country. Cocaine production in Colombia continues to rise rapidly, even
though it is declining in other Andean nations.

Both FARC and the drug cartels operate predominantly in the southern
regions and have a mutual interest in establishing an autonomous zone in
which Bogota cannot realistically interfere.

It is believed that FARC charges a 20% tax on coca crops, paste production
and transportation through the regions it controls. This is in effect
protection money paid by the cartels and it goes towards the arming of FARC
with Stinger manportable surface-to-air missiles, mortars, heavy machine
guns and night-vision equipment.

The FARC's income which is believed to have risen to $230 million in 1997
also goes towards paying good 'wages' to its members: 'wages' that are
higher than a farmer could earn and may be more than a Colombian soldier's
pay.

"I think the connection between the insurgents and the narco-traffickers
has been very clearly demonstrated," says US Marine Corps Gen Charles
Wilhelm, commander-in-chief of Southern Command which oversees US military
activities and assistance in South America. "This is an insurgency that has
been sustaining itself for a number of years, so I think the linkage is
definitely there."

Taking the view that the drug cartels and FARC represent two fronts in the
same war, President Pastrana has formulated a new policy to deal with both.

Pastrana has been receiving increased aid and support from the USA. In
recent years the USA had distanced itself from previous Colombian
governments because of their ties to the drug cartels.

"A new stage has begun in the relationship between the two countries and
clearly we are being treated completely differently than was the case in
the previous four years," Pastrana said in December after meeting with US
Defense Secretary William Cohen.

As in the past, however, US aid, including $230 million in additional
funding authorised by the US Congress late last year, has been earmarked
only for anti-drug operations conducted by the Colombian National Police.

US aid has been forbidden, with few exceptions, from being used by the
Colombian Army for counterinsurgency efforts because of concern about human
rights abuses. The USA is also determined to avoid being drawn into a
political and military quagmire.

"We do not have any interest in getting involved in a counter-insurgency
programme in Colombia," a senior US Department of Defense official told
Jane's Defence Weekly. However, the symbiotic relationship between the FARC
and the drug cartels and Pastrana's 'two fronts, one enemy' approach have
begun to blur the distinction between counter-insurgency and anti-drugs
operations.

It is widely believed that FARC and the cartels can only be dealt with by
the police and military acting together. Now, US policy is beginning to
warm to this view and as a result greater ties are being formed between the
US armed forces and its Colombian counterparts.

Central to Pastrana's policy is a major effort to co-ordinate the military
and police operations, and to lay the ground for a wide-ranging reform of
the armed forces.

An example of the integration of the police and armed forces is the
newly-established Joint Inter-Agency Task Force based at Tres Equinas.
Here, air force, army and navy aircraft operate jointly with assets of the
Colombian National Police.

Colombia, with US funding and training, has also begun to establish the
first of several 1,000-strong counter-narcotics battalions within the army.

"We have proposed to the US government that it is important to set up a
new, special unit within the army in order to give support to this police
eradication effort," Defence Minister Rodrigo Lloreda told JDW. "We have to
put in army forces first before we come in with the police."

Gen Wilhelm says that there has been "remarkable progress in a relatively
short time and some very creative thoughts about new directions in
restructuring certain portions of the armed forces to make them more
effective in this integrated campaign and strategy against the dual threat
of the narcotics traffickers and the insurgents".

Concluding that the army's human rights record must improve if it is to
receive additional US military aid, Pastrana has also put forward a plan to
professionalise the armed forces. The aim is to replace 15,000 conscripts
with regular troops and to increase human rights training with the aid of
US Army Special Forces instructors.

Lloreda stresses that much progress has already been made. In 1998 only
four charges of human rights abuses were brought against military personnel
and Lloreda expects that at least three will prove false: "that's a
remarkable achievement when you consider this is a country at war" he said.

Apart from questions of professionalisation and reform, the Colombian armed
forces is severely lacking the modern systems it needs to counter the
guerrillas. "There are fairly well recognised deficiencies in things like
mobility, intelligence collection capabilities, direct attack capabilities
and certain aspects of command and control," says Gen Wilhelm. "This is a
mobility issue to a large extent, or how to effectively confront the
traffickers and insurgents."

The armed forces "need direct attack systems and that means attack
helicopters of one kind or another. They need improved command and control,
better vehicles for intelligence analysis, production and dissemination.
They really need to make some overhauls to the riverine mobility
requirements. Look at a map of the country ... you see all blue lines. So
surface mobility is frequently riverine mobility."

Taken together, the integration of military and police forces for anti-drug
operations that will involve conflict with insurgents is drawing the USA
closer to Colombia's armed forces. Assistance in creating counter-narcotics
battalions, help in setting up a new intelligence centre and the sharing of
US satellite data on the de-militarised zone constitute steps along a path
towards US involvement in Colombia's counter-insurgency, though the USA
insists that any military-to-military involvement is restricted to
counter-drug operations.

The outcome of the current peace talks could be decisive in the future of
US policy. If they collapse, as many experts expect, the FARC is certain to
continue its relationship with the cartels. If there is a determination to
stem the flow of drugs from Colombia to US streets there is little doubt
that military aid will need to be increased if the cartels and their FARC
allies are to be confronted.