THE CALL OF THE ANDES

The Escalating War Abroad Will Only Divert Attention From The Question At
Home: Are Attacks On The Supply Of Drugs More Effective Than Major Efforts
To Reduce Demand?

A new media-op in the perpetual drug war.

This is a media alert for editors and television producers who thought they
could safely ignore all news outside the United States: the permanent drug
war is going military -- and abroad. The White House and Congress, having
failed with massive domestic police actions to reduce the quantity or
quality of illegal drugs on our streets, are mounting a major pursuit of
coca growers in Colombia.

Lay news junkies may also be interested, but they can take their time; this
story promises to be around for years. Alert media, however, will want to
prepare to field Spanish-speaking correspondents, duly covered by kidnap
insurance, to follow the action across the photogenic terrain of the Andes.

It would be unwise to expect trustworthy information from Washington, where
success in this war is still defined by the bag count -- the amount of
cocaine captured or the number of coca plants destroyed. The experience of
decades proves that any such good result in one venue merely pushes the
farming, processing or trafficking of drugs to another. Indeed, it was the
great assault on coca plantations in Peru and Bolivia a decade ago that led
to the cultivation of even richer strains in Colombia. That country, two
and a half times the size of France, now supplies 80 percent of the cocaine
consumed in the United States and equal amounts for the rest of the world.

Nor can much reliable information be expected from Colombian journalists.
Though intrepid, they are the targets of murderous assaults by the
competing factions of Colombia's drug-fueled civil war. In the past six
months, five reporters have been killed and scores threatened, kidnapped or
forced into exile. The newest refugee is Francisco Santos, the news editor
of El Tiempo, the country's leading paper, who left in despair last month
before a credible death threat could be carried out.

The terrorism of left- and right-wing guerrillas -- and the efforts of the
army and the police to pursue them -- have resulted in the deaths of
thousands of Colombians each year. All the paramilitary gangs are well
armed; some tax the coca growers whom they protect, others profit from
kidnappings and extortions. The turf battles in coca regions caused 350,000
people to abandon their homes last year. The violence and Colombia's bitter
economic depression combined to cause another 350,000 to leave the country
altogether.

Gen. Barry R. McCaffrey, the White House drug commander, says the explosion
in Colombia's cocaine production is "clearly a huge drug emergency." But
Congress has taken its time acting on a $1.3 billion aid package, which
will send the drug hunters 60 helicopters, assorted weapons and several
hundred American military instructors.

A major cause of delay was the need to apportion the aid among rival units
of the Colombian Army and national police. Another was the search for a
compromise between lobbyists for two helicopters -- the Sikorsky UH-60L
Blackhawk, made by United Technologies in Connecticut, and the cheaper but
slower Huey, made by Textron's Bell division in Texas. As Tim Golden
reported in The Times last month, both companies began as far back as 1996
to demonstrate their alarm about developments in Colombia and their
readiness to contribute to the drug war there and to political campaigns at
home.

A further delay, after the House finally acted, was prompted by Senate
leaders who thought the aid was attached to too many pork barrel projects.
In the meantime, Roberto Suro learned for The Washington Post that coca
production was resurgent in Peru because of the loss of American radar
flights in the Andes region. Our base for reconnaissance planes in Panama
was closed. A substitute field in Ecuador can operate only in daytime. Even
if that field was refurbished with money in the pending aid package, all of
the Air Force's big Awacs radar planes have now been irretrievably
committed to surveillance over Kosovo, North Korea and Iraq.

The confusion at the American end of the war is more than matched by that
in Colombia. President Andrés Pastrana has promised to wage a vigorous
campaign against the drug lords, but some of his closest political
associates (as well as their top American military adviser) have been
enveloped by scandal. Pastrana still trusts the Colombian Army, but many of
its units have been accused of complicity in human rights violations.

A further complication is the fact that President Pastrana has begun peace
talks with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (F.A.R.C.), the
country's largest leftist insurgent force and the protector of many drug
growers. Those negotiations have further inflamed a rival, right-wing
guerrilla group that the State Department has called a bunch of murderous
thugs. There is little chance of waging the drug war in Colombia without
also becoming involved in a multilayered civil war.

Moreover, unless peace is achieved soon, the American aid seems destined to
provoke an arms race. As Gen. Fred F. Woerner, the former commander of our
forces in Latin America, has said: "What you can absolutely count on is
that with the Blackhawks or the beefed-up Hueys, the bad guys are going to
acquire surface-to-air missiles. Helicopters will be shot down. The
question is, will we replace them?"

It is but one question among many. The pending aid package is for two
years, the time needed to deliver all the helicopters. But General
McCaffrey has told Congress to expect at least a five-year effort in
Colombia. Others warn that an effective campaign will simply push the coca
planting back into Peru or into neighboring regions of Venezuela and Brazil.

And alas, the escalating war abroad will only divert attention from the
ultimate policy question at home: are attacks on the supply of drugs really
more effective than major efforts to reduce demand? The cost of federal
anti-drug programs during the Clinton years has doubled to nearly $20
billion, but only one-fifth of that goes for treating addicts. States and
cities have spent vastly greater sums and filled their prisons with 400,000
violators of drug laws. But that has had no apparent effect on street
supplies. Concerned media could dig into that conundrum without even
worrying about kidnap insurance.