COLOMBIA'S MILITARY PROSPECTS ARE NOT GETTING ANY BRIGHTER

Last week the Colombian government dismissed 388 military officers. On its
own this action doesn't change much, but it is part of continuing effort,
begun more than two years ago, to confront the problem of human rights
violations by one of the country 's most important law enforcement
institutions.

Two years ago the city of Barrancabermeja provided an exceptionally grim
snapshot of the Andean nation. Its marginalized neighborhoods were
veritable battlefields where guerrilla organizations fought for political
control to the expense of terrified civilian population; paramilitary
vigilante groups targeted these same civilians, accusing them of
collaborating with the guerrillas. A weak, gun-shy military was inclined to
remain in the barracks rather than venture out to confront the terror. Even
for Colombia, a country plagued by instability, Barrancabermeja was extreme.

Today, however, with illegal drug revenues filling both the guerrillas' and
paramilitaries' war chests, Barrancabermeja has become nearly the norm
throughout much of Colombia. Indeed, a week doesn't go by without some
report of paramilitary massacre or of guerrillas overrunning a government
office. These atrocities are so routine that they are often relegated to
fifth page importance, while newspapers reserve the front page for the
national soccer team 's success against Chile or traffic problems in Bogota.

Solving the crisis in Colombia requires much greater legitimate state
presence throughout the country. While the rule of law is heavily dependent
on comprehensive judicial reform, such efforts cannot begin until reformed
Colombian military gains the upper hand over lawless bands roving the
country. Firing bad apples is partial solution, but comprehensive reform
requires serious funding, training and political commitment. U.S. aid to
Colombia for the express purpose of meeting these goals would be far more
effective than the current war on drugs.

The U.S. realizes that key to stopping the dangerous trend toward collapse
lies with transformed Colombian military. Unfortunately, however,
Washington 's strategy for promoting military "reform " is distorted by
U.S. domestic politics.

Driven by the war on drugs, the U.S. is pursuing defoliation efforts as the
solution to Colombia 's current state of lawlessness, with the lion 's
share of the $1 billion U.S. aid package designed to transform the
Colombian military into more effective drug-fighting force. Orders for 60
combat helicopters will fill the coffers of U.S. defense contractors and
perhaps make a small dent in overall coca cultivation. But U.S. money and
efforts would be much better spent promoting an institutional reform of the
military, including reform of the costly military pension system that
drains funds from more important areas like training and salaries.

Central to the issue of military reform is the problem of the meteoric rise
of the paramilitary groups. The state 's military appears scared and
outgunned by the guerrillas. But over the course of the past several years
the paramilitaries have been extremely effective in wresting portions of
the country from guerrilla control. This success has prompted many
Colombian landowners and businessmen to provide financial backing to these
vigilantes, who are viewed as the only effective way to deal with the
guerrilla threat. Given the authority vacuum, their attacks against
civilians are likely to continue.

Unless the Colombian military becomes more effective and legitimate
institution, it is likely that more Colombians will come to consider the
paramilitaries as the only "effective military" in the country, even if
they personally abhor their brutal tactics.

Human rights organizations have long considered the Colombian army an enemy
of their cause. In 1998 independent Colombian human rights groups estimated
that 15% of the country 's human rights abuses were committed by the
military. Thus most human rights organizations focusing on Colombia tend to
see any attempt to bolster the military's presence in heretofore-lawless
areas as a recipe for even greater paramilitary strength.

They maintain that any support for an institution with such a legacy of
abuse is equivalent to paying the weasel to guard the hen house. But while
these critics are correct in emphasizing the need to break the links that
persist between the military and the paramilitaries, they fail to recognize
the need for constructive efforts toward an established and legitimate
state presence.

Colombia is always going to have military. The question is whether it is
going to be legitimate and effective, and the only way to promote this is
to engage it in reform. This has already begun. In 1998 a notoriously
abusive military brigade was dismantled; in April 1999, under intense
pressure from the U.S. Embassy in Bogota, two generals were removed from
office after being accused of complicity in paramilitary massacres. So far
this year less than 2% of human rights abuses have been blamed on the military.

It is true that much more is needed. But today 's Colombian military is
less abusive and more responsive to civilian control than any other time in
recent history. In contrast, the guerrillas and paramilitaries have
increased the frequency and ferocity of their attacks. Further investment
in the reform process will ensure that the Colombian military evolves into
a better institution, prepared to fight the armed belligerents and protect
civilians.

To its credit, the U.S. embassy has been quietly but persistently working
to promote reform within the military. One U.S. diplomat received threats
believed to be from military elements that resented the embassy 's call for
the dismissal of officers alleged to have committed human rights
violations. But there are limits to the amount of pressure the U.S. can apply.

Too much pushing could produce a backlash from disenchanted elements within
the ranks, something that could jeopardize the already fragile government
of President Andres Pastrana. The efforts of some noble Foreign Service
officers aside, the brunt of U.S. policy in Colombia is presently geared
toward getting the Colombian military to increase its involvement in the
war on drugs. But a military that is better able to fumigate coca and poppy
plants is not the type of military that will promote state presence and the
rule of law and, ultimately, peace agreement.

While it is the Colombian people who need to demand that their military
leave its abusive legacy behind, the U.S. can only support this reformist
path once it recognizes the conflict in Colombia is about something much
broader than just drugs.