News (Media Awareness Project) - US: Editorial: America's Role in Colombia |
Title: | US: Editorial: America's Role in Colombia |
Published On: | 1999-07-31 |
Source: | New York Times (NY) |
Fetched On: | 2008-09-06 00:52:51 |
AMERICA'S ROLE IN COLOMBIA
The Clinton Administration and Congress are struggling to decide what
Washington should do to help Colombia, one of Latin America's most complex
and troubled nations. The country's two overwhelming problems are a growing
trade in cocaine and heroin and a 35-year civil war against Marxist
guerrillas. President Andres Pastrana is well intentioned, and deserves
American support.
But Washington must draw a sharp distinction between the two struggles.
Helping Colombia to reduce its narcotics production is an American interest.
Getting involved in a brutal guerrilla war -- one that neither side can win
- -- is not.
The issues have gotten confused because both sides in the political
conflict benefit from drug trafficking, in different ways. The largest
guerrilla group controls much of the area where coca is grown and protects
peasant growers. Some groups also raise much of their war treasury by
shielding and taxing local traffickers, and may transport some drugs inside
Colombia. On the other side, many top-ranking and mid-level army officials
have close links to paramilitary groups, which also control drug-growing
areas. Some paramilitaries are extensively involved in cocaine trafficking.
Colombia's army, which has demonstrated more interest in fighting the
rebels than fighting cocaine, has in the past misused American
counternarcotics aid, turning it against the guerrillas. That is why
Washington must be careful about military aid, and ought not to buy the
idea that an effective drug policy must include fighting the guerrillas.
As President Pastrana recognizes, only negotiations can end the war.
He has taken courageous steps to advance peace talks -- steps the rebels
have largely rebuffed. They have escalated their military offensive. Barry
McCaffrey, the White House drug chief, is recommending that the United
States give $600 million to Colombia, some of which is likely to go toward
fighting the guerrillas.
The United States has already been drawn too far into the conflict. Such
new aid would widen the war. Instead, Washington should give all possible
support to the peace effort.
The army in the past has been ineffective, and still maintains close links
to the paramilitaries, who run death squads that have massacred thousands
of peasants.
Nor is military aid likely to end the drug problem.
The American-sponsored approach so far has centered on aerial spraying, but
cocaine and heroin production in Colombia are soaring.
Mr. Pastrana would like to see fumigation combined with help to bring roads
and electricity to coca areas, so peasants have alternatives. Bolivia and
Peru have had some success with this mixed strategy, and Washington should
emphasize it in Colombia.
The Clinton Administration and Congress are struggling to decide what
Washington should do to help Colombia, one of Latin America's most complex
and troubled nations. The country's two overwhelming problems are a growing
trade in cocaine and heroin and a 35-year civil war against Marxist
guerrillas. President Andres Pastrana is well intentioned, and deserves
American support.
But Washington must draw a sharp distinction between the two struggles.
Helping Colombia to reduce its narcotics production is an American interest.
Getting involved in a brutal guerrilla war -- one that neither side can win
- -- is not.
The issues have gotten confused because both sides in the political
conflict benefit from drug trafficking, in different ways. The largest
guerrilla group controls much of the area where coca is grown and protects
peasant growers. Some groups also raise much of their war treasury by
shielding and taxing local traffickers, and may transport some drugs inside
Colombia. On the other side, many top-ranking and mid-level army officials
have close links to paramilitary groups, which also control drug-growing
areas. Some paramilitaries are extensively involved in cocaine trafficking.
Colombia's army, which has demonstrated more interest in fighting the
rebels than fighting cocaine, has in the past misused American
counternarcotics aid, turning it against the guerrillas. That is why
Washington must be careful about military aid, and ought not to buy the
idea that an effective drug policy must include fighting the guerrillas.
As President Pastrana recognizes, only negotiations can end the war.
He has taken courageous steps to advance peace talks -- steps the rebels
have largely rebuffed. They have escalated their military offensive. Barry
McCaffrey, the White House drug chief, is recommending that the United
States give $600 million to Colombia, some of which is likely to go toward
fighting the guerrillas.
The United States has already been drawn too far into the conflict. Such
new aid would widen the war. Instead, Washington should give all possible
support to the peace effort.
The army in the past has been ineffective, and still maintains close links
to the paramilitaries, who run death squads that have massacred thousands
of peasants.
Nor is military aid likely to end the drug problem.
The American-sponsored approach so far has centered on aerial spraying, but
cocaine and heroin production in Colombia are soaring.
Mr. Pastrana would like to see fumigation combined with help to bring roads
and electricity to coca areas, so peasants have alternatives. Bolivia and
Peru have had some success with this mixed strategy, and Washington should
emphasize it in Colombia.
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