NEW US AID TO COLOMBIA- DEEPER INTO THE ANTIDRUG MIRE

DAVIDSON, N.C.-Between the years 1994 and 1998 the United States went to
extremes to isolate the then-president of Colombia, Ernesto Samper, as it
suspected him of receiving $ 6 million in campaign contributions from the
Cali drug cartel.

Yet, the US continued fighting its war on drugs in Colombia by circumventing
Mr. Samper's office and working directly with the Colombian National Police
and its highly respected commander Gen. Rosso Jos Serrano. Many US officials
now admit the isolation of Samper was a mistake because it weakened the
Colombian state at the very time both paramilitary and guerrilla groups were
gaining strength in the countryside.

Now, believing the situation in Colombia could spin further out of control
and possibly spread into neighboring countries, the Clinton administration
is trying to compensate for its earlier misguided policies - and the
continued failure of the war on drugs in general - by sending $ 1.3 billion
over the next two years in mostly counternarcotics-related assistance to
Samper's successor Andrs Pastrana.

This $ 1.3 billion is more than all of the US military aid sent to combat a
leftist insurgency in El Salvador during the 1980s.

Many policymakers in Washington seem to be arguing that the massive size of
this aid package alone ensures that it will be able to at once stabilize
Colombia and win the long and elusive war on drugs. Yet, the type of
"reform" promoted by Washington is predicated on domestic political concerns
rather than the situation in Colombia. It could potentially do even greater
harm than was done during the Samper years.

Both Congress and the executive branch are well aware the American public
remains weary of military involvement in complex conflicts in "far away"
lands. With this in mind, the White House has continued to insist aid be
geared toward only drugs, not guerrilla insurgencies. Indeed, the massive
package, agreed on this month by the House and Senate is predicated on
vastly increasing the Colombian military's involvement in coca and poppy
fumigation and the destruction of clandestine cocaine-producing
laboratories.

Yet, a more stable Colombia - something all agree is the first step in
addressing the drug problem - will not come about because the Colombian
military is better able to fumigate coca plants and "bust" drug labs.

Rather, peace will only come when the Colombian military can better ensure
citizen safety and increase its battlefield strength to force guerrillas
into a negotiated settlement - prerequisites for the establishment of rule
of law in any society.

In rural Colombia a large portion of civilians live under constant fear of
violence from right-wing paramilitaries or leftist guerrillas, groups that
both use civilians as pawns in efforts to increase their areas of control.
Making matters worse, few Colombians have any faith that the military -
normally the logical institution to take charge of this problem - is
committed to protecting them. This dire scenario might lead some to conclude
that the US should stay far away from the inept and often abusive Colombian
military; that any assistance would only exacerbate an already bad
situation.

But, in Colombia, as in a number of "failed states" around the world, there
are rarely "good" options. Instead, there are "least bad" ones. In this
case, what Colombia needs is a more professional military committed to
protecting the 98 percent of the Colombians who support peace. Only when the
Colombian military is considered legitimate by citizens in the areas of
conflict will it ever be able to pressure the guerrillas effectively for a
negotiated settlement. A peace agreement with guerrillas could then
potentially isolate the paramilitary groups, forcing them to reconsider
their violent ways. Only after it's clear that the military is firmly
committed to this reform path could substantial US aid truly make a
difference.

Over the past year, both Congress and the administration have realized that
a more effective military is a key to peace in Colombia. Yet, driven by the
powerful domestic political allure of "doing something about the drug
problem," the US now promotes the "reform" of the Colombian military by
vastly increasing its counternarcotics operations, efforts that until
recently were carried out almost exclusively by the Colombian National
Police. This type of support enables administration officials to claim the
US is only "fighting drugs," not getting involved in counterinsurgency. But
it does little to push the Colombian military toward reform that would help
reduce rural violence and improve its negotiating position with guerrilla
insurgents. In other words, a military that is essentially a larger version
of the National Police is a reinforcement of the status quo, not the the
type of stronger military Colombia needs.

Nor is there certainty among policymakers that more antidrug aid would even
be able to make a dent in Colombia's cultivation and export of illicit
crops. For instance, the linchpin of the revved up antidrug assistance is
the delivery of more than 50 helicopters, including several state-of-the-art
Blackhawks and the creation of several "elite" counternarcotics battalions
culled from the ranks of the Colombian military.

Yet, US diplomats in Bogota insist quietly that there is absolutely no way
the Colombian military is able to handle the massive influx of armaments. In
the past year there has been more than one Blackhawk accident involving
poorly trained Colombian pilots; also, the first "crack" counternarcotics
battalion inaugurated last year is still far from full combat readiness.

If current policy runs its course over the next several years, the US will
pump more than $ 1 billion into Colombia to push the military into a highly
dubious drug war.

But even if the US did redirect aid toward a more comprehensive reform of
the Colombian military, this too would fail unless the Colombian political
and economic elites decide something drastic is needed to improve military
legitimacy.

During the Vietnam War, the US continued to supply various South Vietnamese
regimes even when it was clear the South Vietnamese population was
ambivalent in its commitment to fight the enemy.

In Colombia, a firm resolve to do something about the decades-long and
increasingly violent civil conflict is still lacking, and no amount of US
aid will make a dent in the situation until this changes. For example, to
date combat troops in the Colombian military are predominantly from the
lower classes, while high school and college graduates are exempt from
combat duty.

Ultimately, Colombians are responsible for the terrible conflict that has
plagued their country. Hopefully someday soon they'll also be responsible
for resolving it.

While it almost seems like it's part of the American psyche to believe the
US can solve other nations' problems, foreign aid will only promote peace in
Colombia once there are clear signals the military is committed to reform.
This aid should go not toward what's politically most expedient in
Washington, but for supporting the type of reform that Colombia needs.

Russell Crandall is assistant professor of political science at

Davidson College. He recently spent time in Colombia researching a book
project on US policy toward Colombia during the 1990s.