A LOOK AT . . . DRUG CERTIFICATION

The Process Has Become an Annual Charade

In what has become a March ritual, Congress and the Clinton
administration are once again battling over whether to "decertify"
Mexico and other countries whose efforts to combat illegal drug
production and trafficking are deemed insufficiently vigorous.
Decertification, however, is simply bad foreign policy and is often
counterproductive. In most instances, administration officials decide
that the overall interests of the United States weigh against
decertification. The officials are then summoned to Capitol Hill to be
denounced by members of Congress for not being "tough on drugs." As
this year's raucous debate comes to a close, it is time for
policymakers to take a hard look at the costs and benefits of the
annual certification charade.

Legislation enacted by Congress in 1986 requires the president to
decide whether to certify that illegal drug-producing and drug-transit
countries are cooperating effectively with U.S. counter-narcotics
efforts. Those that do not make the grade face stiff
penalties--including withdrawal of U.S. aid (with the exception of
counter-narcotics and humanitarian aid), American opposition to loans
from multilateral development banks and possible trade sanctions.
These penalties are almost always waived on "national security"
grounds, and this year they were waived for Haiti, Paraguay, Cambodia
and Nigeria. U.S. adversaries, on the other hand, face the full range
of sanctions. Afghanistan and Burma were decertified this year.
Colombia is the only ally to have been decertified and face
sanctions--in 1996 and 1997.

Congress has one month--until next weekend--to overturn the
president's certification decisions.

The certification process is intended to improve foreign cooperation
with U.S. counter-narcotics programs. More than a decade after its
inception, however, it is clear that the process does more harm than
good to U.S. efforts to stem the production of illicit drugs and to
U.S. policy toward Latin America. Certification generates conflict and
breeds resentment--not collaboration. Latin American politicians of
all ideological stripes resent the unilateral, score-card approach by
the United States, the world's largest consumer of illicit drugs.
Mexican President Ernesto Zedillo has called the certification process
"offensive" and has proposed that the United States be subject to the
same review.

Certification advocates argue that the process prods countries to step
up anti-narcotics activities and has often produced some short-term
results. The Bolivian government, for example, ratchets up its
eradication of coca plants (the raw material for producing cocaine) as
the deadline nears. The Mexican government launched a $500 million
anti-drug campaign last month--hardly a coincidence.

There is no evidence, however, of any positive long-term effect.
Despite nearly $30 billion invested by the U.S. government in
international drug control efforts over the past 15 years, cocaine and
heroin are purer, cheaper and more readily available than before. The
drug trade remains firmly entrenched in Colombia.

Under U.S. pressure, the Colombian government did dismantle the Cali
cartel, which was the main exporter of cocaine to the United States.
But a plethora of smaller, locally based cartels--much harder to
infiltrate and deter--moved in to replace it. Colombia has gone from
third to first in the list of coca-producing countries and has also
become a major supplier of heroin to the United States. In other
words, the Colombian drug trade is as much of a threat as it was
before 1996.

Decertifying Colombia had little political cost and few repercussions
here in the United States. The weak political position of Colombia's
president at the time, Ernesto Samper--weakness stemming from
revelations that his presidential campaign had accepted millions of
dollars in contributions from Colombian drug traffickers--made
retaliation against the United States improbable. Although Colombia
has traditionally been a strong U.S. ally, for most U.S. officials it
lacked strategic significance in areas beyond drug
enforcement.

Mexico presents a very different scenario. Decertification would
likely provoke a harsh response from Mexican officials and would
jeopardize a range of other important U.S. policy interests, from
trade to immigration.

The Mexican government has consistently failed to meet the anti-drug
targets set by Washington, and official corruption remains rampant.
Yet Mexico is certified each year, whereas Colombia has had to endure
stiff sanctions. With different standards applied to different
countries, Latin American governments view the certification process
as fundamentally unfair.

Washington politics also interferes in the decisions. One of the
architects of the certification process, Sen. Joseph R. Biden Jr.
(D-Del.), claims that before 1986, Congress had no mechanism to obtain
information from the State Department about drug policy abroad; now,
the certification process means the administration must provide annual
reports evaluating progress and defend its policies on Capitol Hill.
The ritual gives Congress leverage over the administration. It also
guarantees members of Congress an opportunity to present a tough
position in the "war on drugs" to win votes back home. In the end,
drug-war politics and domestic politics are inextricably
intertwined.

It is time for Congress to repeal the certification process. Although
certification is viewed as a useful tool by many politicians,
opposition in Washington is growing. Both national security adviser
Samuel R. "Sandy" Berger and White House drug policy adviser Barry R.
McCaffrey are on record opposing certification and favoring
development of more effective multilateral mechanisms for promoting
counter-narcotics cooperation. Draft legislation introduced on March
11 by Democratic Sens. Christopher J. Dodd (Conn.) and Barbara Boxer
(Calif.) and Republican Sen. Phil Gramm (Tex.) would exempt countries
that have bilateral drug agreements with the United States from the
certification process. While this legislation is unlikely to become
law anytime soon, congressional support for reform is building.

The proposed legislation is a step in the right direction; however,
U.S. policymakers should go further in recognizing our Latin American
neighbors not as the enemy, but as sovereign partners. Eliminating the
certification process would send an important message of support to
our Latin American allies. It also would allow Washington to shift its
attention from compiling short-term statistics, such as drug arrests
and seizures, to promoting long-term solutions, such as building
strong and effective civilian institutions--judiciaries and police
forces--capable of confronting the illegal drug trade within a
framework of respect for the rule of law and human rights.

Finally, it would allow U.S. policymakers to focus on the domestic
roots of the U.S. drug problem, preventing and treating drug abuse and
addiction and encouraging effective community responses to the damage
wrought by illegal drug use here at home.