JUST SAY NO TO MORE MONEY FOR THE COLOMBIA DRUG WAR

No Interdiction Program Has Had Any Serious Impact On The Supply Of Illegal
Drugs In The U.S. Rather, These Campaigns Have Spurred New Source
Countries, New Trafficking Routes And New Drugs.

Current congressional consideration of a $1.7 billion military aid program
for Colombia is the most recent escalation of the U.S. government's war on
drugs with a total federal budget of over $250 billion since 1980. Each
administration has fought the drug war aggressively, using the military,
spraying herbicides, extraditing leaders of cartels, providing intelligence
and other assistance to the military and police forces of the Americas.

The results have been dismal. The street price of both cocaine and heroin
has dropped to one fourth what it was in 1981 while the potency has
increased dramatically. Drugs arriving from Colombia today are practically
pharmaceutical grade, and they've never been easier to get. According to a
government survey 35% of high school seniors now say heroin is readily
available a proportion that has doubled in two decades.

A policy failure this spectacular would normally call for rolling heads or
at the very least a congressional hearing. But instead of questioning a
course that is steering us onto the rocks, we're about to push the
throttles to flank speed. No eradication or interdiction program in the
past 35 years has had any serious impact on the supply of illegal drugs in
the U.S. Rather than cutting off the supply, these campaigns have
consistently spurred new source countries, new trafficking routes and new
drugs. Yet the White House and Congress are assembling a military aid
package for Colombia that ignores this history.

Among the many examples of the law of unintended consequences are several
disasters that illuminate the problem. In the early 1980s South Florida was
the entry point for Colombian marijuana, and the Reagan administration
moved marijuana interdiction to top priority. For the first time in history
the Department of Defense was drafted for drug war duty, complete with
troops and high tech resources.

The Colombian traffickers responded almost overnight. Since marijuana is
bulky and easily seized, they needed something more compact. And since
smuggling was now more dangerous, they needed to up the profit margin.
Cocaine was the obvious choice almost as easy to produce, much more
profitable, and compact enough to be hidden in the normal stream of
commerce. Thus, the cocaine explosion of the 1980s which also brought us
crack can be viewed as a direct consequence of drug enforcement efforts
directed at the marijuana supply.

This lesson should have been obvious from catastrophic experience with a
previous interdiction campaign. In 1969 the Nixon administration virtually
shut down the Mexican border in an effort to stem the tide of marijuana and
heroin. U.S. Customs was ordered to search one out of every three vehicles
entering the U.S. The backups stretched for miles, Mexico was outraged, and
the policy was soon shelved.

But the brief disruption of normal drug traffic lasted long enough to spur
fundamental changes in the dynamics of drug trafficking and use. There are
indications that prescription drug use filled the temporary void. Seizure
reports demonstrate that traffickers adapted to the land blockade by
switching to boats and planes. And Asian drug lords saw an opportunity to
expand their heroin markets. Thus the end result was increased use of
prescription drugs, expanded supplies of "China White" and the development
of sea and air routes by the Mexican cartels. The rapid escalation of drug
use in the 1970s can be directly connected to this effort.

It's not only interdiction efforts that have backfired. Eradication
programs have an even worse track record. When President Carter decided to
nip marijuana and heroin supplies in the bud by spraying herbicides in
Mexico in 1977, the Mexicans simply shipped the stuff anyway. Health,
Education and Welfare Secretary Joseph Califano announced that contaminated
marijuana showing up in the U.S. posed a significant health risk. American
pot smokers responded. Instead of throwing the seeds away, they planted
them, and with typical Yankee know how they refined the humble weed into a
potent plant that made the Mexican stuff look like dandelions. The National
Drug Intelligence Center now reports marijuana is cultivated in every state
in the union.

In the unlikely event that the Colombian campaign has any impact on the
cocaine trade, it could trigger an even more dangerous backlash.
Methamphetamine, far more dangerous, is a less expensive, domestically
produced substitute that can be manufactured in a motel room. Another
likely impact is increased coca production in other countries. Peru reports
that the price of raw coca has tripled and new coca cultivation expanded by
3,700 acres in 1999.

Since the problem we face today can be traced in large part to our
misguided enforcement campaigns, a rational person might ask why we are
about to commit once again to a program that is probably doomed at the
outset and almost certain to make everything worse. One might also ask why
we are ignoring the mountains of data that show us a better way.

The White House says there are five million serious U.S. users who need
treatment. It is this group addicts who have to get drugs several times a
day that drives the narcotics market. Studies by the RAND Corp. tell us
that treatment is 10 times as cost effective as interdiction, yet U.S.
treatment facilities have room for only 43% of these hard core addicts.

The government could also be a lot more effective in preventing drug abuse
in the first place. The best prevention programs for American youth are
after school and alternative activity programs. The U.S. spends $600
million on after school programs, and they help kids "just say no" by
giving them something to say "yes" to. If there is a decision to be made
between spending more resources on eradication and interdiction or on youth
programs, the latter should be chosen. It has proved to be far more effective.

These simple steps involve no military hardware, but they could have a
major impact on the drug market. For anyone who cares to look, the evidence
is unequivocal. Focusing on demand reduction at home is the most effective
way to undermine the Colombian drug markets. Military intervention cannot
repeal the laws of supply and demand.