The Americas

URIBE VS THE DRUG THUGS

To get an idea of how long Afghanistan's war against
narco-trafficking terrorists could last, the Colombian experience
with criminals of a similar ilk might be instructive -- though not
encouraging. That thought occurred to me after an interview with
Colombian President Alvaro Uribe in New York last week. Mr. Uribe may
be the most clear-thinking, courageous ally in the war on terror that
the U.S. has in Latin America, and Washington has spent billions of
dollars trying to eradicate coca plants in his country.

That is to say, there has been no lack of political will in the fight
against drug thugs in Colombia. If other world leaders have gone
wobbly on fighting terrorism, Mr. Uribe has not. "Under no
circumstances will the government weaken its policy on democratic
security," he told me emphatically last week. But as the popular
president begins his second four-year term, his challenges are daunting.

While it is true that guerrilla kidnappings and killings are down
sharply since he instituted his policy of "democratic security" in
2002, it is also true that Colombians have rising expectations of the
man who did so much in his first term to push back the terrorists and
restore Colombian confidence. The trouble is that, despite these
efforts, the persistent demand for illicit cocaine from the U.S. and
Europe is still feeding an organized-crime network that has little
incentive to take up honest work. Drug-financed terrorism remains a
constant drain on resources and an impediment to Colombian development.

Mr. Uribe put the Sisyphean task ahead of him clearly when I asked
about progress in the war on drugs: "Colombia is a great ally of the
U.S. In spraying, extradition, forfeiture of assets and manual
eradication we have done our best. However, in relation to our
efforts, we need better results." In other words, despite copious
amounts of Colombian blood, sweat and tears, the reality of demand
for a high-priced commodity keeps the goal to end supply out of reach.

The most immediate challenge facing the president involves the fate
of 62 kidnap victims now held by the drug-trafficking Revolutionary
Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). In recent weeks the FARC has turned
up the pressure on Mr. Uribe to agree to an exchange of 500 FARC
operatives held by the government for the 62 kidnap victims, some of
whom have been hostages for years. The guerrilla objectives are
clear: A good number of the FARC prisoners are important mid-level
commandantes whom the organization needs. To boost public support for
an exchange, the FARC has been releasing video tapes of the hostages
to the Colombian media.

Relatives of the hostages are then filmed, tears streaming down their
faces as they view their loved ones held captive.

It has long been the policy of the Uribe government that any prisoner
release must be carried out in accordance with the law and that any
prisoner who is freed must agree to lay down arms. So I asked Mr.
Uribe whether he would negotiate with the guerrillas. "I have
expressed my willingness to open negotiations under conditions of
good faith," he told me. "So far we have no negotiations but given
good faith, we would talk." This seems, at first, a departure from
the standard views of a hard-liner on terrorism. But in fact it is a
continuation of his hope for reconciliation, a hope that Mr. Uribe
has held since I first interviewed him in 1997, when he was governor
of the Colombian state of Antioquia. That hope may be even greater
today because of the success the government has had in bringing so
many of the lawless in from the cold. It is a record he is proud of.
"At this moment we have completed the demobilization of 40,000
[individuals]," he says. "Over 7,000 came from the guerrillas and
over 30,000 were [in the paramilitary]. There is no previous
comparison [of these results]. When Colombia had the demobilization
of the [former rebel group] M-19, there were 900 people
[demobilized]. This is the biggest guerrilla demobilization in our history."

Despite Mr. Uribe's hope, though, if the government sticks to its
policy that freed prisoners must renounce violence, not much is
likely to happen. The FARC wants the swap so it can regroup.

Moreover, on the subject of a broader peace negotiation, FARC
leadership seems to think it can play the same game it played with
previous governments, pretending to want peace so as to gain a safe
haven for its businesses in arms, drugs and kidnapping. That much
comes through in an open letter from FARC leaders sent to the three
branches of government on Oct. 2. The letter details the conditions
that the FARC demands for peace talks, "once the swap [of prisoners
for kidnapping victims] is completed."

At the top of the list is the demilitarization of the coca growing
states of Caqueta and Putumayo, followed by the suspension of orders
to the military for the capture of FARC leadership, and an army
withdrawal to its barracks. As if those demands weren't ridiculous
enough, the letter goes on to say that the government must make an
appeal to the international community to stop referring to the FARC
as terrorists. Tell that to the 12-year-old girl who lost her leg,
her parents and her four-year-old sister in the FARC attack on Club
Nogal in Bogota in 2003. That bombing, aimed at innocent civilians,
killed 35 people and injured more than 170. It is a good example of
why polls in Colombia put public support for the FARC at 1%. Mr.
Uribe understands that in addition to being open to talks and pushing
security, he also has to show that he is responsive to political,
economic and social problems.

In our interview he stressed judicial reforms under his government,
including the introduction of an oral-trial system similar to what is
used in the U.S., an increase in judicial independence and the
transfer of more legal cases against the military to civilian court
jurisdiction. He also emphasized the importance of boosting economic
growth, although he has already tripped on this issue by allowing a
bold tax reform -- designed to stimulate investment by cutting and
simplifying taxes -- to be perverted by special interests.

Analysts are now warning that if Mr. Uribe is smart, he will pull the
bill rather than let it further damage Colombia's investment profile.

Still, his biggest problem remains security, and it is hard to
imagine real progress unless the demand for illegal drugs collapses
in Europe and the U.S., or rich countries change their prohibition policies.