AT WAR WITH ECONOMICS

WASHINGTON -- In the 1980s, right-thinking people had a clever slogan at
their disposal: "El Salvador is Spanish for Vietnam." What they meant, of
course, was that American efforts to halt the spread of communist tyranny in
this hemisphere were doomed to quagmire status -- and, presumably, failure.

They were wrong, as it turned out. But many of the same people who
complained about Reagan/Bush administration policy in El Salvador and
Nicaragua are now conducting Clinton administration policy in Colombia. And
that policy, as the President made clear in his recent trip to Bogota, is to
use American troops to accomplish what the Colombian military has failed to
do: Reclaim the countryside from insurgent (communist) control, and in so
doing, eradicate Colombia's lucrative coca and cocaine trade.

This two-tiered approach -- soldiers winning the minds and hearts of
peasants, agronomists persuading farmers to plant new crops -- has the
endorsement of Congress, which has authorized a $7.5 billion plan to address
the problem of drug trafficking in Colombia. It certainly has the blessing
of the nation's drug czar, Gen. Barry McCaffrey, who frequently complains
about the hemispheric drug pipeline. And in a passive sort of way, it has
won the support of the nation's press, which knows that drugs are manifestly
not a good thing, and Colombia is a country somewhere in South America.

The idea that $7.5 billion (and counting) may be headed toward the rathole
has either not occured to anyone, or is too painfully obvious to
contemplate.

For the Clinton plan makes little strategic sense. During the past three
decades the Colombian armed forces have been at war with Marxist rebels, and
the scorecard is not encouraging: The coca-growing half of the country
remains under communist control; the Colombian judiciary is (literally)
under fire; and as The New York Times puts it, "parents of means buy
bullet-proof vests for their children." The army has even allied itself with
paramilitary death squads, who burn villages, crops and people -- all to no
avail. The idea that squadrons of U.S. advisers, in uniform and out, will
make a difference is as illusory today as it was when John Kennedy went to
war in South Vietnam.

Nor does the Clinton plan make economic sense. The farmers in rural Colombia
who raise coca for the drug trade do so for two plausible reasons. First,
they are ordered to grow such crops by communist rebels who would kill them
if they refused. And second, if you were a starving Colombian farmer, what
would you do: Switch to "alternative agricultural development," in the
delicious American phrase, or raise a crop that sells in an ever-expanding
market? The question answers itself.

Which brings us to Colombia's president, Andres Pastrana. Halfway through
his term, Mr. Pastrana is delighted that the United States has chosen to
come to the rescue of a country divided by war, riven by the drug trade, and
suffering from record unemployment. The idea that the world's surviving
superpower is willing to send troops, and spend billions, would be
comforting to any head of state in distress. Mr. Pastrana is an honorable
man, and considers U.S. aid essential to Colombia's survival.

But Mr. Pastrana is honest, as well as honorable, and he recognizes one
truth Washington cannot face. "Colombia can put a stop to drugs here at some
point," he says, "but if the demand continues, somebody else somewhere else
in the world is going to produce them. What we are talking about is the most
lucrative business in the world."

There are perils in the short term. From an American standpoint, no military
campaign against the Marxist rebels will succeed with halfway measures, and
that means more troops, more money, and an escalating U.S. involvement in
Colombia. From a regional standpoint, if the rebels are seriously
challenged, huge armies of refugees will pour into neighboring Ecuador, Peru
and Brazil, and conflict could spread.

In the long term, however, the Colombian problem will be solved here at
home. This is not a question of whether the United States has the will or
resources to help President Pastrana and his successors; we have plenty of
cash and soldiers for that. It is a question of recognizing what drives the
hemispheric drug trade -- domestic American demand for drugs -- and whether
the disease is really worth this cure.

Since we define the drug war in military terms, it is fair to assume we're a
long way from victory. The Coast Guard captures huge shipments of
contraband, and the quantity of illicit drugs keeps on growing. The police
spend their days harassing small dealers, and the prisons are full of petty
entrepreneurs. America is not threatened by disorder in Colombia, but
Colombia is suffering because of America. So long as there remains an
appetite for drugs, a market will exist, and the laws of supply and demand
will prevail.