THE THIRTY YEARS' WAR

Looking Back On Three Decades Of American Drug Policy, Are We Winning The
War On Drugs?

WHO'S WINNING THE WAR ON DRUGS? It doesn't look good for the federal
government. Despite record drug seizures, arrests, and incarceration of drug
users, most illegal substances are still inexpensive and easy to obtain.
Today, with nearly two million citizens behind bars, the United States is
competing with Russia for the dubious distinction of being the nation with
the highest incarceration rate in the world. Last September, the Coalition
for Effective Drug Policy, a consortium of nearly 150 public-health and
public-interest organizations, took out a full-page ad in major newspapers
and magazines proclaiming "It is time to admit the War on Drugs has failed."
Whether or not the War on Drugs has failed, such an open and bold accusation
underscores the growing sense that the government's current strategy is not
working.

This is not to imply, however, that the Office of National Drug Control
Policy (ONDCP) does not recognize the shortcomings of its strategy, which
emphasizes incarceration and tough sentencing laws. Drug Czar Barry
McCaffrey freely admitted in a speech last June that the ONDCP "cannot
arrest its way out of the problem of chronic drug abuse and drug-driven
crime. We cannot continue to apply policies and programs that do not deal
with the root causes of substance abuse and attendant crime." This is a
radical departure from the official government orthodoxy of the previous 25
years. It is the belated realization that a policy built on electoral
opportunism and political pandering cannot long survive after its raison
d'etre disappears.

Rehabilitation

In the halcyon days following World War II, a prosperous and hopeful America
embraced the idea of rehabilitating its criminals. Capital punishment was
out; feel-good social programs were in. However, by the late 1960s,
challenges by both the left and right drove rehabilitation out of favor.
Great Society liberals felt that rehabilitation was missing the point;
instead, they felt that crime policy should target prevention by eliminating
the social ills that cause crime. Conservatives, alarmed at the social
dislocations of the 1960s, sniffed a political windfall by appealing to the
"law and order" sensibilities of Nixon's so-called Silent Majority. Their
strategy quickly bore fruit: in 1973, New York State passed the Rockefeller
Drug Laws, which were the first laws in the nation to require mandatory
sentencing for drug arrests. Yet, even as late as 1974, policymakers were
still entertaining the idea of a moratorium on all prison construction. By
the late 1970s however, the conservative approach emerged as the preferred
model for drug policy.

The Reagan/Bush Approach

The election of Ronald Reagan in 1980 solidified the "tough on crime"
strategy for dealing with drug policy. Attorney General William Smith argued
that if the administration wanted to establish a hard-line crime policy that
was highly popular and did not undermine Reagan's "return to smaller
government" philosophy, a War on Drugs would be an ideal political coup. The
primary elements of the strategy were Nancy Reagan's popular "Just Say No"
campaign and vastly increased resources for federal narcotics agencies. The
Administration reacted to the exploding crack cocaine epidemic in the
mid-1980s in an equally harsh manner. The Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988
increased both the number and severity of mandatory-sentencing laws to
punish drug offenders.

George Bush continued the get-tough approach by building on Reagan's
policies. Bush focused on the need to build more prisons to house the
criminals being sentenced under Reagan's mandatory-sentencing laws. Attorney
General William Barr's soundbite, "more prisons or more crime," reflects the
Bush Administration's embrace of harsher crime policies. By 1993, drug
arrests exceeded one million per year, and corrections spending had
increased more than fivefold since 1980. What began as a political ploy had
blossomed into an entrenched interest with its own bureaucratic inertia.

Candidate Clinton vs. President Clinton

When Bill Clinton ran for President in 1992, he emphasized the need for
prevention and treatment of drug offenders. However, even the Arkansas
governor was not immune from the temptation to reap the benefits of
appearing tough on crime. He argued in favor of both the death penalty and
juvenile boot camps. In office, however, the Clinton administration has
chosen to continue the policies of his Republican predecessors, focusing its
efforts on increasing the number of police, the "three strikes and you're
out" rule, gun control, and increased spending on prisons.

A Successful War?

In recent years, critics of the "get-tough" drug policy have become more
outspoken and more severe in their critiques. According to Robert Field,
founder and co-chair of Common Sense for Drug Policy, mandatory minimum
sentences prevent judges from being able to use their discretion with
sentencing, which results in some non-violent criminals serving longer
prison terms than convicted murderers. The War on Drugs has criminalized a
health problem by emphasizing incarceration and punishment rather than
treatment. Perhaps the most damning critique of mandatory sentencing laws is
their inability to reduce levels of drug use, increase street prices of
drugs, or reduce the availability of drugs. To the War's critics, hundreds
of thousands of non-violent offenders are being sacrificed on the altar of a
failed religion.

Critics also suggest that the War on Drugs has focused too much on scoring
political points and too little on saving lives. Field blasts the Clinton
administration for paying network TV shows for airing Drug War messages,
saying that it "undermines free speech" and propagates what he feels are
government misrepresentations regarding the number of lives lost annually to
drugs and the merits of other models of drug control.

Finally, the War on Drugs has come under fire for its disparate impact on
minorities. According to the Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services
Administration of the Department of Health and Human Services,
African-Americans constitute only 15% of drug users. However,
African-Americans account for nearly 35% of all drug arrests. The numbers
are even higher for juveniles. This disturbing trend continues into
sentencing for those convicted: a 1997 Harvard Medical School study of
Massachusetts sentencing found African-Americans 39 times more likely to be
incarcerated for a drug offense than whites. Today, 134,000
African-Americans are in state prisons, as opposed to 86,000 whites; the
numbers were 21,000 whites and 16,000 African-Americans 15 years ago. Marc
Mauer, president of The Sentencing Project, is particularly harsh on the
administration, calling the sentencing provisions "unjust and unwise" and
claiming that Clinton knowingly rejected a Sentencing Commission request to
redress these racial disparities in sentencing.

However, many of the administration's critics are quick to point out areas
in which they feel that Clinton has gotten it right. Field and Mauer agree
that the Clinton administration's policies on methadone and its stress on a
greater need for treatment are big steps in the right direction. Despite
these areas of agreement, one thing remains clear to Field: "the essence of
the War on Drugs…is that it is an example of the need of a great majority to
beat up on a defenseless minority." Harsh words, but considering the conduct
of three administrations, perhaps not unwarranted ones.

Some New Options

The ONDCP has not, of course, been without its successes and innovations.
Perhaps one of the most successful and universally admired new federal
initiatives are the so-called drug courts. By segregating drug cases from
other criminal cases, drug judges and drug attorneys quickly become
specialists in the field and are able to deal with the massive caseload of
drug offenses in a more reasonable and considered manner. Mauer went out of
his way to praise the administration's expansion of the drug court system.
However, he noted one perverse incentive: "Offenders may get into a
treatment program [via a drug court] but only if they committed a crime."
Critics of the War on Drugs believe that the government should expand the
use of drug courts and resolve this inner contradiction.

There have been calls for a reallocation of federal resources to make the
War on Drugs a winnable one. Common Sense for Drug Policy believes that too
much emphasis is being placed on suppressing marijuana use. Field says the
government "devotes nearly 70% of its resources to [marijuana]
suppression…whereas we should focus our energies to discourage the misuse of
the most dangerous drugs: tobacco, alcohol, cocaine, and heroin."

Some critics also feel that a move back towards prevention rather than
incarceration is long overdue. The Sentencing Project advocates treatment on
demand. Mauer calls this the "middle-class model" based on the dichotomy in
the ways middle-class families and inner-city families deal with drug abuse.
Middle-class families never involve the police; rather, they ask their
health insurer which treatment programs are available. Inner-city families,
often without insurance, face police custody and jail time for similar drug
use. By treating this as a public-health issue rather than a
criminal-justice issue, there is some chance that not only will racial
disparities disappear, but also the distressingly high rates of
incarceration will come down.

Outlook

The War on Drugs is a toss-up. Originally conceived as a response to the
excesses of the 1960s and as a convenient political ploy by an opportunistic
Reagan Administration, the "get tough" policy quickly became ingrained in
the public mind as an article of faith. Both Reagan and Bush used harsh and
draconian drug policies to bolster their standing as tough, law-and-order
Chief Executives. Fearful of alienating his New Democrat power base,
President Clinton has kept a tough-on-crime demeanor even as he has moved
towards more emphasis on treatment. The system is in dire need of an
overhaul: drug rates have stubbornly refused to fall, African-Americans are
being sent to jail in massive and disproportionate numbers, and treatment
has fallen by the wayside in favor of incarceration. Looking ahead, Mauer is
not optimistic: "Gore has not said anything to call for a substantial
redirection of current administration approaches, and Bush is fixated with
Texas' 'lock-'em-up' criminal justice model." Until at least 2004, it may
just be business as usual.

[Sidebar:]

YOUR BRAIN ON DRUGS:

TRUE, America's evening news is full of depressing stories of drug use. But
change the channel to, say, MTV and wait for a commercial break. The
evolution of anti-drug television ads is a sign of hope in the War on Drugs.
These new ads intelligently address the complexity of the problem instead of
oversimplifying it.

We post-Gen Xers grew up with Nancy Reagan telling us to "Just Say No." The
most memorable anti-drug message from our childhood was the Partnership for
a Drug-Free America's 1987 spot featuring an egg sizzling in a frying pan
that asked: "This is your brain on drugs. Any questions?"

The new wave of anti-drug commercials has a decidedly different flavor. They
are trendier, often employing celebrities (from bands like Everclear and the
Dixie Chicks to Olympic runner Michael Johnson). But they're also smarter.
The media campaign launched in 1998 by the Office of National Drug Control
Policy (ONDCP) recognizes that there are no easy answers. One ad directly
references the 1987 frying pan, but shows how drugs damage all aspects of a
user's life, not just intellectual pursuits. A young woman uses the frying
pan to smash everything in the kitchen, screaming that drugs also destroy
"your body… and your family…and your friends, and your money, and your job,
and your self-respect, and your future." This pervasive view of the
consequences of drugs may reach kids who scoff at a threat only to their
smarts.

Another recent ad concedes that "just saying no" is an oversimplification of
America's drug problem. A small boy running home through an inner city
neighborhood tries to reconcile this advice with reality: "Teachers tell us
to just say no… They don't have to walk home through here… The dealers are
scared of cops, but they're not scared of me. And they don't take 'no' for
an answer." A man's voice then cuts in: "To Kevin Scott, and all the other
kids who take the long way home, we hear you. Don't give up."

In another smart move, the ONDCP has targeted parents with ads calling
communication "the anti-drug" and encouraging adults to talk to their
children about drugs. Some list specific ways parents can help kids avoid
drugs, like giving up one phone call a day to talk to their kids instead, or
checking in at home while at work. Other ads use shock tactics to alert
parents of the gravity of their responsibilities. In one, undertakers
discuss standard procedures for children's funerals. Another emphasizes the
peer pressure experienced by children by showing a mother going about her
daily business in shops and boutiques, while encountering questions like
"Want a hit?" and "You want to get high?"

Upon unveiling the 1998 ads, ONDCP director Barry McCaffrey reflected,
``We're not going to solve the drug problem in America with television and
radio ads… But we estimate the average high school senior has had 12,000
hours of education when they get out of school. That same kid has watched
15,000 hours of television. You know that television has got an effect."

Although we cannot yet measure the impact of anti-drug messages, perhaps the
evolution from Nancy Reagan to Kevin Scott shows that Washington recognizes
what it's up against, and is at last ready to face the problem head-on.

Catherine Burnham

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Index for the Harvard Political Review's series:

"Smoke and Mirrors - America's Drug War"

The Thirty Years' War - (Part 1 of a 10 part series)

http://www.mapinc.org/drugnews/v00/n1084/a03.html

Editorial: From The Editor - (Part 2 of a 10 part series)

http://www.mapinc.org/drugnews/v00/n1084/a02.html

The Experts Speak Out - (Part 3 of a 10 part series)

http://www.mapinc.org/drugnews/v00/n1084/a05.html

Keep It Real - (Part 4 of a 10 part series)

http://www.mapinc.org/drugnews/v00/n1084/a04.html

The Colombian Conundrum - (Part 5 of a 10 part series)

http://www.mapinc.org/drugnews/v00/n1084/a06.html

Demystifying the Dutch - (Part 6 of a 10 part series)

http://www.mapinc.org/drugnews/v00/n1085/a03.html

Paralyzed by Politics - (Part 7 of a 10 part series)

http://www.mapinc.org/drugnews/v00/n1085/a01.html

An Unfortunate Hypocrisy - (Part 8 of a 10 part series)

http://www.mapinc.org/drugnews/v00/n1085/a02.html

Throwing Away the Key - (Part 9 of a 10 part series)

http://www.mapinc.org/drugnews/v00/n1085/a04.html

Beyond Good and Evil - (Part 10 of a 10 part series)

http://www.mapinc.org/drugnews/v00/n1085/a05.html