AFGHANISTAN'S CATCH-22

"Hong Kong harbor? Well, that's not all that different from my view
here in Kabul," quips Lt. Gen. Karl Eikenberry, the commander of
U.S.-led coalition forces in Afghanistan, as we begin our telephone interview.

The three-star general is chipper, given how far he is from the
creature comforts of our last encounter -- a black-tie affair at
Washington, D.C.'s Ritz-Carlton. It was inside the Beltway that I
noticed the general's striking resemblance -- both physically and
intellectually -- to Gen. Douglas MacArthur, the military man who
rebuilt Japan six decades earlier.

A fluent Mandarin Chinese speaker and a Harvard and Stanford
graduate, Gen. Eikenberry, like MacArthur, is a brainy soldier.

And like MacArthur, he's trying to come to grips with "an
unprecedented undertaking," as he puts it: the reconstruction of an
entire country, from scratch. From an armchair in Washington or
Brussels or Tokyo, it's hard to grasp the magnitude of the security
problems that U.S. forces, and the NATO troops operating separately
from the U.S.-led coalition, are facing.

Modern-day Afghanistan has rarely existed in this, its current form.
It was a notional nation -- bound more by kinship and ethnic
tribalism, than nationality or rule of law. After the Soviets
withdrew and the country fell into civil war, the country was ripe
for the Taliban to settle in, but they, too, couldn't tame the rugged
Afghan outback and provincial warlords and strongmen. "In my 33 years
in the military, I have never seen tougher terrain than here," says
the general, who adds that the "vast majority of the country" is now
secure. "There are about five or six provinces that have significant
security challenges and they are primarily in rural areas."
Translation: Kabul and major cities are calm, but in the southern and
eastern provinces, where the government hasn't established its
authority, violence prevails. In some regions, peace admittedly won't
come easily, if at all. Take the border with Pakistan, which is
roughly twice as long as California -- and twice as mountainous. Gen.
Eikenberry says the area can't physically be secured, no matter how
many boots are planted on the ground.

True, Pakistan has committed nearly 80,000 troops to the effort, but
the general -- while lauding the cooperation between the Pakistani
and Afghan forces, which are old foes -- avoids questions about why
Taliban insurgents are still finding safe haven in Pakistan.

Other areas, however, could be secured, and haven't been --
particularly the southern provinces.

In recent months, Taliban fighters seized on the transfer of control
from U.S. to NATO forces and engaged in pitched battles. NATO's top
commander said last week that he needs 15% more troops to effectively
roll back the Taliban threat.

They may not get there before the Afghan winter sets in and the
Taliban retreats into well-fortified caves. "The insurgents are
better equipped and better trained than they were a year ago," Gen.
Eikenberry says. "People often fail to understand the full complexity
of the violence here. There are several causes for violence in these
provinces, including land disputes, tribal feuds and property titles.
Taliban fighters often capitalize on these existing divisions to
garner support in local communities."

Gen. Eikenberry understands the root of the problem.

And it's a big one. In 2005, Afghanistan earned $2.7 billion in opium
exports, or 52% of its GDP -- plenty of cash to support an
insurgency. That fighting has, in turn, basically halted all of the
infrastructure build-out that was meant to provide Afghan farmers and
other rural residents alternatives to growing poppy. "In traveling
around the country, the top concern of Afghans is unemployment,
education and irrigation," Gen. Eikenberry confirms.

But to address these issues -- and here's the catch-22 -- violence in
rural Afghanistan must first be quelled.

If it isn't, the infrastructure that will facilitate trade cannot be built.

It's not the military's job to tackle the drug trade head on, Gen.
Eikenberry explains.

He argues that it's a police matter that should be handled by
Afghanistan's police force (which is not nearly as well-trained as
the army). Rather, the U.S.-led coalition forces assist local law
enforcement with intelligence gathering, training, medical assistance
and some combat power, he explains.

But even with military assistance, Afghanistan's law enforcement is
woefully ill-prepared to uproot the firmly entrenched drug
enterprise. NATO Secretary-General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer reiterated
last week that NATO forces wouldn't take a leading role in combating
the Afghan drug trade.

But calls for change are growing: This week even the United Nations
called on NATO to take up the fight.

Afghans have been growing opium for centuries, and without a
practical alternative, they will continue to grow the cash crop.
Despite the Karzai government's effort to eradicate the plant, and
$780 million in U.S. aid to promote crop replacement, old habits die
hard. In many rural areas, there are no schools or hospitals, and
water is scarce.

The population is largely illiterate. It will be hard for Kabul's
democratic methods to take root as long as the violence continues,
and no roads or schools are built. "It's going to take education.

And it will take a long-term international commitment. It was never
going to be easy." Gen. Eikenberry says. "There are some fundamental
problems that have no easy answers." Since NATO relieved U.S. forces
in southern Afghanistan in July, more than 500 suspected Taliban
fighters have been killed. "The insurgents are no match for the
forces here and can be managed," Gen. Eikenberry says. While the
general is confident the military can suppress the insurgency, it's
unclear whether the violence can stop long enough for the government
to provide viable alternatives to Afghans. That's not a question for
the general, but for the politicians.