TWO WAYS U.S. CAN HELP BRING PEACE TO COLOMBIA

WITH the exception of Cuba, Colombia today is the last communist stronghold
in the Western Hemisphere. It is home to the largest and richest irregular
army in the continent: the Colombian Revolutionary Armed Forces.

With 15,000 members under arms, it is able to operate throughout the
country. It controls 296,400 acres of coca and 37,500 acres of poppy
plantations. It supervises the production of more than 300 tons of basic
coca paste, earning it approximately $600 million a year. It has used these
drug dollars to fight the Colombian government.

How did FARC manage to become probably the richest guerrilla organization in
the world?

Like most other guerrilla organizations in Latin America, FARC formed in the
'60s, partly in reaction to Colombia's endemic rural violence, but also
inspired by the leftist political and guerrilla movements that swept through
the region following the Cuban Revolution.

But unlike other Latin guerrilla groups, FARC has managed to survive the end
of the Cold War because it discovered an important financial lifeline: the
illegal drug trade.

The production and processing of illegal drugs has long thrived in Colombia,
in part because of the government's historic inability to exert effective
control over its territory. The oldest electoral democracy in Latin America,
Colombia traditionally has had a weak and small army. This, in effect, has
impeded the state from having effective control of its extensive territory,
even today.

Throughout Colombia's history, traffickers, guerrillas and armed banditos
have operated in the countryside at will. It is a vicious circle, since the
lack of governmental control further weakens the concept of law and order in
the country.

Four years ago, two events occurred that have served to strengthen the
guerrillas even further. The first was the appearance of a fungus that
destroyed much of the production on Peruvian coca plantations. The second
was an aggressive effort by the Peruvian government to halt the shipment of
coca paste by air to drug labs in Colombia by shooting down the cocaine
planes.

Like any businessmen, the drug producers immediately sought new areas in
which to grow their crops. They selected jungle areas traditionally under
FARC control. Within two years, Colombia coca leaf production skyrocketed.
The country went from being a minimal coca leaf producer to one having
nearly 300,000 acres of coca plantations and producing more than a quarter
of the world's coca leaf.

The coca bonanza helped FARC achieve a prominence that had eluded it for 30
years. With solid financing from the coca plantations in the territory it
controlled, it was able to develop into a military and political force. When
the Colombian army tried to take control of the coca plantations, the coca
growers, backed by FARC, rose up and mobilized 100,000 people in public
protests.

Between 1996 and 1998, FARC carried out 15 successful military operations.
It captured 500 members of the military and police, and managed to become a
player in the presidential campaign of 1998. Every candidate promised they
would begin talks with FARC.

The week before the elections, FARC gave its tacit approval to Andres
Pastrana when it agreed to meet publicly with one of his campaign advisers.
Some say this was the single factor that gave Pastrana the victory.

Although the Colombian army has achieved several victories against the
guerrillas in the last year, the FARC remains a formidable political and
military force. Colombia has asked the United States for military aid
because its own forces do not have the capacity to eliminate the guerrillas'
control of the coca plantations.

And while the Colombian police have succeeded in their efforts to dismantle
the drug cartels in the country, battling FARC is another matter. The
extensive coca plantations are protected by highly trained FARC guerrillas
units. It will require the police, working in conjunction with army units,
for these operations to be successful.

The future peace in Colombia is undoubtedly connected to gaining an upper
hand on the drug trade. An insurgent group that has access to a drug cash
lifeline will never have interest in discussing a settlement but rather will
look at strengthening itself militarily. But FARC is also an organization
with a political ideology. This guerrilla group is looking for political
power and that is why the government of Colombia has decided to negotiate
with it.

The Colombian government has begun a peace process. As a good-will gesture,
the government demilitarized 42 square kilometers of Colombian territory
where the guerrillas have established camps and where the peace talks are
taking place.

It is a long road ahead. But for these negotiation to bear positive fruits,
the United States must support Colombia's efforts in two ways: by helping
Colombian forces to combat the traffickers and the guerrilla-controlled coca
crops; and by playing a supporting role in the peace efforts, much like the
role the United States has played in the Northern Ireland or Middle East
peace processes.

Only such support will help make a negotiated solution with FARC possible.

Pardo is a former minister of defense and peace negotiator for the Colombian
government.