WRONG KIND OF WAR

The U.S. Should Try Another Way In The Fight Against Colombia's Drug Lords

Having failed for years to halt Colombia's thriving drug trade the
old-fashioned way, with guns, the U.S. is now pinning hopes on a new weapon
- -- a fungus that would destroy the coca plants used in making cocaine.

It's an appealing idea because, on the surface, it seems to resolve several
frustrating problems simultaneously.

Not only would the fungus combat the flow of cocaine into the U.S., but it
also would do so for far less money than the millions Washington has sent to
Bogota over the years to fight drug traffickers. That, in turn, would
reduce, if not end, the savage crimes that accompany drugs in both Colombia
and the U.S.

For the moment, research into the fungus was used as leverage to win U.S.
congressional approval of $1.3 billion in aid to Colombia to wage a
crackdown on traffickers and their henchmen.

In return for support of that package, Colombian officials agreed to submit
a proposal to the United Nations to conduct research into biological
controls of the coca crop.

For all the advantages that a fungus would offer, however, there are as many
reasons to oppose this form of biological warfare. For one thing, there is
no data yet to suggest that such a coca fungus, officially called fusarium
oxysporum, could result in an environmentally safe herbicide.

Colombian scientists have yet to complete evaluations on safety and
effectiveness, although a Colombian proposal is now before the United
Nations to provide for research on controlling the coca crop.

For another, the U.S. has a poor track record in using biological agents to
fight an enemy, most notably in the spraying of Agent Orange during the
Vietnam War.

The defoliant did eliminate much of the jungle cover that helped the Viet
Cong hide from U.S. and South Vietnamese forces. But it left behind a legacy
of human health ailments that continues to this day, and there are still no
certainties about the long-term effects on the environment.

During times of conventional war, the use of such agents might be justified
to reduce battlefield deaths. But the war on drugs, though rife with
casualties, does not equate with a conventional battlefield.

The enemy in the drug war -- growers to some degree, but mostly the
traffickers in Colombia, and the dealers in the U.S. -- should be challenged
on their own terms. The herbicide approach would inflict a heavy toll on the
Colombian countryside in response to what is a human struggle over poverty
and profits.