THE ENEMY NEXT DOOR

Good Reasons To Hammer South America's Drug Cartels

The next battleground for US forces could be in America's backyard-with
South American drug-producing cartels the principal targets. The war's
objectives would include eliminating the threat the cartels' well-armed
protectors pose to legitimate South American governments, and severing the
drug-runners' links to organized international terrorist networks and
organizations.

While most US military long-range planners keep watchful eyes on faraway
places likely to become tomorrow's hot spots-North Korea, the Middle East,
and the Balkans immediately spring to mind-a small but rapidly growing
number of analysts are focusing their attention much closer to home.
They're monitoring drug-related activities throughout the northern South
American ridge and Mexico, and what they're seeing gives them reason to
believe that US combat forces might be needed to stabilize the region.

It's no secret that drugs have long flowed to the streets of US cities
through a well-oiled pipeline extending from Peru and Columbia into Mexico.
US assistance programs, including uniformed military and Drug Enforcement
Administration advisors, hardware, and hefty infusions of cash, have done
little to curtail either local production of drugs or their availability to
US users. Successive US administrations have dutifully paid lip service to
the scourge of illegal drugs but, absent a clear national security threat
that can be grasped by the American public, most politicians have
assiduously avoided confronting the problem head-on. That might not be
possible much longer.

Drug Marriage

"With the absence of Soviet-backed financing for terrorist organizations, a
grand shift is occurring that few people have noticed," Robert Charles told
AFJI. "Today, international drug traffickers and international terrorists
are in a hedonistic marriage of design. Drug funds are financing terrorists
whose aim is to overthrow governments; in the meantime, those terrorists
are providing wide-ranging protection for drug operations. These groups are
now linked at the hip, and they are extremely wealthy."

Charles was chief of staff of the US House of Representatives' Committee on
Government Reform's subcommittee on national security from 1995 to 1999,
and managed the House Speaker's Task Force for a Drug-Free America from
1997 to 1999.

Until about five years ago, Charles said, the linkages between drug
producers and organized, armed groups were generally localized marriages of
convenience. In Peru, for example, the Shining Path provided cover for drug
producers who, in exchange for this service, funded the group's arms
purchases. Although battered years ago, the Shining Path is reemerging as a
threat to Peru's Fujimori regime. Virtually decapitated in 1992, this group
is again becoming active in the countryside, Charles said.

Similarly, the militia groups providing cover for Colombia's drug kingpins
today are a far cry from the ragtag bands of yesteryear. Numbering an
estimated 25,000, they are equipped with modern weapons and other military
equipment purchased with some of the estimated $600 million in drug
revenues that flow into Colombia each year.

"When representatives from these groups show up at so-called 'peace
negotiations,' they show up with state-of-the-art weapons in hand. They
carry brand-new rifles-some observers have quipped that they still have the
price tags on them-they have night-vision goggles straight off the shelf,
and they all wear crisp, new uniforms," Charles said. "What we're basically
looking at is a military-style force in the international criminal world
unlike any other force we've previously seen."

No longer content with reacting to government forces' intrusions into their
benefactors' domains, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC)
have carried out assaults against government forces on the outskirts of
Bogota. Along with their like-minded compatriots from the National
Liberation Army (ELN), they routinely disrupt the flow of crude oil through
Colombia's major pipeline and carry out wide-ranging acts of terrorism in
various metropolitan areas in efforts to undermine public support for the
Pastrana government.

"Colombia is being significantly destabilized at a time when the United
States has just withdrawn from Panama, there's a new leader in Venezuela,
and drug operations are penetrating Bolivia," Charles said. "This fault
line through the northern ridge of South America means it's time for the US
government to either make a substantial military commitment to the region
or acquiesce to the narco-militias. If we acquiesce, we will be ceding
control of civil institutions to the narco-traffickers."

Why would this matter? As Charles sees it, the most compelling answer is
the 14,000 American lives lost to heroin and cocaine last year.
Additionally, a strong economic argument can be made for aggressive US
military involvement against South American drug kingpins: about 20 percent
of the raw crude oil used by Americans comes from Colombia and Venezuela.

"Colombia is a $100 billion economy," Charles pointed out. "The United
States has about $10 billion invested there right now. This includes such
companies as Texaco, BP-Amoco, Occidental Petroleum, Bechtel Enterprises,
United Parcel Service, ENRON, 3M, and Caterpillar. Whether you measure the
effects of the drug trade in terms of the threat they pose to civil
institutions, the number of US lives they claim each year, or economic
terms, we have a legitimate national security crisis brewing in the region."

Ominous Warnings

Although the magnitude of the crisis isn't yet apparent to the American
public, senior US officials are already grappling with the issue. In
increasingly frequent public comments, as well as in private discussions,
the problem is being addressed in the White House, the Pentagon, the State
Department, and on Capitol Hill.

Last summer, the situation in Colombia became so grave that Colombian
President Andres Pastrana appealed for help directly to US Senate
Republican Leader Trent Lott (R-MS) and long-time drug opponent House
Speaker Rep. Dennis Hastert (R-IL), who has traveled into the Colombian
jungles three times in the past four years. In effect, Pastrana told the US
lawmakers that he needed help-right away.

Shortly thereafter, during a July visit to Colombia, US drug czar and
retired US Army General Barry McCaffrey declared that America faces a
genuine national security "emergency" in Colombia, and that US agencies-law
enforcement, military, State Department-needed at least a billion dollars
to begin tackling the problem. These funds would help build three
counter-drug battalions in Colombia's military, reinforce the stretched
resources of the Colombian National Police, and beef up US Coast Guard,
Customs, and Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) operations. Optimally,
they would finally breathe life into a law passed by Congress in 1998 and
signed by the President-The Western Hemisphere Drug Elimination Act-which
had, since then, languished without a funding request.

The following month, Lott and Hastert wrote to the White House urging the
President to fund emergency aid to Colombia. Pastrana followed up that
letter with a personal visit to Washington, during which he pressed
President Clinton to support Colombia's anti-drug operations. At every
stop, he was assured that financial aid would be forthcoming.

Anti-Drug Cash Infusion

Because of American lawmakers' growing recognition of the scope of
Colombia's drug problem, in October the US government put together a
special $1.6 billion military equipment aid package for Colombia and its
neighbors. Of that sum, $1 billion would be emergency aid to fund the
Western Hemisphere Drug Elimination Act (which had already become US law in
October 1998); the remainder would "plus-up" the Fiscal 2001 and 2002 aid
requests for Colombia. Plans called for the special anti-drug cash infusion
to be spread over three years. The funds would have come on top of other US
assistance programs already in place for Colombia, many of which were cut
deeply in 1993, 1994, 1995, and 1996.

Although the special military aid program was proposed by the Clinton
Administration and enjoyed the backing of influential Republican lawmakers,
it was derailed in late October during final budget deliberations by
House-Senate conferees, because US lawmakers couldn't agree how the funds
should be spent and because the office of Management and Budget wasn't
persuaded by the chorus of Colombia experts inside and outside the
Administration. Democrats generally wanted a substantial portion of the
assistance package to be spent on programs aimed at shoring up Colombia's
infrastucture and government institutions; Republicans felt the funds would
be better spent if the lion's share went directly into military and police
counter-drug programs.

In the wake of that fiscal setback, the Pastrana government pledged to fund
its own $4 billion campaign against the drug lords and their mercenary
protectors, as part of a $7.5 billion program over three years. Pastrana
again appealed to the US, as well as to some European nations, to fund the
$3.5 billion portion of the bill above Colombia's $4 billion commitment. US
analysts point out, however, that the Colombian government will be hard
pressed to come up with the $4 billion it says will be put into the
program, making the international contributions all the more important.

In response to Pastrana's latest appeal, President Clinton announced in
January that he would press for a new aid package for Colombia. Targeted at
$1.278 billion, the proposed aid program would be spread over two years and
include funds to shore up Colombia's infrastructure and government
institutions and for purchasing high-tech military equipment for Colombian
forces.

During a January Pentagon press briefing, Defense Department spokesman
Kenneth Bacon said the Pentagon would receive about $144 million of the
nearly $1.3-billion counter-drugs assistance package requested by President
Clinton. Most of it would be spent this year, Bacon said.

Some of the funds would be used to train and equip two new Colombian
counter-drug battalions, which would augment the similar unit now battling
the narco-traffickers. In compliance with a congressional directive, all
members of the new battalions will be screened to preclude individuals with
past involvement in human rights abuses from joining the units.

Another portion of the Pentagon-controlled funds will be spent on
establishing what Bacon described as "a forward-operating location, which
is actually in Ecuador, on the border of Colombia, to help strengthen our
ability to provide intelligence information-mainly radar information-to the
Colombians so they can use that to interdict illegal narcotics shipments."
That "forward-operating location" will actually be an air base situated in
a country shaken by political upheaval in January.

The third portion of the funds will be spent on enhancing "radar and
interdiction facilities within Colombia," Bacon said. Three such sites are
no w operating there.

Not A Counter-Insurgency

Anticipating some success from these counter-drug initiatives, Bacon added
that some of the Pentagon-controlled funds will also be earmarked for
training programs aimed at improving the Colombians' ability to inderdict
drug shipments moving along river routes. When the planned counter-drug air
operations are in full swing, he said, the drug traffickers will probably
be forced to increasingly depend upon waterways for moving their drugs.
Plans for increased air operations will result in shipments of 30 new Black
Hawk helicopters and 15 used UH-1 Hueys (or UH-1H upgrade kits) to
Colombian forces, Bacon said. Funds for the helicopters will be handled by
the State Department.

In discussing the proposed aid package, Bacon (and other government
officials) repeatedly emphasized that the materiel and additional US
military forces being dispatched to Colombia don't signal that the US is
getting involved in "the counter-insurgency business; we are in the
counternarcotics business. And we do our best to separate the two." He
anticipates "probably a small increase...a very modest number" of
additional US service members will be dispatched to the region to join some
150 to 200 Americans-military and other government employees-now involved
there in counter-drug operations.

As this issue goes to press, the outcome of Clinton's latest anti-drugs aid
package for Colombia is pending congressional action. Approval is
considered likely, although the Republican leadership might try to redirect
some of this aid to US law enforcement agencies operating in or near
Colombia, specifically Customs, Coast Guard, and DEA.

Republicans have long pushed for tougher action against South American drug
dealers. For example, in 1998 Hastert went to the wall in a fight that
resulted in an infusion of $690 million above the president's request for
drug-war funds. Included in the Omnibus Appropriation, the action required
waivers from seven congressional committees.

Following the October demise of the $1.6 billion aid package, Charles said,
Pastrana put in a call directly to the White House. President Clinton
couldn't take the call immediately, but did return it, a White House
spokeman told AFJI. After what the spokesman characterized as a "lengthy
conversation," President Clinton referred the matter to Secretary of State
Madeleine Albright. As a result, the State Department dispatched four
interagency teams to Colombia to assess the situation, and Clinton
subsequently dispatched Albright, herself, to Colombia in January.

Pastrana's desperation is shared by most Colombian citizens. In a recent
poll conducted in 41 Colombian cities, 70 percent of the respondents
indicated they would accept US economic or military aid to combat the
narco-traffickers, Charles said. "They said, 'We need help-right now-and
will take it in whatever form it comes.' That's a very strong response from
citizens who have traditionally zealously guarded their national
sovereignty. It shows their extreme concern for a stable future-concern
bordering on desperation."

Broader Picture

As troubling as the drug situation in South America is, its implications
become even more ominous when considered from a global perspective. Because
narco-traffickers and terrorist organizations often work hand-in-hand,
their span of influence is truly international. Together, they have become
the most powerful force in the criminal world.

South American drugs have given rise to three powerful Mexican drug
cartels, which now operate-often with apparent impunity-on America's
doorstep. Farther from American soil, but no greater distance from vital US
interests, drug money flowing to and from the Middle East and Eastern
Europe is now believed to fund organizations ranging from Hezbollah
affiliates to the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA).

"During the past three years or so, drug money has begun flowing to and
from the Middle East and Eastern Europe in a new set of exchanges," Charles
said. "Heroin is being swapped for cocaine; cocaine wasn't widely available
in Europe until about three years ago. We didn't have heroin coming out of
Colombia until about five years ago; today we're seeing both the
indigeneously created heroin and the new heroin that is coming from places
such as Afghanistan. Where do you think the money from those drugs is going
when it reaches the Middle East?

"It's going into Middle Eastern and Southern European terrorist
organizations," Charles continued. "It's going into organizations with
names you would recognize, like the KLA, and they're using it for terrorist
activities. With the absence of Soviet money, a grand shift has occurred-a
shift that has escaped notice by most Americans.

"Is it time to send in the Marines?" Charles asked. "I don't know. But if
people don't realize that we're now dealing with a force that is very well
funded, violent, and ruthless-one that is intent on penetrating civil
institutions to our immediate south-then we're kidding ourselves. And if we
believe we're immune to the threat, we're in for a rude awakening.

"Democracy rests on vulnerable civil institutions-in South American
countries and, to a lesser degree, in ours," Charles continued. "If we
think that our political processes and civil institutions are immune to the
threat of drug money, again, we're kidding ourselves. In time, we'll
experience the result of what's happening in South America in cities like
Baltimore, Washington, and New York.

"Without sounding too passionate," Charles concluded, "I have to emphasize
that only substantial US military support, in the near term, will preclude
more intense, longer-term pain for Colombia, for its neighbors, and for us.
The worst thing we could do would be to underestimate the threat to vital
US national security interests that is spreading along the northern ridge
of South America."