DANGEROUS PLANS FOR COLOMBIA

Colombia is Latin America's most complex and troubled country. Its two
overwhelming problems - a booming trade in cocaine and heroin, and a
vicious, nearly 40-year-old civil war - are intertwined and getting worse.
Increasingly they threaten not just Colombia, but neighboring countries as
well, including Venezuela, one of the largest suppliers of oil to the
United States.

Now the Clinton administration has unveiled a $1.3 billion plan to help
Colombia, including $955 million in security assistance. Colombia is
already the largest recipient of American security aid after Israel and
Egypt. The plan reflects neither a realistic strategy to fight illegal
drugs nor an effective long-term approach to establish peace and stability.
Instead it risks dragging the United States into a costly counterinsurgency
war.

Both the drug trade and Colombia's stability are legitimate American
concerns. The administration and supporters of the plan in Congress have
concluded that the most effective American response is to increase military
assistance and forge a close alliance with Colombia's armed forces.
Washington should have learned long ago that partnership with an abusive
and ineffective Latin American military rarely produces positive results
and often undermines democracy in the region.

Colombia produces 80 percent of the world's cocaine and about two-thirds of
the heroin consumed in the United States. Administration officials insist
that the security assistance would be aimed primarily at fighting drug
trafficking and not at counterinsurgency operations against leftist
guerrilla groups. But in many areas of Colombia the distinction is
meaningless. In recent years both the guerrillas and murderous right-wing
paramilitary squads associated with the army have earned millions of
dollars from the drug trade.

President Andres Pastrana is well intentioned and deserves American
support. But this plan is overwhelmingly skewed toward a military approach
to problems that for years have stubbornly resisted military solutions.
Washington should be devoting a far greater share of its support to the
Pastrana government's own admirable efforts to strengthen civil
institutions and address social and economic inequities that fuel the war
and the drug economy. They include reorganizing and strengthening the
judiciary, as well as alternative development strategies that would help
farmers grow conventional crops, like coffee and cotton, and subsidize the
construction of roads and schools. Colombia's security problems cannot be
ignored, and there may be ways for the United States to work with the
Pastrana government to strengthen the Colombian military. But this should
be done with stricter conditions and an emphasis on reforming the armed
forces rather than on equipping them to fight a protracted civil war in
which civilians are the main casualties.

Peace talks aimed at a negotiated settlement represent the best solution to
both the drug problem and the war. The Clinton administration has provided
intermittent support for Mr. Pastrana's early efforts to talk peace with
guerrilla leaders. He has had little success thus far. But in recent days
key rebel leaders have signaled a new interest in negotiations, agreeing to
meet with government representatives in Sweden. Washington should redouble
its support for these talks. Throwing its weight behind Colombia's military
at this stage will only escalate a war that neither side can win.