News (Media Awareness Project) - US CA: Editorial: What Next In The Colombia Drug War |
Title: | US CA: Editorial: What Next In The Colombia Drug War |
Published On: | 1999-10-12 |
Source: | Orange County Register (CA) |
Fetched On: | 2008-09-05 18:10:55 |
WHAT NEXT IN THE COLOMBIA DRUG WAR
The most disturbing aspect of the current crisis in Colombia is the extent
to which the U.S. war on drugs has strengthened the most violent and
ruthless elements in Colombia and given them every reason to continue their
war-like ways. Unless some way is found to ameliorate, or even eliminate,
the disruptive effects of the way the war on drugs has been carried out in
Colombia, sending more money and more aid is likely only to increase the
killing and the suffering.
Her's why. A civil war between the government and leftist guerrillas has
been waged at various levels of intensity, mostly in the rural portions of
Colombia, for some 40 years.
In recent years, with the temporary success of coca eradication programs in
Peru and Bolivia, more coca and poppy growing has moved to the rural
southern parts of Colombia, where people live in poverty.
The United States pressured the Colombian government- and offered equipment
and help - to intensify the military aspects of the war on drugs - airplane
and helicopter attacks and the like - which has given growers and
distributors an incentive to turn both to leftwing guerrilla forces and
rightwing paramilitary opponents of the guerrillas for protection. That has
given both the guerrillas and the paramilitaries more money, better weapons
and more support, escalating violence and reducing any incentive to seek
peace.
We asked Adam Isaacson, Colombia expert at Washington's Center for
International Policy, a liberal think-tank, to forget about feasibility and
fantasize for a moment. What if the United States simply stopped waging the
war on drugs, at least in Colombia?
The first result, he suggested, would be that the price of coca would
plummet. That would reduce the incentive for marginal farmers to plant coca
instead of coffee, rice, bananas or corn.
The second result would be that the guerrillas and the paramilitaries would
no longer be able to extort more from coca farmers than they can extort
from cattle ranches or coffee farmers. Their revenue would drop
precipitously and they would no longer be able to pay recruits as well.
Very soon, the guerrillas, with less popular support, less money and less
ability to buy weapons, would be forced to the negotiating table to make
something resembling peace.
The paramilitaries - formed to protect ranchers from attack by guerrillas
but often with close ties to the official military and to drug traffickers
- - would face the same revenue loss and corresponding incentives to disband
or go legitimate.
That wouldn't solve all of Colombia's problems, of course. Forty years of
civil war and drug trafficking have weakened the country's democratic
institutions, especially the judiciary. It would take a long time to
re-establish respect for private property, open markets and an independent
judiciary. But the effort would at least take place in an atmosphere of
relative peace in which trust could be built gradually.
It's probably safe to assume that the U.S. government is not going to drop
its foolish war on drugs tomorrow, however sensible that might be. What
steps might at least ameliorate the damage being done in Colombia and other
supplier countries?
The best bet would be to de-emphasize to the vanishing point the military
aspects of the drug war and use the resources freed up to work on demand
reduction and drug treatment.
Almost every study suggests that is a more cost-effective way to reduce
drug consumption than emphasizing law enforcement and military skirmishes
in foreign countries. The result in a country like Colombia would be almost
the same as abandoning the drug war entirely. It could be supplemented by a
program, which could be privately funded, of sending experts in the
burgeoning field of law and economics to help Colombia set up a stable
rule-of-law system that would lay the foundation for economic growth and
development.
What both the administration and Congress want to do (there is much
disagreement over details but some consensus on the general idea) is to
beef up military aid to Colombia under the guise of beefing up the drug
war. That would increase violence, strengthen the most skillful and vicious
drug traffickers, guerrillas and paramilitaries and eliminate any incentive
any of them might have to sue for peace.
It would make almost every aspect of the Colombia crisis worse rather than
better.
Americans should demand better from their government.
The most disturbing aspect of the current crisis in Colombia is the extent
to which the U.S. war on drugs has strengthened the most violent and
ruthless elements in Colombia and given them every reason to continue their
war-like ways. Unless some way is found to ameliorate, or even eliminate,
the disruptive effects of the way the war on drugs has been carried out in
Colombia, sending more money and more aid is likely only to increase the
killing and the suffering.
Her's why. A civil war between the government and leftist guerrillas has
been waged at various levels of intensity, mostly in the rural portions of
Colombia, for some 40 years.
In recent years, with the temporary success of coca eradication programs in
Peru and Bolivia, more coca and poppy growing has moved to the rural
southern parts of Colombia, where people live in poverty.
The United States pressured the Colombian government- and offered equipment
and help - to intensify the military aspects of the war on drugs - airplane
and helicopter attacks and the like - which has given growers and
distributors an incentive to turn both to leftwing guerrilla forces and
rightwing paramilitary opponents of the guerrillas for protection. That has
given both the guerrillas and the paramilitaries more money, better weapons
and more support, escalating violence and reducing any incentive to seek
peace.
We asked Adam Isaacson, Colombia expert at Washington's Center for
International Policy, a liberal think-tank, to forget about feasibility and
fantasize for a moment. What if the United States simply stopped waging the
war on drugs, at least in Colombia?
The first result, he suggested, would be that the price of coca would
plummet. That would reduce the incentive for marginal farmers to plant coca
instead of coffee, rice, bananas or corn.
The second result would be that the guerrillas and the paramilitaries would
no longer be able to extort more from coca farmers than they can extort
from cattle ranches or coffee farmers. Their revenue would drop
precipitously and they would no longer be able to pay recruits as well.
Very soon, the guerrillas, with less popular support, less money and less
ability to buy weapons, would be forced to the negotiating table to make
something resembling peace.
The paramilitaries - formed to protect ranchers from attack by guerrillas
but often with close ties to the official military and to drug traffickers
- - would face the same revenue loss and corresponding incentives to disband
or go legitimate.
That wouldn't solve all of Colombia's problems, of course. Forty years of
civil war and drug trafficking have weakened the country's democratic
institutions, especially the judiciary. It would take a long time to
re-establish respect for private property, open markets and an independent
judiciary. But the effort would at least take place in an atmosphere of
relative peace in which trust could be built gradually.
It's probably safe to assume that the U.S. government is not going to drop
its foolish war on drugs tomorrow, however sensible that might be. What
steps might at least ameliorate the damage being done in Colombia and other
supplier countries?
The best bet would be to de-emphasize to the vanishing point the military
aspects of the drug war and use the resources freed up to work on demand
reduction and drug treatment.
Almost every study suggests that is a more cost-effective way to reduce
drug consumption than emphasizing law enforcement and military skirmishes
in foreign countries. The result in a country like Colombia would be almost
the same as abandoning the drug war entirely. It could be supplemented by a
program, which could be privately funded, of sending experts in the
burgeoning field of law and economics to help Colombia set up a stable
rule-of-law system that would lay the foundation for economic growth and
development.
What both the administration and Congress want to do (there is much
disagreement over details but some consensus on the general idea) is to
beef up military aid to Colombia under the guise of beefing up the drug
war. That would increase violence, strengthen the most skillful and vicious
drug traffickers, guerrillas and paramilitaries and eliminate any incentive
any of them might have to sue for peace.
It would make almost every aspect of the Colombia crisis worse rather than
better.
Americans should demand better from their government.
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