COLOMBIA'S PLAN

Congress has reconciled two versions of the Colombia aid bill. It provides
$1.3 billion in aid to that beleaguered country. Now the quagmire can
begin. The bill makes it clear that the aid can be used only to curb
narcotics trade rather than to battle rebels who have waged civil war for
two very long decades. However, when those rebels are not busy kidnapping
the wealthy for ransom, they are busy gathering tithes from drug trade
thugs. It does not require great insight to conclude that the rebels will
not look favorably upon a war on drugs that threatens their revenue stream.

The U.S. aid is but a part of an ambitious $7.5 billion plan created by
Colombian President Andres Pastrana and aimed at resolving that miserable,
war-torn and lawless country's ills. Most of the money is to come from
Colombia, but a hefty portion will be borrowed. Pastrana's plan calls for:

* A peace process.

* Shoring up the Colombian economy.

* A counter-drug strategy.

* Justice system reform.

* Democratization and social development.

The key in this strategy is the peace process. If Colombia doesn't make
peace or defeat the country's guerrillas, the other four reforms will not
take place.

Pastrana has tried to make peace. He has courted the rebels. He even took
rebel leaders on a trip to Europe to let them see how other democracies
operate. Such wooing aside, however, drug interdiction is not an attractive
prospect for the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) or the
National Liberation Army (ELN). Both rely on drug-trade payments.

The Senate bill carefully outlines the limits of American involvement in
battling the guerrillas. However, the implications of suppressing coca
production bode ill for the rebels. The plan is to replicate the tactics
used in Peru. There, U.S. and Peruvian forces intercepted and destroyed
coca-laden airplanes. The reduction of transport left coca farmers without
a market for their product.

No one knows exactly how much FARC takes from the drug trade. Estimates
range from $100 million to $500 million a year. Whatever the number, it is
considerable. It means that FARC relies less on ransom demands than ELN
guerillas.

Assuming the Colombian government's success in stemming the tide of cocaine
distribution, the result inevitably would weaken the rebels. The rebel
strategy then would be to thwart the government's eradication strategy. If
experience is any indication, FARC's rebel army is superior to the
Colombian army, which still has strong ties to right-wing counter-insurgent
movements distinguished only by their penchant for torture and terror.

The Pastrana plan's flaw is it depends completely on the notion the rebels
will see the light, lay down arms and join the march to a new Colombia
where justice prevails and farmers grow crops other than coca. Given the
fact that the FARC is a growth industry that controls much of the south -
an area the size of Switzerland - it will require miracles to achieve
peace. The quagmire in the making lies in what inevitably will be certain
American impatience with an inept Colombian army, a justice system that
tolerates murder with impunity and corruption as a way of life. It's not
likely Americans will stand idle. It's such a temptation to meddle,
American style, by throwing troops and equipment to resolve a problem.