News (Media Awareness Project) - US: Soldiering On |
Title: | US: Soldiering On |
Published On: | 2000-06-02 |
Source: | The Retired Officer Magazine (US) |
Fetched On: | 2008-09-03 20:53:25 |
SOLDIERING ON
I've seen more misery in this job, by far, than I did in any combat tour,"
says Gen. Barry R. McCaffrey, USA-Ret., director of the White House Office
of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP). McCaffrey, 57, has served as the
nation's drug czar since February 1996, when he accepted the cabinet-level
appointment and retired as commander in chief (CINC), U.S. Southern Command
at the time the Army's youngest, most highly decorated four-star officer.
McCaffrey saw a little combat in the Dominican Republic in 1965 and a lot
during two tours in South Vietnam. He commanded the 24th Infantry Division
(Mechanized) when it delivered the "left hook" to Iraqi forces during the
Persian Gulf War. For heroism in Vietnam, McCaffrey twice was awarded the
Distinguished Service Cross and twice the Silver Star. He is interviewed
here by contributing editor Tom Philpott.
P: You didn't choose a relaxing second career when you opted to shape the
United States' strategy on illegal drug use.
M: I didn't volunteer. I had a terrific joint assignment in Latin America.
My wife and I were happy with the responsibilities. But the [ONDCP] had
been politicized badly. Both parties in Congress defunded it. The president
had to veto that action. My predecessor, Lee Brown, police chief for three
huge cities, was a good man. But he was ground up by the political process
and walked away from it.
I told [the White House] I did not want the job, but I defined how the
person who took it could be more successful. My name went to the front of
the pack for several reasons. Most important was, I was confirmable by the
Senate. I also took the job because my dad [Lt. Gen. William McCaffrey,
USA-Ret.,] told me to. He had 37 years in uniform, eight in combat, three
wars. He said, "If you think you can make a difference, take it on."
P: How would you characterize the progress your office has made in the drug
war since you took the helm four years ago?
M: We've tried to redefine that metaphor for the antidrug effort in
America. "Drug war" has some serious failings for organizing ourselves to
confront the issue. A more helpful way is to describe it as a cancer
affecting American communities.
The overwhelming majority of Americans don't use illegal drugs.
Unfortunately, around 6 percent do. Seventy percent of them have jobs; they
are overwhelmingly white, and they're lousy employees with [high rates
of] absenteeism, and [being] late for work, and industrial accidents. They
do huge amounts of damage. The numbers are 52,000 deaths a year and $110
billion in damages.
Possibly 5 million people end up chronically addicted. They consume
two-thirds of all illegal drugs and absolutely dominate discussion of every
issue that makes you sad about America. Of the 2 million people behind
bars, as many as 85 percent have a chronic drug or alcohol abuse problem.
They're there because they're unemployed or physically ill, they've changed
the neurochemistry of their brain, they're alienated from their families,
and they're involved in criminal behavior. You can't live a moral life when
you are chronically addicted.
So the war metaphor isn't the best. But if it is a war, then we're winning.
Our peak of illegal drug use was 1979 when 14.1 percent of the population
were past-month drug users. By the way, [at that time] a third of the U.S.
Army was past-month drug users. Since then, drug use in America is down by
50 percent. Cocaine use is down by more than 70 percent. Drug-related
murders are down by 50 percent since 1985.
When I got this job, these figures were the larger context. But adolescent
drug use was up sharply. It had tripled among eighth graders, doubled among
12- to 17-year-olds. Now, we've leveled it out, and this year announced a
13 percent reduction in drug use by adolescents.
To see the future of chronic drug use in your community, look at your
middle school kids and what we call gateway drug-taking behavior. A decade
later, an enhanced percentage of that population will turn into chronic
addicts. That's why the heart and soul of our national drug strategy has to
be prevention and education, to minimize or delay drug-taking behavior by
kids from sixth through 12th grade. People don't turn 25 and start using
heroin or cocaine.
At the same time, drug use has to be against the law and vigorously
prosecuted. Finally, we've had some achievements in the international
community. We've reduced cocaine production by 19 percent in four years.
Though a disaster is unfolding in Colombia, there have been such huge
successes in Peru and Bolivia that, overall, cocaine production is down
dramatically.
The House of Representatives passed a bill in late March allocating $1.7
billion to help train and equip security forces in Colombia and other
Andean countries to fight drug traffickers. That congressional action
suggests there is a rising threat to this country. But you're indicating
the money is needed more to save Colombia.
Poor Colombia has become a nexus of criminal drug activity, threatening not
just the United States but the global community. Ninety percent of cocaine
in America originates in, or is transited out of, Colombia. Over 70 percent
of heroin seized last year was Colombian. But your assessment is correct:
Colombia is threatened by money produced by heroin and cocaine production.
[With it, insurgents and paramilitary forces] control 40 percent of the
land area of the country. They assassinate mayors, bribe journalists and
legislators, and shoot down aircraft. They've got helicopters, and
airplanes, and wiretap equipment, and more machine guns than Colombian army
battalions.
P: How do you answer critics who worry we're slipping into a quagmire that
will lead to U.S. casualties and greater U.S. involvement there?
M: First, I ask if we believe our own rhetoric, that illegal drugs cost us
52,000 lives a year and $110 billion in damages. Do we believe Colombia is
the source of 90 percent of the cocaine, more than 70 percent of the heroin
in America? If we do, then a small investment in a fellow democracy three
hours' flight away from Miami, which has seen a half million citizens flee
the country in the last two years, sounds like self-defense to me. And put
this in context. The House bill also supports Peru and Bolivia, which have
cut drug production by more than half in three years. This program will
help protect America.
Second, half of our program for Colombia is [in the form of] 63
helicopters. I had 108 helicopters in my division when we attacked Iraq.
This is not the Marshall Plan. And as a Vietnam veteran, with a daughter
who's a captain in the Army and a son who's an infantry major, you can bet
none of us is talking about putting American troops in combat against drug
lords. The Colombians have to defend their own democratic institutions. But
we ought to be proud to cooperate in regional efforts.
P: Rep. Gene Taylor (D-Miss.) got an amendment through the House that would
limit U.S. personnel on the ground in Colombia to no more than 300. Is that
reasonable?
M: No. He loves the armed forces. But come on. Trust us to do the right
thing for America. Don't put silly caps on. We're not going into Colombia
to fight. We do have a training mission. But I had more than 300 people in
Colombia when I was cinc. I had an engineer battalion building schools and
ports. Does that mean we can't do that anymore? Should we never have a Navy
or Coast Guard ship in Cartagena? We're not going militarily into Colombia.
We're going to support their economy, police, armed forces, judicial
system. We're going to work with them to get drug production, up 140
percent in three years, turned around.
P: Do you see more of America's military resources being committed to drug
interdiction efforts in future years as other world threats lessen?
M: U.S. Southern Command has less than 1 percent of Department of Defense
(DoD) assets. This is not a war-fighting theater. This is a theater of
political-military engagement. It would be inappropriate to try to solve
this broader problem with military force. Our broad-gauged engagement won't
work without military support the awacs (airborne warning and control
system) of the Air Force, P-3s of the Navy, Coast Guard interdiction,
contributions of military intelligence and special operations command. All
are vital, but they are modest in the overall program.
P: Was there a national drug strategy before you took over?
M: Interesting question. One thing I bring to this job is planning. I was
the Army's strategic planner, the joint strategic planner, Gen. [Colin]
Powell's National Security Council guy. So I had intellectual tools you get
from DoD where you organize one of the world's largest activities. I knew I
had to have a strategy. Turns out there was one, but I'd never heard of it
even as a cinc. It was an annual document, a throwaway. We said, "No, we've
got to have a strategy." We also demanded, and got written into law, a
requirement for me to produce each year a five-year budget estimate for
programs. And we had the law rewritten to demand that I create performance
measures of effectiveness. Now we're building a database to measure how
programs are achieving their purpose.
P: You also beefed up the staff.
M: I said to the secretary of Defense, "I'm not going over there if you
don't give me 30 military detailees." I needed some planners. Now, the
staff directors of the four major subcomponents of the [ONDCP] are all full
colonels. My deputy chief of staff was a full colonel. The intelligence
officer and some planners are military. This tiny number of military
officers gave a very different tempo and discipline [to] what was
essentially a dispirited, undermanned, confused group of civilians.
P: Will that military element be perpetuated?
M: It darn sure better be. There's a billion dollars of DoD money involved,
out of $19.2 billion overall. There are national security aspects to it.
The National Guard, the Air Force and Navy, Army Special Forces, our
intelligence system are all part of this effort. So there's certainly room
for the small number of very talented, dedicated military officers.
P: What is your drug strategy?
M: There are five goals [and] 31 objectives, common sense kinds of things.
The dominant goal is to motivate American youngsters to reject the use of
illegal drugs, as well as alcohol and tobacco. That's the heart and soul of
the program. Goals two and three relate to the 5 million [already]
chronically addicted to drugs. We've got to get organized to reduce the
social and criminal consequences of their drug abuse and abject misery.
[Goals four and five are to shield U.S. frontiers from the drug threat and
to break foreign and U.S. sources of supply.]
It's unbelievable what drug abuse does to people. We've got chronic addicts
16 years old, but most tend to be in their 30s. They're HIV-positive.
They've got hepatitis, tuberculosis, and leg sores. They are creatures who
are literally disgusting and every one of them is somebody's baby. I
mean, they're the children of America. We've got to get them into treatment
and link that effort to the criminal justice, welfare, and health care
systems. If I'm addicted, my dearest wish is that I be allowed to continue
my addictive behavior. You've got to grab me when I end up in one of those
three places and engage me.
P: What factors lead someone to abuse illegal drugs?
M: People use drugs for two broad reasons. One group uses them because they
need to feel better. They have an underlying mental health problem that
[often] starts in adolescence, and they are literally self-medicating. Of
course, the more you use illegal drugs, the worse your mental health
problem becomes.
The second group likes the effect of the drugs on the brain. There are 12
families of drugs that change the neurochemistry of the brain's reward
pathway. We can take a picture of it in real time. And when you use these
drugs you feel intense pleasure that far outweighs drinking water, sex,
eating food, watching a sunset, anything that gives the pleasure sensation.
The problem is, most people who use these substances end up permanently
rewiring their brain chemistry. Then they no longer use drugs because
they're having fun. They're trying to avoid misery.
P: Why are some kids more prone than others to abuse drugs?
M: Many of us who might like to try them have what we call protective
factors. If I eat supper with my parents five nights a week, that's a
protective factor. If I go to church or synagogue or I'm involved in teen
sports, those are protective factors. If I have a lot of these, there's an
extremely low likelihood I'll be out using pot and beer, the worst drugs of
adolescence. In combination, they significantly enhance the risk that a
young person will end up a chronic abuser. By the way, 80 percent of the
12- to 17-year-olds have never touched an illegal drug. And the number one
reason: "I don't want to disappoint my parents."
P: What has been your greatest challenge?
M: Life without sergeants is mean and brutish. That's my strongest
impression of being a civilian. Getting people who can organize activities
and do things that are practical. That's what sergeants and petty officers
do. It's the reason I stayed in the Army. I liked being around infantry
sergeants. I do have one Air Force master sergeant who runs this entire
place, and I say that only half tongue in cheek.
P: The way you've set up ONDCP, you almost need a military person to run
it, don't you? And given how the office was once so politicized, I presume
you wouldn't like to see it become a political favor for somebody.
M: Lawyers have a good generalist background. I work with people now from a
bunch of professions whom I would love to work for myself. An incredible
emergency room physician. I've met college presidents who are enormously
capable. There are lots of backgrounds that might well be useful. The
mayors of America are so close to the people they can't posture on issues.
There's another fruitful place to look for leadership.
P: Did your own military background bump up against more traditional ways
of addressing the drug challenge?
M: One new aspect of this job is that I'm all over this country now. I
travel a third of the time. There are 31 areas of the country I've
designated as high-intensity drug-trafficking areas, and I'm in and out of
them all the time. I'm on college campuses. I talk to 11,000 Elks. My
exposure to the American people is enormous. One thing I've learned is that
this country is not screwed up. I've never seen such incredible community
leadership. I see modern-day saints all the time, people who deal with our
children, with chronic addicts. I'm upbeat on the American people. And I'll
tell you, a majority of them are thrilled they've got some general running
the program. I have enormous credibility. I'm not in uniform, but when I
deal with Congress they assume correctly, I might add, having turned in
my retirement pay for this job that I'm here to defend the American people.
I do think there's still lingering animus, particularly in the Vietnam-age
population. But when I'm dealing with law enforcement [personnel] and
educators and young kids, my background is the best thing I have going. And
if I had a sergeant major with me, I'd be in great shape.
P: There was an incident early in the first Clinton administration when,
during one of your visits to the White House, a staffer reportedly told you
she didn't talk to military people. You don't get that response today, I
presume?
M: There was an incident outside the White House. But there's a test
coming, Tom. I had just walked out of the southern entrance, passing an
attractive woman. I'm in uniform. Fifteen rows of ribbons. A beautiful day.
I said, happily, "Hello. How are you?" She said, "I don't talk to the
military," and stomped by me. I don't actually know if she was in the
administration, but I assume she was. I went back [to the Pentagon] and
talked about it to many people. The gays-in-the-military dispute was going
on. I said, "Here it comes again, a sense of alienation." But here's the
test: How old was the woman, 25 or 45?
P: My impression was 25.
M: Wrong. I have never encountered anything but respectful, courteous
behavior from young people. This woman was 45 or 50. It was Vietnam, as a
bubble, traveling through our society.
P: How does this job stack up against your past military assignments?
M: What drug abuse does to a human being is almost beyond belief. And the
pathology of drug abuse won't ever go away. But we fought against ignorance
for over 200 years and haven't declared total victory. We understand that
in every generation, every year, a new group of kids shows up and we have
to shape their attitude, educate and civilize them. That's what we have to
do with drug abuse.
I've been enormously grateful to be in this job. It's given me even greater
confidence in the American people. The mayors, police chiefs, sheriffs,
high school principals, and kids I deal with are good reminders that this
country is in great shape.
I've seen more misery in this job, by far, than I did in any combat tour,"
says Gen. Barry R. McCaffrey, USA-Ret., director of the White House Office
of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP). McCaffrey, 57, has served as the
nation's drug czar since February 1996, when he accepted the cabinet-level
appointment and retired as commander in chief (CINC), U.S. Southern Command
at the time the Army's youngest, most highly decorated four-star officer.
McCaffrey saw a little combat in the Dominican Republic in 1965 and a lot
during two tours in South Vietnam. He commanded the 24th Infantry Division
(Mechanized) when it delivered the "left hook" to Iraqi forces during the
Persian Gulf War. For heroism in Vietnam, McCaffrey twice was awarded the
Distinguished Service Cross and twice the Silver Star. He is interviewed
here by contributing editor Tom Philpott.
P: You didn't choose a relaxing second career when you opted to shape the
United States' strategy on illegal drug use.
M: I didn't volunteer. I had a terrific joint assignment in Latin America.
My wife and I were happy with the responsibilities. But the [ONDCP] had
been politicized badly. Both parties in Congress defunded it. The president
had to veto that action. My predecessor, Lee Brown, police chief for three
huge cities, was a good man. But he was ground up by the political process
and walked away from it.
I told [the White House] I did not want the job, but I defined how the
person who took it could be more successful. My name went to the front of
the pack for several reasons. Most important was, I was confirmable by the
Senate. I also took the job because my dad [Lt. Gen. William McCaffrey,
USA-Ret.,] told me to. He had 37 years in uniform, eight in combat, three
wars. He said, "If you think you can make a difference, take it on."
P: How would you characterize the progress your office has made in the drug
war since you took the helm four years ago?
M: We've tried to redefine that metaphor for the antidrug effort in
America. "Drug war" has some serious failings for organizing ourselves to
confront the issue. A more helpful way is to describe it as a cancer
affecting American communities.
The overwhelming majority of Americans don't use illegal drugs.
Unfortunately, around 6 percent do. Seventy percent of them have jobs; they
are overwhelmingly white, and they're lousy employees with [high rates
of] absenteeism, and [being] late for work, and industrial accidents. They
do huge amounts of damage. The numbers are 52,000 deaths a year and $110
billion in damages.
Possibly 5 million people end up chronically addicted. They consume
two-thirds of all illegal drugs and absolutely dominate discussion of every
issue that makes you sad about America. Of the 2 million people behind
bars, as many as 85 percent have a chronic drug or alcohol abuse problem.
They're there because they're unemployed or physically ill, they've changed
the neurochemistry of their brain, they're alienated from their families,
and they're involved in criminal behavior. You can't live a moral life when
you are chronically addicted.
So the war metaphor isn't the best. But if it is a war, then we're winning.
Our peak of illegal drug use was 1979 when 14.1 percent of the population
were past-month drug users. By the way, [at that time] a third of the U.S.
Army was past-month drug users. Since then, drug use in America is down by
50 percent. Cocaine use is down by more than 70 percent. Drug-related
murders are down by 50 percent since 1985.
When I got this job, these figures were the larger context. But adolescent
drug use was up sharply. It had tripled among eighth graders, doubled among
12- to 17-year-olds. Now, we've leveled it out, and this year announced a
13 percent reduction in drug use by adolescents.
To see the future of chronic drug use in your community, look at your
middle school kids and what we call gateway drug-taking behavior. A decade
later, an enhanced percentage of that population will turn into chronic
addicts. That's why the heart and soul of our national drug strategy has to
be prevention and education, to minimize or delay drug-taking behavior by
kids from sixth through 12th grade. People don't turn 25 and start using
heroin or cocaine.
At the same time, drug use has to be against the law and vigorously
prosecuted. Finally, we've had some achievements in the international
community. We've reduced cocaine production by 19 percent in four years.
Though a disaster is unfolding in Colombia, there have been such huge
successes in Peru and Bolivia that, overall, cocaine production is down
dramatically.
The House of Representatives passed a bill in late March allocating $1.7
billion to help train and equip security forces in Colombia and other
Andean countries to fight drug traffickers. That congressional action
suggests there is a rising threat to this country. But you're indicating
the money is needed more to save Colombia.
Poor Colombia has become a nexus of criminal drug activity, threatening not
just the United States but the global community. Ninety percent of cocaine
in America originates in, or is transited out of, Colombia. Over 70 percent
of heroin seized last year was Colombian. But your assessment is correct:
Colombia is threatened by money produced by heroin and cocaine production.
[With it, insurgents and paramilitary forces] control 40 percent of the
land area of the country. They assassinate mayors, bribe journalists and
legislators, and shoot down aircraft. They've got helicopters, and
airplanes, and wiretap equipment, and more machine guns than Colombian army
battalions.
P: How do you answer critics who worry we're slipping into a quagmire that
will lead to U.S. casualties and greater U.S. involvement there?
M: First, I ask if we believe our own rhetoric, that illegal drugs cost us
52,000 lives a year and $110 billion in damages. Do we believe Colombia is
the source of 90 percent of the cocaine, more than 70 percent of the heroin
in America? If we do, then a small investment in a fellow democracy three
hours' flight away from Miami, which has seen a half million citizens flee
the country in the last two years, sounds like self-defense to me. And put
this in context. The House bill also supports Peru and Bolivia, which have
cut drug production by more than half in three years. This program will
help protect America.
Second, half of our program for Colombia is [in the form of] 63
helicopters. I had 108 helicopters in my division when we attacked Iraq.
This is not the Marshall Plan. And as a Vietnam veteran, with a daughter
who's a captain in the Army and a son who's an infantry major, you can bet
none of us is talking about putting American troops in combat against drug
lords. The Colombians have to defend their own democratic institutions. But
we ought to be proud to cooperate in regional efforts.
P: Rep. Gene Taylor (D-Miss.) got an amendment through the House that would
limit U.S. personnel on the ground in Colombia to no more than 300. Is that
reasonable?
M: No. He loves the armed forces. But come on. Trust us to do the right
thing for America. Don't put silly caps on. We're not going into Colombia
to fight. We do have a training mission. But I had more than 300 people in
Colombia when I was cinc. I had an engineer battalion building schools and
ports. Does that mean we can't do that anymore? Should we never have a Navy
or Coast Guard ship in Cartagena? We're not going militarily into Colombia.
We're going to support their economy, police, armed forces, judicial
system. We're going to work with them to get drug production, up 140
percent in three years, turned around.
P: Do you see more of America's military resources being committed to drug
interdiction efforts in future years as other world threats lessen?
M: U.S. Southern Command has less than 1 percent of Department of Defense
(DoD) assets. This is not a war-fighting theater. This is a theater of
political-military engagement. It would be inappropriate to try to solve
this broader problem with military force. Our broad-gauged engagement won't
work without military support the awacs (airborne warning and control
system) of the Air Force, P-3s of the Navy, Coast Guard interdiction,
contributions of military intelligence and special operations command. All
are vital, but they are modest in the overall program.
P: Was there a national drug strategy before you took over?
M: Interesting question. One thing I bring to this job is planning. I was
the Army's strategic planner, the joint strategic planner, Gen. [Colin]
Powell's National Security Council guy. So I had intellectual tools you get
from DoD where you organize one of the world's largest activities. I knew I
had to have a strategy. Turns out there was one, but I'd never heard of it
even as a cinc. It was an annual document, a throwaway. We said, "No, we've
got to have a strategy." We also demanded, and got written into law, a
requirement for me to produce each year a five-year budget estimate for
programs. And we had the law rewritten to demand that I create performance
measures of effectiveness. Now we're building a database to measure how
programs are achieving their purpose.
P: You also beefed up the staff.
M: I said to the secretary of Defense, "I'm not going over there if you
don't give me 30 military detailees." I needed some planners. Now, the
staff directors of the four major subcomponents of the [ONDCP] are all full
colonels. My deputy chief of staff was a full colonel. The intelligence
officer and some planners are military. This tiny number of military
officers gave a very different tempo and discipline [to] what was
essentially a dispirited, undermanned, confused group of civilians.
P: Will that military element be perpetuated?
M: It darn sure better be. There's a billion dollars of DoD money involved,
out of $19.2 billion overall. There are national security aspects to it.
The National Guard, the Air Force and Navy, Army Special Forces, our
intelligence system are all part of this effort. So there's certainly room
for the small number of very talented, dedicated military officers.
P: What is your drug strategy?
M: There are five goals [and] 31 objectives, common sense kinds of things.
The dominant goal is to motivate American youngsters to reject the use of
illegal drugs, as well as alcohol and tobacco. That's the heart and soul of
the program. Goals two and three relate to the 5 million [already]
chronically addicted to drugs. We've got to get organized to reduce the
social and criminal consequences of their drug abuse and abject misery.
[Goals four and five are to shield U.S. frontiers from the drug threat and
to break foreign and U.S. sources of supply.]
It's unbelievable what drug abuse does to people. We've got chronic addicts
16 years old, but most tend to be in their 30s. They're HIV-positive.
They've got hepatitis, tuberculosis, and leg sores. They are creatures who
are literally disgusting and every one of them is somebody's baby. I
mean, they're the children of America. We've got to get them into treatment
and link that effort to the criminal justice, welfare, and health care
systems. If I'm addicted, my dearest wish is that I be allowed to continue
my addictive behavior. You've got to grab me when I end up in one of those
three places and engage me.
P: What factors lead someone to abuse illegal drugs?
M: People use drugs for two broad reasons. One group uses them because they
need to feel better. They have an underlying mental health problem that
[often] starts in adolescence, and they are literally self-medicating. Of
course, the more you use illegal drugs, the worse your mental health
problem becomes.
The second group likes the effect of the drugs on the brain. There are 12
families of drugs that change the neurochemistry of the brain's reward
pathway. We can take a picture of it in real time. And when you use these
drugs you feel intense pleasure that far outweighs drinking water, sex,
eating food, watching a sunset, anything that gives the pleasure sensation.
The problem is, most people who use these substances end up permanently
rewiring their brain chemistry. Then they no longer use drugs because
they're having fun. They're trying to avoid misery.
P: Why are some kids more prone than others to abuse drugs?
M: Many of us who might like to try them have what we call protective
factors. If I eat supper with my parents five nights a week, that's a
protective factor. If I go to church or synagogue or I'm involved in teen
sports, those are protective factors. If I have a lot of these, there's an
extremely low likelihood I'll be out using pot and beer, the worst drugs of
adolescence. In combination, they significantly enhance the risk that a
young person will end up a chronic abuser. By the way, 80 percent of the
12- to 17-year-olds have never touched an illegal drug. And the number one
reason: "I don't want to disappoint my parents."
P: What has been your greatest challenge?
M: Life without sergeants is mean and brutish. That's my strongest
impression of being a civilian. Getting people who can organize activities
and do things that are practical. That's what sergeants and petty officers
do. It's the reason I stayed in the Army. I liked being around infantry
sergeants. I do have one Air Force master sergeant who runs this entire
place, and I say that only half tongue in cheek.
P: The way you've set up ONDCP, you almost need a military person to run
it, don't you? And given how the office was once so politicized, I presume
you wouldn't like to see it become a political favor for somebody.
M: Lawyers have a good generalist background. I work with people now from a
bunch of professions whom I would love to work for myself. An incredible
emergency room physician. I've met college presidents who are enormously
capable. There are lots of backgrounds that might well be useful. The
mayors of America are so close to the people they can't posture on issues.
There's another fruitful place to look for leadership.
P: Did your own military background bump up against more traditional ways
of addressing the drug challenge?
M: One new aspect of this job is that I'm all over this country now. I
travel a third of the time. There are 31 areas of the country I've
designated as high-intensity drug-trafficking areas, and I'm in and out of
them all the time. I'm on college campuses. I talk to 11,000 Elks. My
exposure to the American people is enormous. One thing I've learned is that
this country is not screwed up. I've never seen such incredible community
leadership. I see modern-day saints all the time, people who deal with our
children, with chronic addicts. I'm upbeat on the American people. And I'll
tell you, a majority of them are thrilled they've got some general running
the program. I have enormous credibility. I'm not in uniform, but when I
deal with Congress they assume correctly, I might add, having turned in
my retirement pay for this job that I'm here to defend the American people.
I do think there's still lingering animus, particularly in the Vietnam-age
population. But when I'm dealing with law enforcement [personnel] and
educators and young kids, my background is the best thing I have going. And
if I had a sergeant major with me, I'd be in great shape.
P: There was an incident early in the first Clinton administration when,
during one of your visits to the White House, a staffer reportedly told you
she didn't talk to military people. You don't get that response today, I
presume?
M: There was an incident outside the White House. But there's a test
coming, Tom. I had just walked out of the southern entrance, passing an
attractive woman. I'm in uniform. Fifteen rows of ribbons. A beautiful day.
I said, happily, "Hello. How are you?" She said, "I don't talk to the
military," and stomped by me. I don't actually know if she was in the
administration, but I assume she was. I went back [to the Pentagon] and
talked about it to many people. The gays-in-the-military dispute was going
on. I said, "Here it comes again, a sense of alienation." But here's the
test: How old was the woman, 25 or 45?
P: My impression was 25.
M: Wrong. I have never encountered anything but respectful, courteous
behavior from young people. This woman was 45 or 50. It was Vietnam, as a
bubble, traveling through our society.
P: How does this job stack up against your past military assignments?
M: What drug abuse does to a human being is almost beyond belief. And the
pathology of drug abuse won't ever go away. But we fought against ignorance
for over 200 years and haven't declared total victory. We understand that
in every generation, every year, a new group of kids shows up and we have
to shape their attitude, educate and civilize them. That's what we have to
do with drug abuse.
I've been enormously grateful to be in this job. It's given me even greater
confidence in the American people. The mayors, police chiefs, sheriffs,
high school principals, and kids I deal with are good reminders that this
country is in great shape.
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