PLAN COLOMBIA IS BEST OPTION

It will strengthen the democratic government and give it leverage to force
the guerrillas finally to negotiate in good faith.

In their twilight weeks this Congress and this administration have
rediscovered the Americas, and this week President Clinton will take senior
members of Congress to Cartagena, Colombia, to meet with President Andres
Pastrana. The agenda: implementation of Plan Colombia -- a $1.3 billion
package of aid to strengthen the Colombian government and weaken the
narco-traffickers and guerrillas who sustain that nation's illicit
narcotics industry.

This first presidential visit to Colombia since the 1990 four-nation drug
summit comes at a critical juncture in that nation's troubled history. It
underlines continued bipartisan support for Colombia in its war against
criminal mafias and thugs of the left and right.

As U.S. ambassador to Colombia, I lived through a crisis in 1989 that was
as severe as the current one. Now, as then, opponents argued that American
assistance would make matters worse and lead to a Vietnam-style quagmire.

In 1989-90 the Medellin drug mafia, led by the infamous Pablo Escobar,
conducted a brutal campaign of bombings, assassinations and kidnappings to
terrorize Colombia into submission to its malevolent dictates. Colombia
prevailed, in part, because it had U.S. support.

The Medellin cartel and Escobar are history. And guess what? There was no
quagmire.

Today, however, criminal guerrillas and mafias seriously threaten Colombia,
and unless we act now, the situation will deteriorate. There are several
reasons why it is in our national interests to assist Colombia:

Bad as the situation is in Colombia today, violence and instability will
worsen if the narcos and guerrillas increase their power base. Violence
already has spilled over Colombia's borders, affecting Panama, Venezuela,
Brazil Peru, and Ecuador.

These guerrillas and mafias are not Robin Hoods and certainly not
supporters of democracy. Our national goals for strengthening democracy,
human rights and market economies in Latin America will suffer a serious
setback if Colombia is further destabilized.

We cannot lead the hemisphere without joining our neighbors to face its
challenges. We must assist states suffering from the curse of drug
trafficking, because it is our insatiable appetite for drugs that is the
major cause of the problem.

The destruction of the Medellin and Cali cartels removed the curtain behind
which guerrillas hid their narco-trafficking. It also opened new
opportunities for them. Without resources provided by kidnapping, extortion
and narco-trafficking, Colombia's guerrillas would have disappeared in the
early 1990s, along with other Latin American Marxist guerrillas.

Likewise, right-wing paramilitaries, established in many cases by drug
mafias, depend on narco income to finance their criminal activities.

Most violence, corruption and human-rights abuses in Colombia arise from
the state's weakness, not its strength. Unlike in Central America, where
governments organized and supported paramilitaries, Colombian
paramilitaries became powerful because of governmental weakness. The
judicial system is a perfect example; the corruption and venality of the
Colombian Congress another.

Pastrana made reinvigorating peace process central to his election
campaign. He engendered great hope among Colombians. Unfortunately, the
peace process has not fared well. Pastrana announced a ``three-legged''
strategy for peace: strengthening the military, providing social welfare in
rebel regions and negotiations with the guerrillas.

This reasonable strategy has been only partially implemented. The first and
second legs have not received the funding each deserves. Only negotiations
have received constant, but not always wise, attention and priority. NOT
PERFECT BUT PROMISING

A three-legged policy with two weak legs is a precarious foundation for
peace. Strengthening the process requires U.S. resources. Plan Colombia is
not perfect. However, it is a good plan to strengthen the legitimate,
democratic government and give it leverage to force the guerrillas to
negotiate in good faith -- something they have shown no inclination to do
thus far.

More attention must be paid to the paramilitaries. Without a strategy on
them, the guerrillas will never settle, nor can the government regain
control of rural areas.

While a strong, proactive approach toward Colombia does not guarantee peace
and stability, a weak, inactive approach guarantees further conflict,
instability and a wider war -- something that no American can view with
equanimity.