COCAINE WAR A special report. (Part III of V)

THE AMERICAN ROLE

Shoestring Operation Welcomes Assistance

The situation on the ground in Colombia had been eroding throughout the
1990's. But in 1994, just as the F.A.R.C. was beginning its big advance,
the Clinton administration's relations with the Colombian government went
into a deep freeze after Washington received information that
President-elect Ernesto Samper had accepted $6 million in campaign
contributions from drug cartels.

Normal ties resumed with the election of Mr. Pastrana in 1998. But it was
not until the F.A.R.C. launched a nationwide offensive that brought it
within striking distance of Bogota last July that the real dimensions of
the crisis began registering in Washington.

Gen. Barry R. McCaffrey, the director of the White House's Office of
National Drug Control Policy and before that the commander of American
military forces in Latin America, was the first to visit, and immediately
began pushing President Clinton for emergency aid. That pressure, along
with the major rebel action in July, convinced the White House of the
seriousness of the situation in Colombia.

"It is essential the Colombian government restore state authority in this
crucial region," General McCaffrey said during a more recent visit to a
military base where three new anti-narcotics battalions, trained and
financed with American assistance, are being formed. "The rapid expansion
of drug production in Colombia, almost entirely in zones dominated by armed
illegal groups, constitutes a drug emergency."

The biggest single item in the administration's proposed assistance
package, which has been approved by the House and is pending in the Senate,
is 63 helicopters, divided between 33 Bell UH-1N models and 30 more modern
Sikorsky UH-60L Blackhawks, which are equipped with night vision equipment
and special armor. As the guerrillas and traffickers are aware, once
training programs for crews and the construction of hangars are taken into
account, the earliest date for complete delivery of the American-supplied
equipment would be late next year.

Nevertheless, the prospect that American aid may soon begin flowing clearly
excites the weary soldiers here. "Tell them we need air support, like the
police get for their operations," said Lt. Gustavo Lievano, the marine
unit's second in command.

A sergeant wanted to know, "How much more money are they going to give us
to buy intelligence from informants?"

Illustrating the shoestring nature of operations here, on this mission Lt.
Arenas was relying on walkie-talkies he paid for out of his own pocket
while in the United States last year. Sometimes, even having enough
gasoline for boats can be a problem.

But to some in Washington, the prospect of increased American involvement
in Colombia is viewed much more warily.

"Before we quadruple our military aid and embark on an open-ended, costly
commitment, the Colombian government needs to come up with a workable
strategy," said Senator Patrick J. Leahy, Democrat of Vermont. "And our own
administration needs to explain in detail what its goals are, what it
expects to achieve at what cost over what period of time, and what the
risks are, both to the thousands of Colombian civilians who will be caught
in the middle when the war intensifies and to our own military advisers there.

"The Colombian government wants a blank check. That is not going to happen."

On the Colombian side, a recent poll shows that a majority of Colombians
favor American intervention.

"Pastrana has shown that he doesn't know how to deal with this situation,"
said Diego Bedoya Hurtado, a Bogota accountant. "Only the Americans are
going to be able to get us out this mess."

From the perspective of the Pastrana administration, however, the American
aid package is only part of a broader effort. It hopes to combine American
military aid with nearly $1 billion from European nations for social and
economic programs, and loans from international organizations, making for a
whopping $7.5 billion effort that mixes carrot and stick.

One additional concern, both in Andean capitals and in Washington, is that
any success against coca cultivation in Colombia will inevitably lead to a
resurgence of coca growing in Peru or Bolivia.

"The balloon effect in drugs is something that we are always looking at,"
said Mr. Ledwith, director of international operations for the D.E.A.

Coca growing in Peru and Bolivia has been cut by more than half following
increased cooperation between their governments and the United States.
Successful crop substitution programs are one reason, but Peruvian
President Alberto Fujimori's policy of shooting down any drug plane flying
over Peru has been a huge deterrent, as have stepped-up eradication efforts.

Thus the bulk of coca production has shifted to Colombia, where most of the
processing and marketing operations were already located. Feeling
relatively safe on their native soil, the coca-growing syndicates have
invested heavily in developing more potent strains, some of which can be
harvested in as little as 60 days.

Smaller, more vulnerable trafficking groups have gravitated toward
insurgent-dominated areas like this one, paying a tax on their drug income
to the guerrillas in return for protection from the Colombian government's
anti-drug campaign.

In 1996, a United States intelligence summary concluded that while
guerrilla units were selling protection "in virtually all departments where
traffickers operate," only a few "probably are involved more directly in
localized, small-scale drug cultivation and processing."

But that has changed dramatically over the past 18 months, since the
Colombian government gave a chunk of territory to the F.A.R.C. That step in
late 1998 was intended as a gesture of good faith to lure the rebels into
peace negotiations.

Hopes that the long war with the leftist guerrillas could end were raised
almost two years ago when Mr. Pastrana was elected as a peace candidate
implicitly endorsed by the F.A.R.C.'s main leader, Manuel Marulanda.

Informal peace talks with the group began last year. But after Mr. Pastrana
flew to San Vicente del Caguan, the largest town in the rebel-held zone,
for the opening ceremonies, Mr. Marulanda delivered a calculated snub by
failing to appear, sending subalterns instead and leaving Mr. Pastrana
looking at an empty chair in front of television cameras and photographers.

Since then, the negotiations have repeatedly stalled, with the F.A.R.C.
breaking off discussions every time the government refuses to bend to one
of its demands, and the government eventually giving in. Though the
agreement called only for withdraw, the F.A.R.C. has also driven mayors,
judges and Roman Catholic priests from its zone.

NEXT CHAPTER: The People, http://www.mapinc.org/drugnews/v00/n528/a03.html