A MUDDLE IN THE JUNGLE

IT IS not Vietnam, nor will it become so. But once again the United States
is preparing to commit lots of cash, military hardware and advisers to a
battle in a foreign jungle.

This one is in southern Colombia, where an embattled president, Andres
Pastrana, faces daunting problems.

These include left-wing guerrillas and right-wing paramilitaries. Political
violence caused almost 300,000 Colombians to flee their homes last year;
the better-off have been terrorised by kidnapping and extortion.

The country is also home to the world's biggest illegal drugs industry: it
accounts for about 80% of the cocaine and some of the heroin imported by
the United States, and has displaced Peru as the world's main source of
coca, the raw material for cocaine.

This is the main front in the developed world's war against the supply of
drugs.

And, to make matters worse, Colombia's economy is reeling from its worst
slump since the 1930s.

On taking office in 1998, Mr Pastrana boldly launched peace talks with the
FARC, the largest guerrilla group.

But they have moved slowly.

The war continues, amid widespread scepticism about the FARC's intentions.
At the same time, Mr Pastrana has turned to the United States for help.
Bill Clinton is sympathetic, and now Congress is debating an administration
request for more aid, which would take total American assistance to
Colombia to $1.6 billion over the next two years.

Mr Pastrana leads a democracy, albeit an imperfect one, and deserves
international support.

But the proposed aid is ambiguous in purpose, and its results may
disappoint. The largest chunk is to set up and train three special
anti-drugs battalions, equipped with 63 helicopters, including 30 fast,
modern Blackhawks. Their mission is to "push into the coca-growing regions
of southern Colombia", in mountainous jungles now controlled by the FARC.
Once secured, the police would go in to wipe out the coca plantations.

The Supply-Siders' Plan

Its backers present this as a plan to staunch the flow of drugs to the
United States. But the motivation seems to be a fear that the FARC's
insurgency is now out of control, and is a threat to other countries in the
region.

In practice, the new battalions' target will be the FARC. Since the FARC
gets lots of money (perhaps as much as $500m a year) from taxing and
protecting the drugs trade, this new southern push would not only help to
prosecute the international war on drugs but also weaken the guerrillas,
persuading them to seek peace.

That, at least, is the theory.

Yet if the main aim were to support the pursuit of peace, the aid proposal
might look very different.

To achieve peace, Colombia needs stronger democratic institutions, capable
of guaranteeing security and justice for its citizens (including
demobilised guerrillas). And it needs radical reform of its armed forces.
Despite Mr Pastrana's efforts, they continue to suffer from two serious
failings.

First, they remain a largely reactive force, lacking mobility and relying
too heavily on poorly trained conscripts. Second, many military commanders
retain close links with the paramilitaries. The belief runs deep that
paramilitary violence will hasten peace. In fact, it does the opposite.

It is as unacceptable as the violence of the guerrillas.

Yet the American aid proposal looks as if it will merely bolt three shiny
new anti-drugs battalions on to an abusive and unreformed military force.

That imbalance is familiar. After more than a decade of American aid,
Colombia's national police are capable of staging sophisticated operations
against drugs gangs, involving months of surveillance and intricately
co-ordinated raids.

Yet they are incapable of acting as an efficient constabulary, providing
the average Colombian with security against crime, kidnapping or
assassination.

Meanwhile, Back In The United States

That is not by chance.

Aiding the Colombian police has been adopted as a political cause by a
group of congressional Republicans who believe that one of the cheaper and
more effective ways to deal with the United States' addiction to drugs is
to stop their production at source.

That approach is also reflected in the annual "certification" process,
which this week again saw the United States stand in unilateral judgment
over its neighbours' anti-drugs efforts.

Belief in supply-side remedies has come to be shared by some officials in
the Clinton administration. They argue that the sharp fall in coca
production in Peru and Bolivia in recent years is proof that a combination
of stepped-up repression and programmes to help former coca farmers can
achieve the complete elimination of coca in those countries - and in
Colombia (see article).

It is a heady vision, but a flawed one. In fact, these policies have
fuelled Colombia's conflict.

The increase in Colombian coca (and thus in the FARC's income) is a direct
consequence of its reduction elsewhere.

That is just the latest example of the "balloon" effect: squeeze the drugs
industry at one point, and it reappears somewhere else. Already
drugs-trafficking gangs, with all their corruption and violence, have
spread across Latin America from Mexico to Brazil.

The reason is elementary. Demand calls forth supply. Prohibition and
repression merely increase the price; and, where cocaine is concerned, they
have failed to increase it enough to have any significant effect in
reducing consumption. After more than a decade of the United States' war
against cocaine at the source, the price of the drug in the United States
remains stable, the supply abundant.

The number of hard-core takers remains stable, too, although casual
consumption has been declining since the mid-1980s.

Latin Americans pay a high price for the drugs trade: it corrupts their
societies from top to bottom.

If this price is ever to be reduced, Americans will have to look not just
at the supply but also at the demand for drugs.

That means they will have to consider alternative policies at home, even at
decriminalisation. This is a war that will not be won with helicopters.