"A FAILED SYSTEM"

WASHINGTON -- As Afghanistan's growing illicit drug trade puts the
country's future in doubt and fuels a deadly insurgency, the
finger-pointing is starting.

President George W. Bush said last week that Afghan President Hamid
Karzai, a key U.S. ally, must wage a tougher fight against the opium
poppy and should be "held accountable" for the results. Bush said
failure would imperil "democratic legitimacy and international support."

Meanwhile, questions are being raised about the proper role of U.S.
military forces in the counter-narcotics effort. The State Department
and Drug Enforcement Agency are wrangling with the Pentagon, saying
drug interdiction and eradication efforts need greater military support.

A congressional memo circulating among several key Republican
legislators engaged in oversight of U.S. policy in Afghanistan makes
that point sharply.

"Nearly all joint DEA/Afghan operations have little to no NATO
support, including little support from the U.S. military. ... During
the last 12 months, (U.S. military units) supported only three DEA
requests for air support of interdiction operations. DEA made 23 such
requests before realizing that DOD has very little interest in
supporting the counter-narcotics mission in Afghanistan," the memo
says.

Rep. Mark Kirk, R-Ill., who has spent a great deal of time in
Afghanistan examining counter-narcotics efforts, authored the 12-page
critique.

A DEA official says the memo accurately depicts the inadequate
military support and that the agency needs more helicopter air support
for its missions, among other things.

"The best helicopters are the military's, and they control the air
space, so you can't hire some private pilot because you'll get shot
down," the official said. He spoke on condition of anonymity, saying
he didn't want to publicly criticize the military. "For us to be
effective in that country, we have to work with the military because
they have the assets to get us from point A to point B. There are some
issues there; it could be better."

While saying they couldn't respond to specific allegations, two top
U.S. commanders said that though the anti-narcotics fight is pivotal
to Afghanistan's future, their priority is defeating the insurgency.
Their drug role, they said, is limited to such areas as logistical
support, including medical evacuations and intelligence.

"We have kind of a generally accepted mantra that narcotics is not a
military problem," said Gen. James L. Jones, strategic commander for

NATO's growing forces in Afghanistan. He added, however, that in the
drug fight, "We're not making progress; we're losing ground."

Jones said he is open to a more active military role if so ordered,
saying: "I think that we're still at the stage in the war on narcotics
of finding a definition for an agreed-upon strategy that says this is
how we're going to win this fight."

Lt. Gen. Karl Eikenberry, commander of U.S. forces in Afghanistan,
sounded a similar note: "The prioritization of our task in Afghanistan
is waging the war against terror and fighting the insurgency."

Intelligence sharing with DEA is taking place at his headquarters in
Kabul, Eikenberry said, but he acknowledged that as far as helicopters
and other equipment, "capacity is always a problem."

At a congressional hearing Sept. 12, a few days before Bush spoke,
members of the House foreign operations panel lit into administration
witnesses.

Rep. Don Sherwood, R-Pa., said record Afghan poppy cultivation shows
the administration lacks a strategy. "I guess I'm so frustrated
because we asked these same questions nine months ago, and now we find
out that poppy cultivation is up 59 percent," he said, adding that
with the large U.S. presence in Afghanistan, there is no excuse.

"We've taken Afghanistan apart," he said, "we're putting it together,
and we've allowed this cancer to spread."

Rep. John Carter, R-Texas, cited an Afghan regional official
responsible for local eradication efforts found with nine tons of
opium in his basement and removed from his post only to be appointed
to the country's senate. Carter said that signals "a failed system."

Rep. Jim Kolbe, R-Ariz., the panel's chairman, put it simply:
"Everything is getting worse."

And those were the Republicans. Democrats, too, were
critical.

Rep. Nita Lowey, D-N.Y., ranking Democrat on the subcommittee, said
aggressive action should be taken against "opium bazaars, convoys" and
other key links in the drug chain. "What we're doing isn't working,"
she said.

Assistant Secretary of State Anne Patterson, who heads the State
Department's Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement
Affairs, conceded that U.S. policies have not yet succeeded. She urged
patience and said that programs are being adapted as necessary.

Why is a solution so elusive? The poppies sit day and night, for
months at a time, in fields that do not move. And yet, despite efforts
by Americans, Afghans, British and NATO, this year Afghan poppy will
produce 90 percent of the world's heroin.

The issue is so complex there simply may be no resolution, at least
for many years to come. Interviews with American, Afghan and United
Nations officials and independent experts indicate that the narcotics
problem in Afghanistan is so interwoven with broader issues that any
efforts to combat drugs will founder.

For example, the growing debate over the military's role is being
waged over matters like helicopters and the frequency of
military-support missions.

But what underlies that dispute is a strategic quandary for U.S.
commanders. The war on terror and the war on drugs in Afghanistan are
closely linked in some ways, but diametrically opposed in others.

Because drug proceeds help fund the insurgents, curbing the trade
would help the war on terrorism. Observers say hundreds of millions of
dollars of drug money has made the Taliban a far-more dangerous foe,
with better equipment, for instance, taking away the night-vision
advantage of U.S. and NATO troops.

But a bigger military role in counter narcotics might complicate the
primary mission of U.S. forces crushing the insurgency. By taking on
farmers and others involved in narcotics, the military could lose much
of its good will and drive people toward the insurgents.

"There is a tension between the two. I will agree there," said Lt.
Col. Todd Vician, a Pentagon spokesman on Afghanistan. He added that
there are discussions about whether the military could "better support
the effort."

The complexities are also pronounced with regard to economic issues.
Most agree that the Afghan narcotics trade can't be curbed until the
legitimate economy grows enough to offer good alternative jobs,
because the nation is among the world's poorest. But a normal economy
can't be created alongside the lure of an illegal economy that offers
so much easy money for relatively little work.

A similarly vicious cycle exists in terms of law enforcement, with
arrests and prosecutions deemed critical to reducing the drug trade.
But Afghans acknowledge that the corruption, violence and chaos
spawned by drug trafficking prevent the building of a functioning
justice system.

An overlooked problem that makes tackling narcotics so daunting is the
sheer number of Afghans involved. Figures from the United Nations
Office on Drugs and Crime in Vienna indicate that just in the past
year the number of Afghans who grow, process or distribute illicit
drugs has risen dramatically to 2.9 million from 2 million.

That equals 12.6 percent of Afghans, which would translate to 38
million Americans roughly the combined populations of Missouri,
Illinois, Ohio and Pennsylvania.

The complexity has spawned debate over how to respond, with sharp
divisions between those who want tougher eradication and other who say
it's counter-productive and instead propose targeting drug kingpins.

The State Department plans to tweak current U.S. policies by setting
regional eradication goals and holding local officials accountable.
Mohammed Nabi Hussaini, a senior official in the Afghan Ministry of
Counter Narcotics, said that would boost "public confidence in the
government."

Rick Barton, who is completing a study of Afghanistan for the U.S.
Agency for International Development, says too many resources have
already gone to attacking drugs in Afghanistan given the fact that so
many broader issues are at play.

"You have to pick priorities that are achievable," he said. "There's
no justice system, there's not an economy, there's no security and
there's no real government. There's a lot that has to be done. So
putting precious resources into making something not happen, rather
than happen, is not a wise way to go when you have so much to do."