BEGINNING OF U.S. QUAGMIRE IN COLUMBIA?

U.S. National Security Adviser Samuel R. "Sandy" Berger insists the U.S.
incursion into a long-running civil war is a $1.3 billion aid package to
Columbia and nothing at all like the Vietnam quagmire. No, not at all.

"The fact is, this is nothing similar whatsoever," he told the Associated
Press recently.

Well, of course there are differences. But the parallels are too eerie to be
dismissed.

As Republican California senatorial candidate Rep. Tom Campbell of
California put it in his speech to the Shadow Convention during the recent
Democratic National Convention, the plan by President Clinton, our national
embarrassment, is to send in advisers and helicopters. Part of the plan is
to relocate people into "strategic hamlets" (though that's not the term
being used) and teach them to grow different crops. The United States is
entering a long-running civil war in a jungle country. Part of the plan is
to defoliate the jungle, with fungus rather than with napalm. "The only
thing missing," said Campbell, "is Robert McNamara's signature on the plan."

With all due respect to Campbell, one of the few members of Congress with
the temerity to question this ill-conceived operation, a few other things
are missing this time around that suggest that U.S. national interest should
be very limited.

Foremost, there is no global communist threat, and therefore no support for
the other side by a hostile superpower with expansive ambitions.

In fact, beyond the idea of "drug traffickers," acknowledged to be a
divided, shifting and competitive lot, it's hard to figure out if there is
an "other side." Most authorities count about 20 armed groups with various
agendas in Colombia.

There is no way to construct a remotely plausible "domino theory" in regard
to the Colombia drug war.

If anything, the most destabilizing force in Colombia is likely to be U.S.
intervention. On a tour to try to drum up support and understanding among
Colombia's neighbors the week before last, Secretary of State Madeleine K.
Albright and other U.S. officials encountered mostly skepticism and fear,
according to news reports.

Ecuador is concerned about refugees, so Albright offered the country $15
million. Brazilian foreign minister Luiz Felipe Lampreia said outright that
"Brazil does not have the same level of commitment as the United States in
the program to fight drug trafficking in Colombia," and the country is
beefing up its border forces. Peru is moving forces from its Ecuadorian
border to its Colombian border in anticipation of refugees and disruption.
Panama is requesting $30 million from the United States to handle expected
border disruptions. Venezuela may or may not provide a safe haven for
guerrillas.

One could hardly expect the Colombian government to say, "no, thanks" to
money and helicopters; indeed, it will no doubt ask for more each year for
years to come. But the iron logic of prohibition economics suggests the drug
trade won't be stopped. As former Colombian police official Gustavo de
Greiff has explained, a kilo of processed cocaine goes for about $2,000 in
Colombia but can be sold for $60,000 on U.S. streets.

That's a lot of profit for a lot of middlemen, and if you arrest one, three
more will jump forward to take his place. If you suppress coca growing in
Colombia it will pop up in Peru, Ecuador, Venezuela or Brazil. Indeed, it's
already happening.

Many drugs are said to cloud the mind, make it difficult to discern reality
and subvert logical thinking. Fighting a drug war seems to have precisely
that impact on policymakers.