CHOPPERS TO COLOMBIA

This week Colombian President Andres Pastrana is working the circuit in
Washington, talking up his $3.5 billion plan to strengthen his military
forces and bring peace to a Colombia ravaged by rebel attacks.

What happens in Colombia matters in Washington. Colombia provides nearly all
of the cocaine and up to 75 percent of the heroin used in the United States.
Rebel groups in Colombia earn money -- up to $1 billion per year -- from the
drug trade.

Pastrana will no doubt hear encouraging words from the administration. Those
words, however, are unlikely to be matched by deeds. On Colombia, the
administration's record has belied its rhetoric.

In October 1997, drug czar Barry McCaffrey promised Colombian officials
while visiting Colombia that he would agree to "a $50 million emergency U.S.
aid package to purchase three new Blackhawk helicopters and refurbish Huey
helicopters." These helicopters are crucial in the war against Colombia's
narco-guerrillas, whose remote labs and coca and opium fields are now beyond
the reach of the aged helicopter fleet of the respected anti-drug police.

Upon McCaffrey's return to the United States, he rescinded his promise. The
badly needed choppers were never delivered.

McCaffrey's flip-flop infected other Clinton officials. Eighteen months ago,
I asked Secretary of State Madeleine Albright to pay close attention to
Colombia's need for helicopters to fight drugs and narco-guerrillas. She
testified before our committee that "I think there is some dispute as to
whether those helicopters are needed or not. Gen. McCaffrey . . . discussed
this issue, and he believes they are not necessary."

Today there is no dispute. Even McCaffrey now says of Colombia's
narco-guerrillas: "If we could cut off their drug financing, the activities
of these groups would fall to one percent of what they are now."

What changed? Over the past few months, it has become obvious that the
Colombian peace process is failing. President Pastrana's decision, endorsed
by the Clinton administration, to cede a Switzerland-sized portion of the
countryside (a "demilitarized zone") to the narco-guerrillas has only
emboldened the rebels. Instead of negotiating, FARC (the Spanish acronym for
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia) rebels have kidnaped and killed
Americans and launched attacks from the DMZ, even to the outskirts of Bogota.

In response, Colombians who can afford to are leaving the country in droves,
a possible indication of a future immigration crisis. A failed, balkanized
Colombia in our backyard would have deep, long-term implications for U.S.
interests in the entire Western Hemisphere.

Albright sent her most capable deputy, Tom Pickering, to Colombia this
month. McCaffrey has floated the idea of $1 billion in aid to Colombia over
three years (although the White House has so far failed to endorse this
plan). It is clear that the administration is now seeking to limit the
political damage from its failed Colombia policy and to ensure that this
policy is not an issue in the 2000 presidential campaign.

If the administration is serious about solving the Colombian dilemma, it
should take concrete actions now. First, the United States can deliver badly
needed helicopters to the Colombian National Police (CNP) for which Congress
has pleaded for years. The CNP, which has a sterling human rights record,
needs 100 helicopters to eradicate the opium crop and adequately fight coca
production. After almost seven years of Clinton policy, the CNP has only 20
choppers that can fly. As a start, McCaffrey should follow through on the
promise he rescinded in 1997.

With a little U.S. support, the CNP can eradicate the opium poppy fields
within two years, denying narco-guerrillas a revenue stream and destroying
the market for heroin in America.

Second, the administration can provide for fast-track processing of
Colombian army and police aid from U.S. stockpiles.

Third, the administration should reestablish an unambiguous policy of not
legitimatizing narco-guerrillas. Any and all contacts with FARC and FLN
narco-guerrillas should be ended immediately. These groups have killed
Americans and directly threaten our national security interests. It is
counterproductive to treat them as legitimate political organizations.

Fourth, the administration can increase training for the Colombian military
that has been neglected over the past three years.

Finally, the administration must demand reforms in Colombia: End the
class-based, elitist policy that exempts high school graduates from combat
units in the Colombian military. Let the Colombian currency float to
eliminate the black market in pesos that helps launder billions of dollars
from the drug trade. Condition any U.S. military aid to the Colombian
military forces on respect for human rights. In 10 years of U.S. anti-drug
assistance, not one credible allegation of human rights abuse has emerged
against the CNP's anti-drug unit, whose policies should be a model for the
Colombian military.

The writer, a Republican representative from New York, is chairman of the
House International Relations Committee.