RUNNING OUT OF TIME IN COLOMBIA

Andres Pastrana became Colombia's new president almost a year ago,
amid exultation both in Bogota and Washington. War-weary Colombians
had endorsed his bold plan to negotiate an end to the country's nearly
four decades of civil war. The Clinton administration, relieved to be
rid of the corrupt Ernesto Samper, also gave Pastrana a rousing
welcome in Washington and embraced the peace talks.

In his search for a peaceful settlement, Pastrana has not
disappointed. He has met with guerrilla leaders. As a goodwill
gesture, late last year he demilitarized an area in central Colombia
four times the size of Kosovo. He has fired several military officers
accused of human rights abuses.

So far, however, his efforts have yielded nothing but increased
attacks, kidnappings and terrorism by the two murderous guerrilla
fronts. It's time for Pastrana--and the Clinton administration--to
develop a credible Plan B, as hopes for a negotiated peace seem to
slip farther away each day.

Indeed, while the U.S. keeps talking up negotiation as the best
solution, it also has increased military aid and intelligence support
to Colombia's beleaguered army--a prudent and justified response to
that country's steady disintegration.

Though Colombia's internal situation is undeniably chaotic--two
guerrilla fronts, an army, an anti-narcotics police, several
paramilitary armies and an omnipresent narcotics industry--there are
two clear alternatives.

On one side there is a duly elected president who is trying mightily
to end the bloodshed. On the other are two cynical guerrilla armies,
heavily financed by the drug cartels and seemingly bent on destroying
any chance of a negotiated settlement.

One guerrilla group launched an offensive on the eve of Pastrana's
inauguration. In the last few weeks--practically on the eve of the
start of negotiations--it again launched attacks that killed
approximately 400 people. Meanwhile, the other guerrilla army has
conducted an orgy of kidnappings and violence despite Pastrana's overtures.

An alternative strategy for the Pastrana administration must begin
with a demand for a cease-fire by the guerrillas--or a cancellation of
the negotiations set for the end of this month.

It behooves the U.S., too, to reaffirm its support of Pastrana--and
also explore increased military aid and logistical assistance to his
government--as time and other options are exhausted.