U.S. NEEDS A LONG-RANGE STRATEGY FOR COLOMBIA

More will be required, both from Bogota and Washington.

When President Bill Clinton traveled to Colombia last week, he should
have taken a cue from his boyhood idol, John F. Kennedy.

In 1961, Kennedy toured South America to launch the Alliance for
Progress for social reform and development.

However one judges the alliance's success, the Kennedy administration
gave it a clear purpose and strategy.

The same cannot be said for the Clinton administration's $1.3 billion
aid package to Colombia.

To be sure, the package satisfies an itch to "do something" about
drugs and drug-fueled violence at home and in Colombia. But at best it
only partially responds to the dramatic deterioration in Colombia. The
United States needs as well to devise a long-range strategy toward
Colombia.

Drugs are only one among many elements in Colombia's complex crisis.
In a country where about 70 percent of the world's kidnappings take
place, the core problem has to do with rampant lawlessness and
insecurity. The Colombian government can't now protect its citizens.
External support is essential. Thoroughgoing social and political
reforms are also critically important, but no government can pursue
reforms in a climate of chaos.

It is hard to be optimistic about Colombia if the government doesn't
gain greater control of its territory and command greater respect. The
police and military need better training to deal with the serious
threats posed by many violent forces. Their function is to protect
Colombians, and they must do so within the rule of law and
human-rights standards.

The aim should be to help produce what President Andres Pastrana and
most Colombians desperately want -- a political solution.
Professionalizing the security forces would help level the playing
field in Colombia, changing the calculations of the guerrillas and
making them more inclined to negotiate in good faith.

The peace process, struggling for the past 18 months, would get a
much-needed boost. There is no contradiction between providing
security assistance and supporting the peace process; on the contrary,
if done with a clear, strategic purpose in mind, these goals reinforce
one another.

Critics rightly point out that U.S. drug policy is of questionable
efficacy, and that assistance runs the risk of dragging the United
States into a quagmire. They offer no realistic options, however, for
dealing with Colombia's security crisis. About 75 percent of all
political killings in the country are committed by paramilitary
forces, some with reported links to the military. Through greater
engagement, the United States can seek to sever such links.

There is no guarantee that U.S. pressure will produce the desired
results. But without it, the atrocities are almost sure to mount; the
"dirty war" will become dirtier still.

Leaving the security challenge unattended could yield the worst
outcome yet for human rights in Colombia.

A more-constructive, balanced U.S. strategy in Colombia is one that
includes support for institutional reforms, humanitarian assistance,
alternative development efforts, and economic and trade benefits.

However, it will succeed only if Colombia gets the sustained,
high-level political attention usually reserved for the Middle East or
Europe. To forge an effective policy, more is required, both from
Bogota and Washington.