POLICE HAVE AUTHORITY TO STOP SUSPECTS

WASHINGTON -- In a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court ruled today that Chicago
police were justified in stopping a man who ran after he spotted officers in
an area known for drug trafficking.

``Nervous, evasive behavior is a pertinent factor in determining reasonable
suspicion'' to justify a stop, Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist wrote for
the court. ``Headlong flight -- wherever it occurs -- is the consummate act
of evasion.''

``Allowing officers confronted with such flight to stop the fugitive and
investigate further is quite consistent with the individual's right to go
about his business or to stay put and remain silent in the face of police
questioning,'' Rehnquist said.

His opinion was joined by Justices Sandra Day O'Connor, Antonin Scalia,
Anthony M. Kennedy and Clarence Thomas.

Justices John Paul Stevens, David H. Souter, Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Stephen
G. Breyer agreed with the court's decision not to adopt a rule that would
always authorize police to stop people who run at the sight of police.

But the four, in an opinion written by Stevens, disagreed with the
majority's conclusion that Chicago police were justified in stopping William
Wardlow in 1995.

The Constitution's Fourth Amendment bans unreasonable searches and seizures.
In 1968, the Supreme Court ruled that police can stop and question someone
without a warrant if there is reasonable suspicion the person is involved in
a crime or about to commit one.

State courts have been deeply divided over whether running after seeing a
police officer is enough to create reasonable suspicion of criminal
activity.

Today, the Supreme Court said such flight can help create reasonable
suspicion to justify a stop.

Wardlow was convicted of a weapons violation after he was chased down and
arrested on a Chicago street while carrying a loaded handgun.

Eight officers in four cars had converged on an area known for drug
trafficking when Wardlow saw them and took off running. Officers pursued and
cornered him, and found the gun after a pat-down search.

Wardlow was sentenced to two years in prison for unlawful use of a weapon,
but a state appeals court threw out his conviction and the Illinois Supreme
Court agreed. Police acted on ``nothing more than a hunch'' and in doing so
violated Wardlow's constitutional rights, the state court said.

Illinois' lawyer argued to the Supreme Court that running at the sight of an
officer is such unusual behavior that it creates suspicion of criminal
activity.

Rehnquist noted that when police want to stop and question someone without
reasonable suspicion that that person is engaged in wrongdoing, people are
entitled to ignore the police and go about their business.

``But unprovoked flight is simply not a mere refusal to cooperate,'' the
chief justice said. ``Flight, by its very nature, is not `going about one's
business'; in fact, it is just the opposite.''

Stevens' opinion said prosecutors did not show that police had enough reason
to stop Wardlow.

``I am not persuaded that the mere fact that someone standing on a sidewalk
looked in the direction of a passing car before starting to run is
sufficient to justify a forcible stop and frisk,'' Stevens wrote.

State courts in Alaska, California, Colorado, Maryland, Michigan, Nebraska,
Nevada, New Jersey and Utah had said police generally could not stop and
question people who flee after seeing them. However, state courts in
Connecticut, Indiana, Louisiana, Minnesota, North Carolina, Ohio and
Wisconsin said running from police created enough suspicion to justify a
police stop.

The case is Illinois vs. Wardlow, 98-1036.