THE DOMINICAN CONNECTION

In 1995 a local narcotics squad warned the CIA that a Dominican political
party was raising campaign funds in Philadelphia through sales of heroin
and coke. Now the investigators' careers are in ruins. What happened?

First of a Two-Part Series

October 20, 1995 was a big day in the lives of State Attorney General
narcotics investigator John McLaughlin and his crew.

That's the day they stopped two Dominican nationals in North Philadelphia
and began to learn how cocaine and heroin were being pumped into Philly to
help fund a candidate for the presidency of the Dominican Republic.

Eventually, McLaughlin and the other members of the Bureau of Narcotics
Investigations and Drug Control (BNI) would learn how the DEA had its own
investigations into similar drug-funded campaign financing operations in
New York and New England. They would discover that the CIA was fully aware
that the U.S.-embassy-backed candidate was suspected of drug smuggling. The
BNI also would learn that some Dominican political party members under
investigation for narco-trafficking and money laundering wound up
contributing thousands at a September 1996 New York State Democratic
Committee fundraiser attended by Al Gore.

Then, two weeks after BNI's thwarted attempt to seize more than a
half-million dollars in allegedly drug-tainted campaign funds from the
Dominican presidential candidate, who was on a fundraising trip to the
States, federal and local prosecutors said they would no longer work with
McLaughlin or his team.

After uncovering the Dominican Connection, McLaughlin found that, like
other officers around the country, there was a complete shutdown of his
investigations by prosecutors, who accused him and his partners of lying
and conducting illegal searches and seizures.

Like other officers around the country who found their investigations
thwarted after encountering Dominican drug dealers, McLaughlin and crew
eventually sued law enforcement -- in this case their employer, the State
Attorney General's Office, and their chief doubter, the U.S. Attorney's
Office. The suit was filed after two separate investigations -- one by a
top deputy AG and one a federal grand jury probe by the FBI -- found
McLaughlin and his squad guilty of no crimes or misconduct.

Earlier this month, a Third District Court of Appeals judge ruled that
McLaughlin, Charlie Micewski and Dennis McKeefery -- barring intervention
by the U.S. Supreme Court -- can have their day in court.

What follows is a depiction of events leading up to that lawsuit pieced
together from thousands of pages of federal and local court documents,
internal memos from local, state and federal law enforcement agencies,
confidential CIA, State Department and Interpol documents and McLaughlin's
personal diary.

By the fall of '95, John "Sparky" McLaughlin had already had a very
interesting career in law enforcement when he came upon two Dominican
gentlemen standing near a blue Oldsmobile 88 outside of a tire store at the
corner of American and Somerset, the crossroads of Philadelphia's narcotics
pipelines.

The 42-year-old narcotics investigator for the State Attorney General's
Office had worked his way up from patrolman in the Philadelphia Police
Department's 17th District to Highway Patrol to the Bureau of Narcotics
Investigation and Drug Control, which was always referred to simply as the
BNI, because, face it, there's not much you can do to control drugs.

Those who knew McLaughlin say that the day he signed on with the bureau the
gruff, fu-manchued ball buster was as happy as a cop can get.

It did not take long for Sparky to get a reputation, both in the bureau and
the barrio.

McLaughlin and his longtime buddy Charlie Micewski, a tall, gaunt, balding
version of Gary Cooper, made a formidable team. They became part of a unit
that confiscated tens of millions of dollars worth of cheap, highly pure
cocaine and heroin that was flooding into Philly from Colombia via the
Dominican Republic.

Day after day, hour after hour, they rode around North Philly and
Kensington in a big blue Pathfinder seized from dealers, blaring Clapton's
"Cocaine" and Glenn Frey's "Smuggler's Blues" before making arrests.

Working a dozen hours a day, sometimes more, McLaughlin was a fixture in
the largely Latino community, where people called him Callahan because they
couldn't pronounce McLaughlin.

For all the drugs and guns they seized, for all the dealers arrested,
McLaughlin and the boys had their problems as well. A number of their cases
were overturned because judges didn't believe them, or defense attorneys
raised enough doubts about the context of he-said-she-said situations
narcotics officers wind up in.

It was an interesting career indeed.

And it would only get more so on October 20, 1995.

The more busts McLaughlin and the BNI made, the more investigators
discovered that Dominicans were gaining a larger share of Philly's coke and
heroin distribution. And that many of the dealers were in this country
illegally. Which is why, on this day, McLaughlin and Micewski were
traveling around the barrio with Special Agent Barry Steward of the INS.

What sparked Sparky's interest, according to BNI investigative files and
McLaughlin's personal diaries obtained by City Paper, were the Dominicans
and the car. As Dominican drug trafficking organizations gained a greater
share of the coke and heroin distribution market, the Olds 88 was becoming
the trafficking vehicle of choice, because the big hulking cars could be
easily fitted with secret compartments used to smuggle dope into Philly.

Suspicious of both the car and its former occupants, McLaughlin, who was
parked around the corner, radioed Harry Fernandez, a bilingual Philadelphia
Housing Authority cop on loan to BNI, and told him to take a walk and
listen to what the Dominican gentlemen were saying.

Fernandez, nicknamed Pineapple by BNI members, ambled over, listened a bit
and reported back.

"Spark, they are real nervous," said Fernandez. "They're saying they hope
you don't stop them because the one guy is illegal."

That's all McLaughlin needed to hear. He and Steward walked over to the
Dominicans.

"Hola, amigos," said McLaughlin. "Tiene su identification?"

There was no reply.

"Baaaary, they don't want to play," McLaughlin whined, in mock annoyance.

"That's because you spoke to him in Spanish, Spark," said Steward. "Watch
this."

Steward turned to the Dominicans and spoke very bluntly in English.

"I'm from Immigration and Naturalization and you're on a plane in the next
24 hours if you don't give me some ID."

With that, Daniel Croussett reached into the Olds and produced his alien
registration card.

"See, Spark, I spoke the universal language, AIRPLANE," said Steward.

Jose Primivito Liriano-Ortega, who was in this country illegally, was not
nearly as lucky as Croussett -- who has been suspected of, but never
charged with, involvement in drug trafficking.

As Steward, also known as the "Stew-man" to McLaughlin, worked his cell
phone making arrangements for Mr. Liriano-Ortega's one-way trip back home,
McLaughlin asked Fernandez about the meaning of a pile of papers marked
Triunfo '96 he found in the front seat of the Olds.

"All I can make out are bits and pieces," McLaughlin said to Fernandez.
"Something about the Revolutionary Dominican Party."

McLaughlin told Fernandez to question Croussett. Croussett told Fernandez
that the documents belong to a "political party back in the DR and they're
running Jose Francisco Pena-Gomez for president in the elections in May."

After Fernandez explained the document's significance, McLaughlin cuffed
Liriano-Ortega, put him in the car and drove off.

Later that day, Liriano-Ortega was deported via an airplane out of Newark,
headed for Santo Domingo.

It was the end of the line for Liriano-Ortega.

But the beginning of a big mess for McLaughlin's team, whom a supervisor
would later dub "The Bastard Squad."

Triunfo '96 was essentially a guide for "organizing an estimated 1.2
million Dominicans who presently reside outside The Dominican Republic to
overthrow the present regime in the elections scheduled for May 1996,"
according to a supplement report McLaughlin filed in January 1996.

Armed with this knowledge, McLaughlin called for two of his better
informants, "6's" and "P-Man."

"I'm going to see what they know about this Revolutionary Dominican Party,"
McLaughlin said to his partner, Dennis McKeefery, whose brush-cut hair went
nicely with his crisp, military demeanor. "You know, this guy we stopped,
Daniel Croussett, is the brother of Carmen Croussett. We pinched her on
October 3 in possession of 86 grams of cocaine and over 4,000 crack vials."

McLaughlin set up a meeting between "6's" and Wilson Prichett, a short,
reedy man who spoke in a nervous staccato. Prichett was a former State
Department field observer and Operations Officer for the Central
Intelligence Agency hired by the BNI to serve as an intelligence analyst.

If anyone could figure out the meaning of Triunfo '96, it was Prichett.

On Oct. 26, 1995, Wilson Prichett wrote a confidential memo to John
Sunderhauf, regional director of the BNI Philly office, about the PRD.

The memo stated that the BNI officers had stumbled onto something big.

Too big for them to handle by themselves.

"A recent incident has political implications which go far beyond Region
IX's responsibilities for investigation of narcotics trafficking," Prichett
wrote.

Prichett wanted Sunderhauf to know the significance of the PRD and the
Triunfo '96 document obtained by McLaughlin.

"…it should be noted that the plan sets up a highly centralized, well
disciplined political organization with a 'Security' Bureau consisting of
an 'Intelligence' Department and a 'Control of Events' Department."

The plan, wrote Prichett, "indicates special interest in recruiting 300,000
Dominican voters in the U.S., which would include a substantial number in
Philadelphia-Camden. Although it speaks at this point only to legal
political activity, the P.R.D. Organization could readily be adapted to
support a violent revolution in the Dominican Republic."

A revolution was only the beginning of Prichett's concerns.

"PRD," he wrote, "could also use its U.S. branches, such as the
Philadelphia-Camden Section, to raise campaign money by intensifying the
present high level of Dominican activity in drug trafficking."

Prichett based his analysis on linking the dots between the man found with
the PRD pamphlet, Daniel Croussett -- a high-ranking official in the
local PRD chapter -- and his sister, Carmen, who was "allegedly a
principal dealer for …a major Dominican distributor of heroin and cocaine.

According to Prichett's memo, a confidential informant "reported that…
organization brings kilos of narcotics from New York to Philadelphia
several times a week in cars with concealed compartments. Daniel
Croussett's car had such a compartment, which was empty at the time he was
stopped."

Prichett then advised Sunderhauf to see if they could get Carmen Croussett
to dime out the PRD by providing "information on the PRD's activities, and
especially whether she could provide the true names and addresses of
Dominican members in this area. That would be invaluable in screening them
for either past drug activity or illegal alien status."

[The DA's office dropped charges on May 28, 1996.]

The former CIA agent then closed out his letter by offering to go
Sunderhauf one better in the effort to get some outside help.

By this point, Sunderhauf wanted to bring the FBI in "if the PRD is felt to
be a threat to U.S. internal security."

Prichett had another idea.

"Since U.S. national security interests in the Caribbean area may also be
involved, [the State Attorney General's office] may feel it is appropriate
to also brief the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA may already be aware of
and have a covert interest in the PRD). I can provide an appropriate
contact point if that would be useful."

Five days later, on Halloween 1995, BNI Regional Director John Sunderhauf
fired off a short memo of his own, marked "Confidential" to his boss,
Richard P. Miller, deputy bureau director of the BNI.

"As you will see, it appears this organization has an agenda to overthrow
the Dominican Republic's Government and it also appears that this
organization is utilizing funds from illegal drug distribution to support
its activities.

"I would recommend the Intelligent Unit get involved and the appropriate
Federal Agency/s be notified about these documents."

For BNI, it was hurry up and wait. Meanwhile, The Bastard Squad continued
acting on tips fed to them by "6's."

On Nov. 2, 1995, "6's" provided a tip about an '84 Olds parked on the 2900
block of North Ella Street that was used by Dominicans to store drugs and
money. A consent search led to a hit by the K-9 dog Hans, who found a
secret compartment in the driver's side rear armrest that contained nearly
$6,000. Four days later, the squad struck again, arresting Ramon Croussett,
Daniel and Carmen's brother, with an ounce of coke and nearly $3,000 in cash.

On Nov. 13, 1995, Wilson Prichett sat down once again with BNI and "6's."

With Prichett sitting in the lieutenant's office at the Essington Avenue
headquarters, McLaughlin questioned the informant "6's."

"Hola, Callahan," said the informant. "Como esta?"

Speaking via Harry Fernandez, McLaughlin asked "6's" what he knew about the
PRD.

"You know about that too, Callahan?" the informant said, somewhat
surprised. "If Pena gets in, they gonna make it cheaper than it is now.
Manteca [street slang for heroin] is $100 to $110 a gram out of New York.
If Pena gets in, it will be $30 a gram for Dominicans."

The same economics held for cocaine, said "6's."

The informant then told McLaughlin about money being collected for the PRD.

"What money?" asked McLaughlin.

"From the corners, for the campaign," said "6's." "All the owners of the
drug corners give lots of money so Pena can buy votes in the DR. Each vote
will cost about $30 so the more money they collect, the better chance for
the PRD to win in the May elections."

Later that day, FBI agents Thomas Dowd and James Sweeney had separate
meetings with Prichett and Sunderhauf.

The results were the same. The FBI told both that investigating the PRD was
not their job.

But Prichett had a plan.

If the FBI wasn't interested in foreign politicos raising campaign cash by
selling dope to Philly junkies, Prichett knew who would be.

On Dec. 7, 1995, he called a 1-800 number, which linked to CIA's local
headquarters, which used a post office box in Narberth.

Prichett asked CIA Agent David Lawrence for assistance.

"… we are facing a serious development which would appear to fall in your
area of interest," according to Prichett's written notes of that
conversation, obtained by City Paper.

Prichett went on to tell Lawrence about how much influence Dominicans were
gaining in U.S. drug trafficking.

"In Baltimore, they dominate in heroin-cocaine and hashish. In Philadelphia
alone we have identified 22 drug corners controlled by the D's."

The next day, Dec. 8, Lawrence called back, according to Prichett's notes
and said that an agent named Victoria Naylor would call over a secure line
and then meet the BNI agents at 9 a.m. Monday, Dec. 11, 1995.

On Dec. 11, 1995, Victoria Naylor arrived in the Essington Avenue offices
of BNI, where she asked for and received the PRD strategy plan. Before
leaving, she told Prichett, Sunderhauf and the Bastard Squad that the CIA
station in Santo Domingo wanted to open up a liaison.

In handwritten notes, Prichett wrote that he "stressed social impact on US
if DRP gains control."

The next day, Prichett wrote a memo to Sunderhauf, warning the BNI boss
about "the serious impact of availability" of cheap Dominican-distributed
coke and heroin and explaining the CIA's interest.

"The Agency has an active counter-intelligence program going in the area of
narcotics trafficking and coordinates with the DEA in operations outside
the U.S.," he wrote. "They indicated that they might request us to submit a
number of questions to our informants and you agreed to cooperate with
them. I will keep you closely advised of any future contacts."

About the same time Sunderhauf was reading Prichett's memo about CIA
interest in Philadelphia drug dealers, McLaughlin's crew followed a blue
Subaru station wagon to Daniel Croussett's house on the 5000 block of
Whitaker Avenue.

Inside the car, they found a secret compartment containing more than 1,000
crack vials, $20,000 worth of "Extra Power" brand heroin, $2,000 worth of
coke, and $6,000 worth of crack.

According to McLaughlin's supplemental report filed Jan. 29, 1996,
Alejandro Lopez, Amalio DeJesus and Ricardo Pascaul were all arrested and
Daniel Croussett consented to a search of his house. Inside the houses,
McLaughlin, Micewski, Steward and Fernandez found $1,247 in cash and an ID
for Croussett's sister, Carmen, who was living in a front bedroom.

In Daniel Croussett's bedroom, according to McLaughlin's supplemental
report, the BNI investigators found "Items from the PRD that included names
of Registered Militants of the party."

McLaughlin ran a small sample of those names through police computers.

The PRD membership list contained the names of several drug dealers and
suspected illegal aliens. Among those names, Angel Manuel Rodon Almonte, a
25-year-old living on Hilton Street, was twice arrested for narcotics
violations. (The DA's office dropped charges on April 25, 1996.) Moises
Jaques, a 39-year-old living on Wyoming Avenue, would prove especially
interesting to investigators. Jaques had two immigration warrants
outstanding and had been arrested in New Jersey, Rhode Island and
Massachusetts on drug charges. Jaques is still at large.

The address and phone number Mr. Jaques gave on his party form was for a
bus company called Juan Express, which authorities would later state was
instrumental in transporting dope-carrying Dominicans from New York and
Worcester to Philly.

With drugs and campaign literature found at the same location and with that
campaign literature containing the names of drug dealers and illegal
aliens, McLaughlin knew he was on the right trail.

With a member of the political party having drug connections in New Jersey
and New England, The Bastard Squad began to suspect that if this is going
on in Philly, it must be going on elsewhere in the States.

On Jan. 13, 1996, McLaughlin's suspicions about the PDR's involvement in
other jurisdictions were confirmed by a call from DEA agent Matt Hackett,
who told McLaughlin that DEA investigators in Worcester, MA, had been
tracking the connection between the PDR and drug dealing in New England.

Among the information McLaughlin received from DEA agents in Massachusetts
was a copy of an April 19, 1995 confidential telex, from George Festa,
special agent in charge of the DEA office in Boston to DEA Headquarters in
Washington, D.C. and the American Embassy in Santo Domingo.

The subject of Festa's telex was a man named Bernardo Paez, a Dominican
national who had "numerous drug distribution convictions in New York and at
one time during the late 1980s was considered to be one of the upper
echelon Dominican distributors of cocaine and heroin in the city of Worcester."

Paez, however, was no ordinary drug dealer.

In his telex, Festa wrote that, according to Worcester police, "Paez is the
head of the Dominican Revolutionary Party.… Worcester police further
advised us that this Worcester headquarters for the DRP is the hub for all
Dominican business owners and large scale narcotic distributors in New
England. Meetings are held once a week."

Party members, according to Festa, discussed "pricing controls on narcotics
to be distributed.… The DRP has been in existence in Worcester for
approximately two years."

Upon receiving the information about Paez, McLaughlin asked Steward to find
out Paez's immigration status. Steward found that there was an active
warrant for Paez's deportation.

As McLaughlin's probe into the PRD expanded, the CIA was showing increasing
interest.

On Jan. 17, 1996, CIA agent Victoria Naylor called BNI intelligence analyst
Wilson Prichett, according to a handwritten, confidential memo from
Prichett to BNI supervisor John Sunderhauf.

"She is arranging for an Intelligence officer from their Caribbean Desk to
come up -- probably next week -- and give us a briefing on the
Dominican Revolutionary Party. Before this, they want to run a quick
preliminary security check on those who will attend the briefing. They need
name -- DOB and where -- and SSN.

"Who do you want to attend? I will collect the data and fax it to them."

On the same day, Sunderhauf received a memo from Larry Leightley, CIA chief
of station in Santo Domingo.

The two-paged memo, marked "confidential" and typed in all caps, thanked
Sunderhauf for providing details of the BNI investigation and offered some
information the CIA had on the PRD and Dominican drug traffickers.

"DEA Santo Domingo information confirms that the Dominicans in the
Philadelphia area are part of the New York- Boston network," Leightley
wrote, adding that "there is no information suggesting that Dominicans in
Philadelphia deal directly with drug transportation groups in the Dominican
Republic. The Philadelphia groups have all their contacts directly with
Dominicans in New York and Boston and receive the drugs from and send the
sale proceeds to the New York area."

Leightley's memo then shifted to the PRD and its presidential candidate,
Jose Francisco Pena Gomez.

"It is important to note that Pena Gomez and the PRD in 1995 are considered
mainstream in the political spectrum," Leightley wrote. "Pena currently
leads in the polls and has a better than even chance of being elected the
next President of the Dominican Republic in May 1996 elections. He and his
PRD ideology pose no specific problems for U.S. foreign policy and, in
fact, Pena was widely seen as the 'U.S. Embassy's candidate' in the 1994
elections given the embassy's strong role in pressuring for free and fair
elections and Pena's role as opposition challenger."

Leightley went on to say that on Dec. 11, 1995, Undersecretary of State
Alex Watson had a lengthy meeting with Pena Gomez, whom Leightley stated
"is a well-respected political leader in the Caribbean."

Leightley wrote that Pena Gomez's political opponents had been spreading
rumors about his involvement in narco-trafficking, but that neither the CIA
nor the Embassy could confirm those rumors.

"We are very interested in receiving any information that would provide
evidence that the PRD and/or Pena Gomez is knowingly receiving drug
proceeds from the U.S.," Leightley wrote.

Five days after Leightley's letter to Sunderhauf, McLaughlin sent "P-Man"
to a meeting at the local PRD headquarters at 416 E. Allegheny.

According to McLaughlin's supplemental report filed Jan. 29, 1996, Bernardo
Paez -- who was under investigation by DEA and local police in Worcester
for running drug deals out of the Worcester PRD headquarters -- was the
keynote speaker, according to "P-Man," who wore a body wire while attending
the meeting.

In his report, McLaughlin wrote the purpose of the 90-minute meeting "was
to raise $2,500 from each member attending to give to Dominican
Presidential candidate Jose Pena Gomez when he comes to Philadelphia on or
around Feb. 1, 1996. Discussed further was the $300,000 assessed to the
Philadelphia/Camden Chapter of the PRD which was needed by the end of
February for the final meeting in New York, where Jose Pena Gomez will
collect all monies for the campaign.

Paez, wrote McLaughlin, "told the meeting that Gomez himself sent a message
to the members to be careful not to be caught with drugs on their person or
in their care between now and the May election in the Dominican Republic
since it may hurt the party and cause it to be investigated. He did not,
however, urge them to stop selling drugs."

Paez did, however, point out the benefits of drug sales.

"A discussion ensued on the difficulty party members [who] did not sell
drugs would have in contributing the $2,500 required," McLaughlin wrote.
"In the case of drug traffickers there would be no problem raising the funds."

Paez, according to the report, "stated that Gomez would carry back the
funds collected by February 1st to the Dominican Republic with the
remainder and larger portion of the funds to be collected at the 'Grand
Reunion' to be held in New York at the end of February 1996.

"Paez reminded the congregation that the incentive for contributing was
that if Gomez won in May 1996, he would facilitate the flow of drugs into
the U.S. and reduce their cost."

News of Pena Gomez's impending visit to Philadelphia, combined with
headlines at the time that Colombian President Ernesto Samper had used drug
money to help finance his campaign, weighed heavily on the mind of BNI
Regional Director John Sunderhauf.

On Jan. 29, 1996, Sunderhauf fired off a memo, marked "Confidential" to
Leightley, apprising the agency of "P-Man"'s surveillance and asking for
guidance.

In essence, Sunderhauf told Leightley that a major PRD party member, with a
history of drug arrests and reputed to be a large-scale dealer in Worcester
by the DEA, was in town on behalf of Pena Gomez.

Sunderhauf also warned Leightley that party members would ship old cars
back home to transport "militantes around the country for political
activities. The plan called for concealing 5 or 6 guns under the engine
covers of these cars for use in case trouble breaks out. [Paez] stressed
the need for secrecy, since the current President would seize the cars on
the dock if he found out."

"P-Man"'s report had Sunderhauf concerned about the impending visit of Pena
Gomez in just three days.

"In the light of the 1 February visit of Gomez to Philadelphia we urgently
need to hear from you whether any appropriate action on our part is
requested in support of U.S. Foreign policy objectives," Sunderhauf wrote.
"The current revelation that President Samper of Colombia had knowingly
used drug money in his political campaign, suggests that appropriate action
may be warranted."

Sometime in the last days of January 1996, BNI investigators began working
on a bold plan of "appropriate action"; nabbing Pena Gomez upon his visit
to the states and seizing the campaign funds as proceeds of illegal drug
transactions.

Such a move would have wide ramifications. On Jan. 30, BNI's intelligence
analyst Wilson Prichett sent a handwritten note to Sunderhauf about what
the BNI could expect if it grabbed money from someone seeking the highest
office in a foreign land.

"Our contact in the Agency answered our two questions after consulting
Washington by phone," Prichett wrote Sunderhauf.

The answer to the first question, "Does Pena Gomez have diplomatic
immunity?," was as follows:

"They reported that he is not accredited to the State Dept. as an official
of the Govt. and therefore does not have diplomatic immunity," Prichett
wrote. "However, that being said, these 'banana republics' issue diplomatic
passports freely to citizens and he would probably 'wave it around and
raise hell' if he is carrying one."

Sunderhauf's second question was, "If, 'with probable cause' he were
stopped while in this country, what would be the political ramifications?"

Prichett responded by saying that the CIA "replied that [Pena Gomez] is a
VIP -- he only lost the last election through fraud and is probably going
to be the next President of the D.R.! If he is stopped and the charge did
not stick it would 'probably adversely affect U.S.-D.R. relations.' [The
CIA said], if we are considering the possibility of stopping him, we had
better clear it with the State Dept. first. We would have to do this
through the local office of DEA."

On Jan. 31, 1996 -- the day after Prichett's memo to Sunderhauf about
seizing Pena Gomez's cash -- Leightley sent a memo to Sunderhauf with a
little more explanation of the current status of the candidate and his
party in the Dominican Republic.

Leightley explained that Dominicans in the United States are playing a
vital role in the May 1996 election.

"Pena continues to lead in most of the local election polls and his
Dominican Revolutionary Party has an even chance of winning the
presidency.… Pena, like his two principal opponents … frequently travels to
the U.S. to meet supporters in New York and other cities on the Eastern
Seaboard to solicit funds for his campaign. Dominicans in the U.S. are big
contributors to the campaigns of their favorite party in the DOMREP."

The key information the CIA was seeking, wrote Leightley, "is whether or
not Pena actually knows of or condones the fact his supporters in
Philadelphia are narcotics traffickers. Pena is attacked in the local press
frequently on this issue and he is very sensitive to the danger these
allegations pose to his presidential hopes. He frequently challenges his
local critics to produce evidence of their claims. They have been unable to
do so thus far; we know, however, that the Dominican Drug Control
Directorate has photographs of Pena in the company of known narcotics
traffickers. Although we do not believe Pena would actually carry USD70,000
in cash back with him, there are individuals working for him who would not
hesitate to carry the cash."

Leightley also noted that there was a concern violence might break out
during the election and a prognostication (dead on, as it would turn out)
that Pena Gomez would win the first round of the election, only to lose the
final round.

"This information is intriguing and we remain very interested in any
additional information your office develops from its contacts."

In an effort to develop more contacts, McLaughlin requested authorization
for "P-Man" to wear a transmitting device at PRD headquarters on Allegheny
Avenue the following day.

Feb. 1, 1996.

"P-Man", wearing a body recorder, transmitter and receiver, attended the
PRD meeting and, at the end of two hours of general conversation, recorded
one party member stress the importance of keeping drug deals on the sly.

"We need to keep those rumors down," said an unknown speaker. "Once
President Pena Gomez wins the election, it doesn't matter about the rumors.
We have to keep rumors from coming out to protect Pena Gomez."

A bit later, the conversation picked up by the recorder strapped to
"P-Man"'s body must have made the informant just a little nervous.

"Members should denounce rumors and be careful of people making links to
the party and taking pictures and making recordings connected to drug
trafficking."

Two weeks later, "P-Man" returned to PRD headquarters and discovered two
major new wrinkles in the case.

Pena Gomez was currently in Miami, traveling with five to six bodyguards,
according to a memo filed the next day by McLaughlin.

And a PRD mahaff from New York was at the meeting, with news that Pena
Gomez was looking to take home more than a half million dollars at a big
New York fundraising event called "The Grand Reunion."

"Fiquito Vasquez, who identified himself as the coordinator from New York…
stated that Pena Gomez is going to be traveling to the different local
chapters of the PRD on the East Coast between the 1st and 4th of March and
will be at the Concord Hotel the night of March 4th, 1996, where $550,000
will be given to Pena Gomez from the funds collected. Pena Gomez will leave
for the Dominican Republic on March 5th, 1996."

The presence of Fiquito Vasquez in Philadelphia meant that the PRD's
fundraising efforts extended beyond Philadelphia and Worcester. McLaughlin
contacted DEA officials in New York, who visited Philly on Feb. 28, 1996 to
share information and coordinate efforts to stop the PRD's alleged drug
smuggling operations.

DEA special agents Richard Mulholland, John Powell from New York and Matt
Hackett from the Philadelphia office met with McLaughlin and Sunderhauf at
1 p.m. at BNI headquarters on Essington Avenue. New York DEA agents were
brought up to speed about visits by Bernardo Paez and Fiquito Vasquez to
Philadelphia, urging PRD members to raise money and avoid getting caught
selling drugs.

In a March 7, 1996 memo, New York DEA agent Mulholland outlined his view of
the significance of BNI's findings.

"U.S. sources are looking for a connection between Pena Gomez and the
monies obtained from drug sales by PRD members," wrote Mulholland. "Current
U.S. policy favors democratic elections and has no objections to a
presidential win by Pena Gomez and the PRD. If solid connections can link
Pena Gomez to the illegal money, this would impact the position of support
for Pena Gomez taken by the U.S. Government. The American Embassy indicated
to BNI that the Dominican Drug Control Directorate has photographed Pena
Gomez in the company of known narcotics traffickers."

By early March, the BNI learned that Pena Gomez had twice changed his
plans, that local party officials had not raised enough money, so he was
putting off his trip until the end of the month.

In New York, DEA special agent Richard Mulholland wrote a memo on March 14
outlining that Bernardo Paez, the New England PRD chapter leader, Pedro
Corporan, who had given $2 million in drug money to a DEA undercover sting
operation and Daniel Croussett, the Philly PRD party official, were among
the targets of a massive combined DEA-BNI investigation.

The investigation's objectives, according to Mulholland, included
additional surveillance and the purchase and seizure of "large amounts of
heroin in order to identify the sources of supply and distribution networks
that are used to fund the PRD and the presidential campaign of Pena Gomez."

Meanwhile, BNI officers continued working the streets, taking nearly
$130,000 worth of heroin from a house on the 1200 block of Luzerne Street
on March 4. Two weeks later, a confidential informant delivered a list of
local party members to the BNI.

One week after the squad was given those names, the CIA paid a visit to
Essington Ave. On March 27, 1996, CIA agent David Lawrence visited
Essington Avenue to speak with BNI regional director John Sunderhauf,
McLaughlin and Micewski.

Lawrence wanted the tapes made by the Bastard Squad's informants of
meetings at which PRD members discussed drug sales.

Lawrence, according to McLaughlin's diary, also wanted the return of
Leightley's memo of Jan. 31, wherein the CIA agent discussed the current
status of the Dominican election.

Lawrence, according to McLaughlin's diary, told Sunderhauf that the BNI was
not supposed to have that memo.

Lawrence had one more, very ominous request.

The CIA wanted biographical information on the Bastard Squad's informants.

Fearing for the lives of their informants, McLaughlin and Micewski refused
to give the CIA that information.

For the Bastard Squad, a very strange day was about to get stranger.

With CIA agent Lawrence in the room, McLaughlin received a call from DEA in
New York.

Head north quickly, said the DEA, and bring your confidential informants.

Pena Gomez was coming to town.

En route to New York, McLaughlin was paged by Special Agent Don Hanson of
DEA in New York.

The Bastard Squad was to go directly to Kennedy International Airport and
await the arrival of Pena Gomez.

When they got there, the BNI investigators and their coterie of informants
were surprised to learn they would not have access to the candidate.

Someone had called in a last-minute death threat against Pena Gomez, which
meant that the New York City Police Department's visiting dignitary unit
had Pena Gomez's arrival at Kennedy cordoned off.

DEA agents, posing as photographers, tried to get some surveillance photos
of Pena Gomez, but were too far away, so they shut down the operation for
the night in anticipation of seizing the campaign funds the following night
at the fundraising event, "The Grand Reunion," to be held at the Concord Hotel.

The next morning, March 28, Assistant U.S. Attorneys Bob Buhler and Guy
Petrillo, also chief of narcotics for the Southern District of New York,
interviewed the Bastard Squad's informants. That afternoon, McLaughlin and
his crew were taken by DEA agents to DEA headquarters, where they were
introduced to undercover agents. Together, the investigators from New York
and Philly devised a plan to seize Pena Gomez's campaign funds.

At 8:30 p.m., Pena Gomez arrived at PRD headquarters in New York. Within 20
minutes, the BNI informant arrived and quickly left, telling the DEA
undercover agents that they would have no trouble gaining access to the
meeting.

At 10:15 p.m., the BNI's confidential informant reported that the
Philadelphia chapter of the PRD brought $10,000 to the fundraising event.
The informant observed "approximately 50 people standing in line and 30 of
these people were carrying bags that contained currency. Different chapters
were called into a side room where they turned in their money," according
to a memo filed by McLaughlin on April 1, 1996.

By now, the Bastard Squad was ready to move in and seize the money.

But at the last minute, plans changed and DEA told McLaughlin, whose agents
did not have jurisdiction in New York, that Pena Gomez was to be allowed to
leave the country with the money.

That was only the beginning of the bad news for the Bastard Squad.

Two weeks later, U.S. Attorney Michael Stiles met with state Attorney
General Tom Corbett -- McLaughlin's boss.

The U.S. Attorney's Office would no longer take BNI cases investigated by
Sparky McLaughlin, Charlie Micewski and Dennis McKeefery.

The District Attorney's Office quickly followed suit.

And, though they continued to probe Pena Gomez and the PRD, the Bastard
Squad was essentially out of business, no longer allowed to work the
streets as narcotics investigators.

Next week:

Why did prosecutors shut down the Bastard Squad?

Why did Lynne Abraham's office in essence hand out "Get Out of Jail Free"
cards to dozens of Dominicans with prior drug-dealing convictions?

And why did Al Gore show up at a fundraiser attended by PRD members under
investigation by the DEA for money laundering and narco-trafficking?