DECISION CLEARS WAY FOR CHASES BY POLICE

High Court Splits 5-4 In Stop-and-frisk Case

WASHINGTON -- A sharply divided Supreme Court ruled Wednesday that
police may stop and frisk people who bolt upon seeing them, saying
that such a sudden scamper raises suspicions of underlying illegal
activity.

With its 5-4 decision, the justices broadened police power under the
Constitution's Fourth Amendment. The constitutional provision bars
officers from stopping and patting down an individual unless they
reasonably suspect evidence of criminality to be on his or her person.

But the high court said the Constitution gives police latitude to make
"common-sense judgments and inferences about human behavior" and
conclude that a fleeing individual, particularly in a high-crime
neighborhood, has something to hide.

Harris County sheriff's Capt. Don McWilliams hailed the court's
decision.

"Yea for our team," he said. "Police simply must have the ability to
detain and question people who are engaging in suspicious behavior.

"It's not only reasonable to question people who flee," he added. "It
seems to me ... an officer who would just say, `Oh, well,' and turn a
blind eye to that kind of behavior would be derelict."

McWilliams said the ruling would not cause any policy changes or
reviews at the Sheriff's Department.

But the NAACP Legal Defense & Educational Fund assailed the ruling as
enabling police to harass minorities, particularly in high-crime
neighborhoods.

"Overwhelmingly, stop-and-frisk activities are directed at
minorities," said George Kendall, an attorney with the fund, who had
filed a brief with the justices urging them in vain to limit police
power. "Many of these stops result in no discovery of criminal
activity at all."

The specific case before the justices involved Sam Wardlow's decision
in 1995 to run upon seeing Chicago police officers, who were
patrolling in a crime-laden neighborhood. Officers gave chase,
catching up with Wardlow and finding a .38- caliber handgun and five
live rounds of ammunition in a bag he was carrying.

Wardlow, who is black, was convicted of illegal gun possession and
sentenced to two years in prison. But the Illinois Supreme Court threw
out the conviction, saying Wardlow's decision to run did not give the
officers sufficient reason under the Constitution to suspect him of
having committed a crime or to frisk him.

The U.S. Supreme Court, however, reinstated the conviction, saying the
officers were well within their constitutional authority to suspect
the fleeing Wardlow of wrongdoing.

Had Wardlow simply stood his ground and refused to even acknowledge
them, the officers would have had no authority to search him or his
bag, the court said.

"When an officer, without reasonable suspicion or probable cause,
approaches an individual, the individual has a right to ignore the
police and go about his business," Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist
wrote in the court's majority opinion. "And any refusal to cooperate,
without more (provocation), does not furnish the minimal level of
objective justification needed for a detention or seizure."

But once Wardlow started to run, his constitutional protection from
the police left with him as officers reasonably became suspicious that
his "nervous, evasive behavior" indicated wrongdoing, Rehnquist added.

"Headlong flight -- wherever it occurs -- is the consummate act of
evasion: It is not necessarily indicative of wrongdoing, but it is
certainly suggestive of such," he wrote. "Allowing officers confronted
with such flight to stop the fugitive and investigate further is quite
consistent with the individual's right to go about his business or to
stay put and remain silent in the face of police questioning."

Joining Rehnquist's opinion were Justices Sandra Day O'Connor, Antonin
Scalia, Anthony M. Kennedy and Clarence Thomas.

In dissent, Justice John Paul Stevens conceded that sudden flight from
officers is suspicious and might justify police action in some cases.

But he also went to great length to illustrate that running from
police could result from innocent intentions, such as to avoid being
caught in potential cross fire between officers and criminals. Stevens
added that innocent minorities in high-crime neighborhoods might fear
being stopped by the police simply because of their skin color.

The dissenting justice also said the arrival of police and the speedy
departure of an individual might simply be a mere coincidence in many
cases.

"A pedestrian may break into a run for a variety of reasons -- to
catch up with a friend a block or two away, to seek shelter from an
impending storm, to arrive at a bus stop before the bus leaves, to get
home in time for dinner, to resume jogging after a pause to rest, to
avoid contact with a bore or a bully, or simply to answer the call of
nature -- any of which might coincide with the arrival of an officer
in the vicinity," Stevens wrote. "In short, there are unquestionably
circumstances in which a person runs for entirely innocent reasons."

With regard to Wardlow's case, Stevens said he remains unconvinced
that the suspect was running from officers. The justice said the trial
record is unclear whether Wardlow even realized the area was being
patrolled by police.

"I am not persuaded that the mere fact that someone standing on a
sidewalk looked in the direction of a passing car before starting to
run is sufficient to justify a forcible stop and frisk," Stevens
wrote, referring to Wardlow's actions.

The justice said the high court should have ordered a new trial in
which the police would have to show that Wardlow was specifically
running from them.

Joining Stevens' dissent were Justices David H. Souter, Ruth Bader
Ginsburg and Stephen G. Breyer.