CLINTON'S DAY IN COLOMBIA - ENOUGH TO HELP?

When President Clinton travels to Cartagena, Colombia, next week, it will
be the most important of his half-dozen or so visits to Latin America
during his two terms.

Following the approval two months ago of $1.3 billion in security
assistance to Colombia, Mr. Clinton's visit underscores the priority
Washington assigns this nation of 40 million people.

Colombia demands that kind of attention.

The world's largest supplier of cocaine, Colombia today is trapped in a
bloody guerrilla war. It also suffers extensive criminal violence,
widespread human rights violations, a distressed economy, and an
increasingly alienated and distrustful population. Continuing deterioration
of Colombia's situation puts the future of the nation's democratic
institutions at risk and threatens to spread instability to five bordering
countries.

Clinton will spend just one day in Colombia, but this is enough time for
him to pursue three vital policy objectives.

First, he must try to make clear to Americans what the US has at stake in
Colombia and why the US should make a long-term commitment to that country.
The argument is only partially about drugs.

More attention now must be paid to how US support can enhance prospects for
peace, reconciliation, and the rule of law, in part by helping to turn
Colombia's Army into a more professional force.

Clinton also needs to explain to taxpayers why progress on these fronts in
Colombia is important for democracy across the hemisphere and for US-Latin
American relations.

Clinton should show he is aware of the concerns that Colombia may become a
Vietnam-style quagmire for the US. He can address these concerns head-on -
by citing Colombia's impressive history of democratic governance and
leaving no doubt that US troops will not be used in combat.

Second, Clinton has the opportunity to bolster the Pastrana government in
Colombia and promote its peace-making efforts.

Right after his election, before taking office, President Andres Pastrana,
with broad national backing, moved boldly to engage Colombia's guerrilla
forces in peace negotiations. But since then, Mr. Pastrana's public support
has eroded as guerrilla intransigence stalls the peace process, the economy
struggles through depression, and violence and corruption remain unchecked.

Clinton's presence alone shows the Pastrana government has succeeded in one
crucial area: It has managed to gain the confidence and support of the US,
which is reassuring for most Colombians.

But beyond boosting the government's authority, Clinton can and should
state in no uncertain terms that Washington fully supports Pastrana's peace
initiatives and that US assistance to Colombia is designed to help make
those initiatives work - not primarily to fight the US battle against drugs.

Clinton, however, must also convey to Pastrana that the US commitment
depends on his government taking decisive action to curtail human rights
abuses and to sever the Colombian Army's remaining ties to the country's
brutal paramilitary organizations. Clinton and his advisers could help in
another way - by figuring out how to extend to Colombia the benefits of
recently approved Caribbean trade legislation - or, better yet, by
considering how to bring Colombia (along with Chile) into the North
American Free Trade Agreement with Canada and Mexico. In the long run,
enhanced trade with the US will be more valuable to Colombia than continued
aid.

Third, other countries in Latin America and Europe will be closely watching
what Clinton says in Colombia. The support of these countries is needed to
help Colombia settle its conflicts.

Many of the countries are suspicious of US motives and troubled by the US
focus on military aid and antidrug rhetoric.

Like US opponents of the administration's policy, some fear a Vietnam-type
debacle.

Their political support and financial assistance, which is considered
essential to supplement US and Colombian resources, has been lagging.

Clinton should make clear that the US understands that Colombia's problems
need to be addressed multilaterally - and the US is prepared to work
cooperatively with other countries and to accept the common agenda of
building peace and achieving reconciliation in Colombia. It must be plain
that the US is not pursuing or planning to pursue a military victory in
Colombia.

This is a tall order for a single day's work. But, if he succeeds, Clinton
will make an enormous contribution to the future of Colombia - and to US
interests in Latin American. This is an opportunity to show that the US can
respond constructively to hemispheric crises.