WHEN COPS THINK OF THEMSELVES AS SOLDIERS

From their inception in the 1840s, urban police departments have been
organized along a military model. Widespread public drunkenness, high
crime rates, race and ethnic riots and labor strife that often turned
violent resulted in law enforcement agencies that "patrolled" city
streets on a continual basis.

There is nothing inherently wrong with structuring police departments
along military lines; agencies so designed exist in many democratic
countries committed to the "rule of law."

However, a problem arises when an organization with a militaristic
orientation entrusted with significant power comes to believe that it
is literally engaged in combat.

Over the past 30 to 35 years almost every administration at the
federal level has waged its version of the "war on crime" and "war on
drugs," a philosophy that has been embraced by many big city police
departments.

Patrick Murphy, who headed police commissions in three cities
(Detroit, New York and Washington, D.C.) stated, "There is no doubt
that this war-on-drugs rhetoric is part of the problem ... raiding all
these crack houses, more guns on the street, cops getting automatics.
... It has cops so psyched up they think they're in combat."

The difference between city streets and a war zone is that, in the
former, police officers encounter fellow citizens with constitutional
rights while, in the latter, soldiers seek out and attempt to destroy
the enemy. According to the testimony of recently convicted LAPD
officer Rafael Perez, it is clear that some members of Rampart CRASH
(Community Resources Against Street Hoodlums) thought of themselves
and their jobs more in terms of soldiers tan peace officers.

Police officers who take the life of another human being in the line
of duty typically experience remorse, and in some cases are so
psychologically distraught by the experience that it precludes them
from continuing their careers in law enforcement.

Perez stated that the night unarmed Juan Saldana was shot and killed
he and two other officers "celebrated" in a bar until 6 or 7 o'clock
the next morning. While this behavior seems incomprehensible to most
people, it is understandable in the context that Saldana and other
suspects were viewed as the enemy.

Although it is true that criminally active gang members (as well as
law-violating non-gang members) are enemies of "law and order," they
are not adversaries in a military sense, to be dispatched as "targets
of opportunity."

Over and above teaching individuals a variety of soldiering skills,
military boot camp is primarily about changing people. After a
life-time of being taught that human life is sacred, adversary on command.

One way of accomplishing this deadly goal is be dehumanizing the
enemy; that is, by redefining him as something less than human; an
animal, for example. Once a designated group loses its status as human
beings, members of that collectivity can be destroyed with few if any
moral and ethical ramifications for the killers.

My guess is that some members of Rampart CRASH internalized this
aspect of the military ethos, hardly surprising in a specialized unit
with a strong sense of purpose and pride. It is worth noting that this
dehumanization process is made easier when the enemy are members of a
different racial or ethnic group, a situation that is not uncommon
concerning the composition of urban police forces and gangs.

During the Vietnam War some American soldiers would attach a playing
card to the bodies of Viet Cong casualties.

For example, one Marine reconnaissance team's "death card" was an ace
of spades adorned with a skull and crossbones.

While Rampart CRASH officers could not tag the individuals they shot
with cards, they did the next best thing via presenting their fellows
with plaques at shooting parties that featured playing cards with
bullet holes through them.

One officer noted that while this practice might appear "barbaric,"
"it's good for morale" and that individuals "talk about the shootings,
how they're heroes or whatever." And just as it is better to kill
one's foe than wound him on the battlefield, CRASH awards with a black
card signifying death were more prestigious than red cards indicating
that someone was wounded.

Shooting parties not only exacerbate an already formidable "we/they"
perspective regarding the police and gang members, but are likely to
facilitate additional shootings.

People typically strive to repeat behavior for which they have been
praised, especially when this adulation comes from significant others
in a close-knit quasi-military unit. Rampart CRASH is such a unit.

The military has always been a closed society given wide latitude by
the federal government regarding its internal affairs. For much of the
20th century, urban police departments have been granted that same
privilege.

When and where local governments have attempted to make law
enforcement agencies accountable to civilian review boards, they ( the
governments) have met with fierce resistance from police
administrators.

United World War 1, urban police departments were often the
handmaidens of "machine" politics, with too many cops little more than
self-serving gangsters in thoroughly corrupt systems of bureaucratic
patronage.

Today, big-city police departments are largely independent of any
meaningful civilian oversight in their everyday work.

Unfortunately, as the LAPD scandal has revealed, some officers are
modern day gangster/soldiers operating from a militaristic world view
that is more in line with totalitarian than democratic societies.