NEW US AID TO COLOMBIA - DEEPER INTO THE ANTIDRUG MIRE

Davidson, N.C.

Between the years 1994 and 1998 the United States went to extremes to
isolate the then-president of Colombia, Ernesto Samper, as it
suspected him of receiving $6 million in campaign contributions from
the Cali drug cartel.

Yet, the US continued fighting its war on drugs in Colombia by
circumventing Mr. Samper's office and working directly with the
Colombian National Police and its highly respected commander Gen.
Rosso Jose Serrano. Many US officials now admit the isolation of
Samper was a mistake because it weakened the Colombian state at the
very time both paramilitary and guerrilla groups were gaining strength
in the countryside.

Now, believing the situation in Colombia could spin further out of
control and possibly spread into neighboring countries, the Clinton
administration is trying to compensate for its earlier misguided
policies - and the continued failure of the war on drugs in general -
by sending $1.3 billion over the next two years in mostly
counternarcotics-related assistance to Samper's successor Andres Pastrana.

This $1.3 billion is more than all of the US military aid sent to
combat a leftist insurgency in El Salvador during the 1980s.

Many policymakers in Washington seem to be arguing that the massive
size of this aid package alone ensures that it will be able to at once
stabilize Colombia and win the long and elusive war on drugs. Yet, the
type of "reform" promoted by Washington is predicated on domestic
political concerns rather than the situation in Colombia. It could
potentially do even greater harm than was done during the Samper years.

Both Congress and the executive branch are well aware the American
public remains weary of military involvement in complex conflicts in
"far away" lands. With this in mind, the White House has continued to
insist aid be geared toward only drugs, not guerrilla insurgencies.
Indeed, the massive package, agreed on this month by the House and
Senate is predicated on vastly increasing the Colombian military's
involvement in coca and poppy fumigation and the destruction of
clandestine cocaine-producing laboratories.

Yet, a more stable Colombia - something all agree is the first step in
addressing the drug problem - will not come about because the
Colombian military is better able to fumigate coca plants and "bust"
drug labs.

Rather, peace will only come when the Colombian military can better
ensure citizen safety and increase its battlefield strength to force
guerrillas into a negotiated settlement - prerequisites for the
establishment of rule of law in any society.

In rural Colombia a large portion of civilians live under constant
fear of violence from right-wing paramilitaries or leftist guerrillas,
groups that both use civilians as pawns in efforts to increase their
areas of control. Making matters worse, few Colombians have any faith
that the military - normally the logical institution to take charge of
this problem - is committed to protecting them. This dire scenario
might lead some to conclude that the US should stay far away from the
inept and often abusive Colombian military; that any assistance would
only exacerbate an already bad situation.

But, in Colombia, as in a number of "failed states" around the world,
there are rarely "good" options. Instead, there are "least bad" ones.
In this case, what Colombia needs is a more professional military
committed to protecting the 98 percent of the Colombians who support
peace. Only when the Colombian military is considered legitimate by
citizens in the areas of conflict will it ever be able to pressure the
guerrillas effectively for a negotiated settlement. A peace agreement
with guerrillas could then potentially isolate the paramilitary
groups, forcing them to reconsider their violent ways. Only after it's
clear that the military is firmly committed to this reform path could
substantial US aid truly make a difference.

Over the past year, both Congress and the administration have realized
that a more effective military is a key to peace in Colombia. Yet,
driven by the powerful domestic political allure of "doing something
about the drug problem," the US now promotes the "reform" of the
Colombian military by vastly increasing its counternarcotics
operations, efforts that until recently were carried out almost
exclusively by the Colombian National Police. This type of support
enables administration officials to claim the US is only "fighting
drugs," not getting involved in counterinsurgency. But it does little
to push the Colombian military toward reform that would help reduce
rural violence and improve its negotiating position with guerrilla
insurgents. In other words, a military that is essentially a larger
version of the National Police is a reinforcement of the status quo,
not the the type of stronger military Colombia needs.

Nor is there certainty among policymakers that more antidrug aid would
even be able to make a dent in Colombia's cultivation and export of
illicit crops. For instance, the linchpin of the revved up antidrug
assistance is the delivery of more than 50 helicopters, including
several state-of-the-art Blackhawks and the creation of several
"elite" counternarcotics battalions culled from the ranks of the
Colombian military.

Yet, US diplomats in Bogota insist quietly that there is absolutely no
way the Colombian military is able to handle the massive influx of
armaments. In the past year there has been more than one Blackhawk
accident involving poorly trained Colombian pilots; also, the first
"crack" counternarcotics battalion inaugurated last year is still far
from full combat readiness.

If current policy runs its course over the next several years, the US
will pump more than $1 billion into Colombia to push the military into
a highly dubious drug war.

But even if the US did redirect aid toward a more comprehensive reform
of the Colombian military, this too would fail unless the Colombian
political and economic elites decide something drastic is needed to
improve military legitimacy.

During the Vietnam War, the US continued to supply various South
Vietnamese regimes even when it was clear the South Vietnamese
population was ambivalent in its commitment to fight the enemy.

In Colombia, a firm resolve to do something about the decades-long and
increasingly violent civil conflict is still lacking, and no amount of
US aid will make a dent in the situation until this changes. For
example, to date combat troops in the Colombian military are
predominantly from the lower classes, while high school and college
graduates are exempt from combat duty.

Ultimately, Colombians are responsible for the terrible conflict that
has plagued their country. Hopefully someday soon they'll also be
responsible for resolving it.

While it almost seems like it's part of the American psyche to believe
the US can solve other nations' problems, foreign aid will only
promote peace in Colombia once there are clear signals the military is
committed to reform. This aid should go not toward what's politically
most expedient in Washington, but for supporting the type of reform
that Colombia needs.