U.S. DRUG ADDICTION RENDERS COLOMBIAN INTERVENTION USELESS

In the 1980s, right-thinking people had a clever slogan at their disposal:
"El Salvador is Spanish for Vietnam." What they meant was American efforts
to halt the spread of communist tyranny in this hemisphere were doomed to
quagmire status -- and, presumably, failure.

They were wrong, as it turned out. But many of the same people who
complained about Reagan-Bush administration policy in El Salvador and
Nicaragua are now conducting Clinton administration policy in Colombia. And
that policy, as the president made clear, is to use American troops to
accomplish what the Colombian military has failed to do: reclaim the
countryside from insurgent (communist) control, and in so doing, eradicate
Colombia's lucrative coca and cocaine trade.

This two-tiered approach -- soldiers winning the minds and hearts of
peasants, agronomists persuading farmers to plant new crops -- has the
endorsement of Congress, which has authorized a $7.5 billion plan to address
the problem of drug trafficking in Colombia. It certainly has the blessing
of the nation's drug czar, Gen. Barry McCaffrey, who frequently complains
about the hemispheric drug pipeline. And in a passive sort of way, it has
won the support of the nation's press, which knows that drugs are manifestly
not a good thing, and Colombia is a country somewhere in South America.

The idea that $7.5 billion (and counting) may be headed toward the rat hole
has either not occurred to anyone, or is too painfully obvious to
contemplate.

For the Clinton plan makes little strategic sense. During the past three
decades, the Colombian armed forces have been at war with Marxist rebels,
and the scorecard is not encouraging: The coca-growing half of the country
remains under communist control; the Colombian judiciary is (literally)
under fire. The army has even allied itself with paramilitary death squads,
who burn villages, crops and people -- all to no avail. The idea that
squadrons of U.S. advisers, in uniform and out, will make a difference is as
illusory today as it was when John Kennedy went to war in South Vietnam.

Neither does the Clinton plan make economic sense. The farmers in rural
Colombia who raise coca for the drug trade do so for two plausible reasons.
First, they are ordered to grow such crops by communist rebels who would
kill them if they refused. And second, if you were a starving Colombian
farmer, what would you do: Switch to "alternative agricultural development,"
in the delicious American phrase, or raise a crop that sells in an
ever-expanding market? The question answers itself.

Which brings us to Colombia's president, Andres Pastrana. Halfway through
his term, Pastrana is delighted that the United States has chosen to come to
the rescue of a country divided by war, riven by the drug trade, and
suffering from record unemployment. The idea that the world's surviving
superpower is willing to send troops, and spend billions, would be
comforting to any head of state in distress. Pastrana is an honorable man,
and considers U.S. aid essential to Colombia's survival.

But Pastrana is honest, as well as honorable, and he recognizes one truth
Washington cannot face. "Colombia can put a stop to drugs here at some
point," he says, "but if the demand continues, somebody else somewhere else
in the world is going to produce them. What we are talking about is the most
lucrative business in the world."

There are perils in the short term. From an American standpoint, no military
campaign against the Marxist rebels will succeed with halfway measures, and
that means more troops, more money and an escalating U.S. involvement in
Colombia. From a regional standpoint, if the rebels are seriously
challenged, huge armies of refugees will pour into neighboring Ecuador, Peru
and Brazil, and conflict could spread.

In the long term, however, the Colombian problem will be solved here at
home. This is not a question of whether the United States has the will or
resources to help President Pastrana and his successors. It is a question of
recognizing what drives the hemispheric drug trade -- domestic American
demand for drugs -- and whether the disease is really worth this cure.

America is not threatened by disorder in Colombia, but Colombia is suffering
because of America. So long as there remains an appetite for drugs, a market
will exist, and the laws of supply and demand will prevail.