HIGH COURT LONG LOOKED ASKANCE AT ROCKEFELLER DRUG LAWS

Albany-- In case after case, the justices have upheld the statutes but
questioned their wisdom

Almost from the beginning, New York's highest court has expressed grave
reservations about the Rockefeller Drug Laws. Yet the Court of Appeals has
consistently, if uncomfortably, upheld the right of the Legislature to
establish sentencing mandates.

Here's a synopsis of the major Court of Appeals rulings on the Rockefeller
Drug Laws:

People v. Broadie, 1975,(37 NY2d 100)

In the first major test of the Rockefeller Drug Laws, eight defendants
sentenced to long prison terms claimed that the statutes were so punitive
that they violated the constitutional ban on cruel and unusual punishment.
But the court, unanimously yet tentatively, upheld the laws in a decision by
then-Chief Judge Charles Breitel.

The court noted that under the Rockefeller laws, drug offenses "are punished
more severely and inflexibly'' than almost any other offense. "Only for
murder in the first degree is a greater penalty, capital punishment,
prescribed by statute,'' the court said.

Yet, Breitel argued that the court's "power to strike down punishments as
violative of constitutional limitations . . . must be exercised with special
restraint'' and observed that "no punishment in this state has ever been
struck down as unconstitutionally disproportionate to its crime.''

In sum, the court said that even though the Rockefeller Drug Laws are harsh,
even though they may be ineffective, and even though they may be
ill-advised, the Legislature has the right to enact harsh, ineffective,
ill-advised laws -- so long as it respects basic constitutional safeguards.

"In so holding, in the exercise of judicial restraint and with respect for
the separation of powers, the court does not necessarily approve or concur
in the Legislature's judgment in adopting these sanctions,'' the court said.
"Their pragmatic value might well be questioned, since more than a half
century of increasingly severe sanctions has failed to stem, if indeed it
has not caused, a parallel crescendo of drug abuse. . . . The court thus
does not pass on the wisdom of the Legislature's acts.''

People v. Winnie Jones, 1976, (39 NY2d 694)

Almost exactly one year after rendering the Brodie decision, the Court of
Appeals again confronted the Rockefeller Drug Laws. This case involved a
woman sentenced to a 15-year to life prison term after she was convicted at
trial of possessing heroin. Twelve co-defendants who waived their right to a
trial were allowed to plea-bargain to lesser charges, and landed prison
terms as low as three years.

In an unsigned opinion, the court upheld the sentence.

"Regardless of its severity, a sentence of imprisonment which is within the
limits of a valid statute ordinarily is not a cruel and unusual punishment
in the constitutional sense,'' the 4-3 court said. "There were present here
no exceptional circumstances which would justify a variance from this
general rule.''

However, a three-judge dissent, led by Breitel, found the mandatory sentence
"unconscionable and barbaric.'' The dissenters were profoundly disturbed by
the fact that Jones, a "minor functionary'' in the drug trade, received such
a harsh sentence when co-defendants were afforded such relative leniency
apparently because they gave up their right to a trial and plea-bargained.

"While justice and law may not be coextensive, and indeed they are not, a
divergence too great is not tolerable or acceptable under constitutional
limitations based on due process of law, equal protection of law, and cruel
and unusual punishment,'' Breitel wrote for the court. "Margin for
discrepancy there may be between law and justice but not an ocean's breadth
justified only by adherence to the letter.''

People v. Thompson,1994, (83 NY2d 477)

In the court's most recent examination of the Rockefeller Drug Laws, the
panel again upheld the constitutionality of the sentencing statute, and
again questioned the wisdom of the harsh mandates.

"The harsh mandatory treatment of drug offenders . . . has failed to deter
drug trafficking or control the epidemic of drug abuse in society, and has
resulted in the incarceration of many offenders whose crimes arose out of
addiction and for whom the cost of imprisonment would have been better spent
on treatment and rehabilitation,'' Judge Howard A. Levine wrote for the 4-2
majority. "Reform of the penological policy choices in combatting the drug
scourge lies with the legislative, not the judicial, branch.''

In dissent, Judge Joseph W. Bellacosa said the Rockefeller Drug Laws were so
unfair and that their impact was so demonstrably negative, that the
judiciary had an obligation to intercede. He was joined in the dissent by
Judge Carmen Beauchamp Ciparick.

"We decided to dissent because we concluded that the judiciary has more
power and responsibility than it is undertaking in this case and in this
critical adjudicative area,'' Bellacosa wrote.