DESTRUCTIVE WAR ON DRUGS

A Rand study financed by the U . S . Army and the government
drug-control agencies found that funds spent on domestic drug
treatment were 23 times as effective as "source country control"
(Clinton's Colombian aid plan), 11 times as effective as interdiction,
and 7 times as effective as domestic law enforcement. The "drug war"
targets poor peasants abroad and poor people at home; by the use of
force, instead of constructive measures to alleviate problems at a
fraction of the cost. Sending more weapons and providing more training
to Colombian forces would only add fuel to the fire and do nothing to
stem the flow of drugs into this country.

The "drug war" is completely misguided and has proven its
ineffectiveness time and time again. The agencies that implement this
policy have established themselves as an industry and the failure to
deal realistically with the problems is being driven by self-interest
and greed by the weapons makers and oil companies, along with their
cohorts in Congress and the Pentagon.

There is a very thin, blurry line between "drug interdiction" and
"counter-insurgency" operations. Military assistance and other
counternarcotics programs may lead the United States into a
counterinsurgency mission that it has not decided to pursue. How to
keep U.S. military personnel, and the counter-drug forces they train
and equip, from getting too deeply involved in Colombia's bloody civil
conflict? About 300 U.S. military advisers are already on the ground
in Colombia on any given day.

The House Armed Service Committee stated in its May 1999 report on the
2000 National Defense Authorization Act, "While the committee supports
more direct involvement by the Colombian government in the war on
drugsthe committee is concerned with the expanding role of the U.S.
military in domestic Colombian Affairs."

U.S. aid to Colombia should be used to help build economic and social
infrastructures, and to strengthen democratic institutions, not to
escalate a bloody civil war. We should reduce the amount of money in
this aid package targeted for military assistance, and increase the
amount for constructive programs. A 50/50 balance would represent a
good start. We also need to have operable restrictions on the use of
military assistance and aid, and a clearly stated mission for any U.S.
troop involvement in Colombia before we find ourselves in another
situation that overextends our reach.

Philip L. Aaronson

Wakefield