DEALING WITH COLOMBIA

The Clinton administration and Congress are struggling to decide what
Washington should do to help Colombia, one of Latin America's most
complex and troubled nations.

The country's two overwhelming problems are a growing trade in cocaine
and heroin and a 35-year civil war against Marxist guerrillas.
President Andr6s Pastrana is well intentioned, and deserves American
support.

But Washington must draw a sharp distinction between the two
struggles.

Helping Colombia to reduce its narcotics production is an American
interest.

Getting involved in a brutal guerrilla war, one that neither side can
win, is not.

The issues have become confused because both sides in the political
conflict benefit from drug trafficking, in different ways. The largest
guerrilla group controls much of the area where coca is grown and
protects peasant growers.

Some groups also raise much of their war treasury by shielding and
taxing local traffickers, and may transport some drugs inside
Colombia. On the other side, many top-ranking and midlevel army
officials have close links to paramilitary groups, which also control
drug-growing areas. Some paramilitaries are extensively involved in
cocaine trafficking.

Colombia's army, which has demonstrated more interest in fighting the
rebels than in fighting cocaine, has in the past misused American
counternarcotics aid, turning it against the guerrillas. That is why
Washington must be careful about military aid, and ought not to buy
the idea that an effective drug policy must include fighting the guerrillas.

As President Pastrana recognizes, only negotiations can end the war.
He has taken courageous steps to advance peace talks - steps that the
rebels have largely rebuffed.

They have escalated their military offensive.

Barry McCaffrey, the White House drug chief, is recommending that the
United States give $600 million to Colombia, some of, which is likely
to go toward fighting the guerrillas. The United States has already
been drawn too far into the conflict.

Such new aid would widen the war. Instead, Washington should give all
possible support to the peace effort.

The army in the past has been ineffective, and still maintains close
links to the paramilitaries, who run death squads that have massacred
thousands of peasants. Nor is military aid likely to end the drug problem.

The American-sponsored approach so far has centered on aerial
spraying, but cocaine and heroin production in Colombia are soaring.

Mr. Pastratia would like to see fumigation combined with help to bring
roads and electricity to coca areas, so that peasants have
alternatives. Bolivia and Peru have had some success with this mixed
strategy, and Washington should emphasize it in Colombia.