COLOMBIA IS MORE THAN A WAR ON DRUGS

Policy: Understand the scope of the Latin nation's problems and the limits
of U.S. help before approving aid package.

The House on Thursday passed a $1.7-billion military and economic aid
package for Colombia to help that country fight its wars against the
drug trade and against longtime insurgencies that now obtain
substantial financial support from narcotics traffickers. The bill now
moves to the Senate.

Although the American public is mostly unaware of this proposal for a
sharp escalation of U.S. involvement in Colombia, an intense debate is
occurring among the most interested parties: those who want to pursue
a tougher international crusade against narcotics; those who are
primarily concerned about the extremely poor human rights record of
the Colombian armed forces, who would receive the massive U.S. aid;
those who argue from past cases--El Salvador in particular--that U.S.
counter-insurgency support can bring peace or that it is a recipe for
prolonged war; and those whose appraisal is shaped mainly by budget
politics.

Each party argues that only the course it recommends will avert
catastrophe. Those who push for a strong U.S. program assert that
failing to counter the insurgencies and curb the drug trade now will
lead to Colombia's collapse, with disastrous consequences for the
stability of its neighbors, the cause of Latin American democracy and
the control of drugs. Critics of the requested aid warn that it would
strengthen the most repressive elements of Colombian society,
undermine civilian control of the armed forces, result in increased
human rights violations and eventually put at risk the lives of
American advisors and trainees. Some even predict that enhanced
involvement may move the U.S. closer to massive and direct military
intervention.

It would be much better for Congress to make this decision, and for
public opinion to comprehend it, with a better-informed assessment of
Colombia's problems and of the limits on America's power to reshape
Colombia's complex internal dynamics.

Colombia suffers from a profound crisis of governance, a huge failure
of institutions that arises from decades of exclusionary politics;
years of denial about the inroads drug lords were making in the
economy, society and politics; and widespread loss of confidence in
those who have long held power. That both a Marxist insurgency and
criminal syndicates are so powerful is more an effect than a cause of
the abject failure of its state and other institutions.

It is unlikely that any external involvement will have much effect on
Colombia's deep underlying crisis unless Colombians themselves
mobilize the will, sacrifice and commitment to fight injustice,
impunity and corruption.

If they fail to reverse the country's deterioration, Colombians surely
will suffer, and neighboring countries may be affected, but the
consequences of Colombia's tragedy for the U.S. probably will not be
dramatically different from what they are now.

The current administration of President Andres Pastrana has done more
than its predecessors to seek a peaceful settlement with insurgent
groups, to clean up the armed forces and police and to strengthen
civilian authority. The Colombian strategy of focusing first on ending
the insurgency through negotiation, not primarily on the narcotics
issue, should structure U.S. thinking about whether and how to be involved.

The strongest case for approving the requested Colombian appropriation
rests on the argument that there are some real, if limited, prospects
that the Pastrana government could modestly advance its approach if it
had U.S. assistance. As the strongest and most prosperous country in
the world, the United States can afford to take concrete steps that
might help friendly neighbors avert disaster.

The fact that the U.S. has the resources does not mean it has the
right answers. Washington should make security and economic assistance
available while focusing on how to minimize the risks of more direct
U.S. military involvement. In deciding whether and how long to sustain
such assistance, Washington should evaluate Colombia's progress toward
ending the insurgency and strengthening national institutions, not on
how much is spent to interfere with narcotics traffic.

The congressional debate on the Colombian aid package distorts our
understanding of Colombia's problems and our prospects for being
helpful in responding to them by viewing Colombia almost entirely
through the prism of drug policy. Washington finds it easier,
understandably, to pretend it is facing up to our drug problem by
addressing it abroad rather than confronting it adequately at home.
That may make good domestic politics but it adds up to unwise policy,
at home and abroad.