U.S. MUST GET SERIOUS ABOUT AID TO COLOMBIA

COLOMBIAN President Pastrana is working the circuit this week
in Washington, talking up his $3.5 billion plan to strengthen his
military forces and bring peace to a nation ravaged by rebel attacks.

What happens in Colombia matters in Washington. Colombia provides
nearly all of the cocaine and up to 75 percent of the heroin used in
the United States. Colombian rebel groups earn money -- up to $1
billion per year -- from the drug trade.

Pastrana will no doubt hear encouraging words from the administration,
but those words are unlikely to be matched by deeds. On Colombia, the
administration's record has belied its rhetoric.

While visiting Colombia in October 1997, drug czar Barry McCaffrey
promised officials that he would agree to ``a $50 million emergency
U.S. aid package to purchase three new Blackhawk helicopters and
refurbish Huey helicopters.'' These helicopters are crucial in the war
against Colombia's narco-guerrillas, whose remote labs and coca and
opium fields are beyond the reach of the aged helicopter fleet of the
respected anti-drug police.

Upon McCaffrey's return, he rescinded his promise. The badly needed
choppers were never delivered.

McCaffrey's flip-flop infected other Clinton officials. Eighteen
months ago, I asked Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright to pay
close attention to Colombia's need for helicopters to fight drugs and
narco-guerrillas. She testified before our committee: ``I think there
is some dispute as to whether those helicopters are needed or not.
Gen. McCaffrey . . . discussed this issue, and he believes they are
not necessary.''

Today, there's no dispute. Even McCaffrey now says of Colombia's
narco-guerrillas: ``If we could cut off their drug financing, the
activities of these groups would fall to 1 percent of what they are
now.''

What changed? Over the past few months, it's become obvious the
Colombian peace

process is failing. Pastrana's decision, endorsed by the Clinton
administration, to cede a Switzerland-sized portion of the countryside
(a ``demilitarized zone'') to the narco-guerrillas has only emboldened
the rebels. Instead of negotiating, FARC (the Spanish acronym for
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia) rebels have kidnapped and
killed Americans and launched attacks from the DMZ, even to the
outskirts of Bogota.

Colombians who can afford to are leaving the country in droves, a
possible indication of a future immigration crisis. A failed,
balkanized Colombia in our back yard would have deep, long-term
implications for U.S. interests in the entire western hemisphere.

Albright sent her most capable deputy, Tom Pickering, to Colombia this
month.

McCaffrey has floated the idea of $1 billion in aid to Colombia over
three years (although the White House has yet to endorse this plan).
Clearly the administration now seeks to limit political damage from
its failed Colombia policy and to ensure that it's not an issue in the
2000 presidential campaign.

If the administration is serious about solving the Colombian dilemma,
it should take concrete actions now.

First, the United States can deliver badly needed helicopters to the
Colombian National Police (CNP) for which Congress has pleaded for
years. The CNP, which has a sterling human rights record, needs 100
helicopters to eradicate the opium crop and adequately fight coca
production. After almost seven years of Clinton policy, the CNP has
only 20 choppers that can fly.

With a little U.S. support, the CNP can eradicate the opium poppy
fields within two years, denying narco-guerrillas a revenue stream and
destroying the heroin market in America.

Second, the administration can provide for fast-track processing of
Colombian army and police aid from U.S. stockpiles.

Third, the administration should re-establish an unambiguous policy of
not legitimatizing narco-guerrillas. All contacts with FARC and FLN
narco-guerrillas should end immediately. These groups have killed
Americans and directly threaten our national security interests. It is
counterproductive to treat them as legitimate political
organizations.

Fourth, the administration can increase training for the Colombian
military that has been neglected over the past three years.

Finally, the administration must demand reforms in Colombia:

End the class-based, elitist policy that exempts high school graduates
from combat units in the Colombian military.

Let the Colombian currency float to eliminate the black market in
pesos that helps launder billions of dollars from the drug trade.

Condition any U.S. military aid to the Colombian military forces on
respect for

human rights. In 10 years of U.S. anti-drug assistance, not one
credible allegation of human rights abuse has emerged against the
CNP's anti-drug unit, whose policies should be a model for the
Colombian military.

Benjamin A. Gilman, a Republican representative from New York, is
chairman of the House International Relations Committee. He wrote this
for the Washington Post.

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