THE THIN WHITE LINE

The saving grace for the much-beleaguered Los Angeles Police
Department has been its legendary reputation of "incorruptibility."

The organization's 60-year run without a major corruption scandal is
often cited as the best example of enduring and successful police reform.

Although progressive-inspired charter reforms and police
professionalization have been heavily criticized for isolating the
police from the public and institutionalizing an organizationwide
"siege mentality," they have also been widely lauded for virtually
eliminating the rampant corruption that plagued the department
intermittently for decades.

As the recent crisis in policing unfolds, it appears this final
bastion of LAPD integrity has come under attack as well. Some
observers believe the current scandal may wield a more damning blow to
the department's badly bruised reputation than the Rodney King beating.

The department's struggle with police violence and brutality is often
attributed to unique aspects of the LAPD's organizational development
and culture.

Now questions are being raised about whether the department's current
troubles also are tied to organizational, cultural and/or political
factors that are unique to the Los Angeles Police Department.

In other words, is this a problem in policing or a problem with the
LAPD? And are there any similarities or lessons to be learned from the
city's last bout with police corruption?

A glance at the LAPD's history of corruption suggests the current
scandal is far different from scandals that plagued earlier decades,
and the LAPD may ultimately benefit from this small mercy.

Corruption in the early 1900s Like many American cities in the early
1900s, policing and politics were riddled with corruption, and
scandals erupted with regularity in the early years of Los Angeles.
Between 1900 and 1938, the leadership of the police department changed
hands no fewer than 22 times.

With the ascension of Frank Shaw to the mayor's office in 1933, the
department reached its nadir. With his brother Joe at his side, Shaw
presided over one of the most corrupt municipal administrations in the
nation's history.

Corruption, abuses of power, politically motivated harassment and
violence flourished in Los Angeles under the Shaw brothers.

Importantly, the police department was an essential cog in the Shaw
machine. Political officials throughout city government were on the
corruption dole, taking regular payoffs from madams, gamblers and
bootleggers.

Joe Shaw set up shop at City Hall selling highly desirable LAPD jobs
and answers to promotional exams. A willing police department was
essential for both of these activities to thrive.

And no one was more willing to cooperate than James E. Davis, who was
reinstated as chief of police after being demoted earlier. Under
Davis, the department didn't police vice so much as manage it.

In concert with the purveyors of vice, the department orchestrated
preplanned raids to demonstrate to the city's Protestant reformers
their commitment to eliminating crimes against morality.

Vice arrests rose precipitously, yet due to the corrupt relationship
between police, politicians and offenders, the vice industry
flourished. Perhaps even more disturbing, during this period the
city's notorious "red squad" terrorized and brutalized labor leaders,
suspected communists and other "subversives."

Corruption and brutality flourished in Los Angeles during this period
because powerful institutions in the city either supported or ignored
it.

City Hall was deeply implicated in the corruption, Protestant
reformers were mollified by the increase in vice arrests, and the
media and business turned a blind eye to the problem.

Although charter reform was passed in 1925 placing the chief under
civil-service protection, not much happened until the outrageous
activities of the Shaw administration came to light.

The final straw that outraged the public and forced action was the
bombing of reformer and former LAPD Detective Harry Raymond's car by a
red squad officer.

But police corruption wasn't truly eradicated within the department
until Chief William Parker was appointed -- 25 years after charter
reform passed. Under his leadership, the police cast off undue
political influence and charted a course toward police
professionalism.

Small group of rogue officers Happily the days of political complicity
in police corruption are gone in Los Angeles. The current scandal
focuses not on political or departmental leaders, but rather on a
small group of rogue officers in one police division.

Early reports suggest these officers were deeply involved in such
drug-related corruption activities as stealing and selling drugs,
brutalizing and threatening informants, lying under oath, and
committing illegal acts supposedly in the service of controlling gang
activity and drug crimes.

Recent research on drug-related corruption indicates that Los Angeles,
like other cities, may be reaping some of the detriments of being
heavily invested in drug enforcement.

In 1998, the U.S. General Accounting Office released a report on the
growing problem of drug-related police corruption. According to the
GAO, 48 percent of FBI investigations of police corruption in 1997
were for drug-related offenses.

Drug-related police corruption is qualitatively different from other
forms of corruption. Police officers involved in drug-related
corruption are more likely to engage in "stealing drugs and/or money
from drug dealers, selling drugs and lying under oath about illegal
searches and seizures" than officers engaged in more traditional forms
of corruption.

Further "the most commonly identified pattern of drug-related police
corruption involved small groups of officers who protected and
assisted each other in criminal activities."

New York's Mollen Commission described the organization of
drug-related police corruption as being akin to a street gang. There
were even instances of officers being "jumped in" to the police
corruption ring.

The parallels between the GAO's findings and what we know so far in
the LAPD scandal are striking.

And if a thorough investigation proves the scandal solely revolves
around drugs and aggressive drug enforcement and not something unique
to the LAPD as an organization, the road to recovery for the LAPD may
be somewhat less perilous.

It is easier to develop ways to identify corrupt officers and change
procedures to reduce drug-related corruption than changing an
organization's culture.

Make no mistake, the difficult work of transforming the LAPD as an
organization must take place for a variety of reasons. However, if
indeed the current problem is isolated to specific policing practices,
solutions to the immediate issue may be more forthcoming.

While early reformers battled against the money, power and influence
of powerful opinion-shaping institutions, current political and
departmental leaders have demonstrated an admirable degree of openness
in their effort to flesh out the perimeters of the problem.

The department is ably led by Chief Bernard C. Parks, an accomplished
administrator whose reputation as a strict disciplinarian bodes well
for developing meaningful internal reforms.

Like his predecessors, however, Parks is myopic with regard to the
importance of independent civilian oversight in re-establishing public
trust.

Although the new charter significantly strengthens the hand of the
inspector general, the chief has consistently failed to see the value
of meaningful independent oversight to the department's overall police
integrity strategy.

Certainly the chief's objections are not completely without merit.
Internal accountability measures will likely be more effective in
identifying officers engaged in corruption and, more important, in
reducing the risk factors associated with corruption.

However, given the department's ignominious history of self-policing
and collaboration with outside agencies on investigatory matters, it
is unlikely the public will regain its faith in the police without
independent oversight.

As Los Angeles must once again face the arduous task of reform and
restoration, the department is well posed to rise to the challenge.

The ultimate challenge, however, will be whether the police are
finally ready to roll back 50 years of self-defeating isolationism and
find ways to work effectively, collaboratively and openly with people
outside of the organization.
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Dr. Sandra Bass Is An Assistant Professor In The Department Of
Criminology And Government And Politics At The University Of Maryland,
College Park. Write To Her In Care Of Daily News Opinions, P.O. Box
4200, Woodland Hills, CA 91365-4200.