MAP's index for the series: http://www.mapinc.org/drugnews/v00/n000/a251.html

Bookmark: Reports about Colombia: http://www.mapinc.org/area/Colombia

A CONDITIONAL OFFER TO SURRENDER

Two days after his escape from prison in July of 1992, Pablo Escobar
sent a taped statement to selected Colombian TV and radio reporters.
It was signed: "Colombian jungle zone, Thursday, July 24, 1992. Pablo
Escobar and comrades."

This was a bit of theater, because Escobar was actually only a few
miles from the prison, ensconced on a private estate in a wealthy
suburb of Medellin. Judging from the aggrieved tone of the statement,
he was in a petulant mood. He alternated between indignation at the
Colombian government and resentment that his comfortable life in
prison had been so disrupted. He portrayed himself as a misunderstood
victim.

In the statement, Escobar complained that even though he and his men -
his fellow inmates - had generously agreed to "lose control over more
than half of the jail, and our rights" to accommodate the government,
he was shocked when the army suddenly surrounded the compound on the
night of July 22. The army acted after the government decided to move
Escobar to an actual prison, in Bogota.

It had become clear to the government, in early 1992, that Escobar had
completely taken control of the prison. His armed bodyguards decided
who and what came in and out of the prison gates. He and his men lived
in suites equipped with big-screen TV sets, king-size beds, sound
systems, a Jacuzzi and a bountiful supply of booze, drugs, guns and
whores. He ran his vast drug empire from inside his prison suite, even
torturing and murdering two former associates behind prison walls.

In the confusion, Escobar also escaped - through an entire brigade of
the Colombian army. In his taped statement, he said he was driven out
in the truck his men had used to haul contraband into the prison.

Now, once again a fugitive, Escobar began issuing the same menacing demands
that he had laid out during his campaign of bombings and assassinations
before his surrender in 1991. In his statement from hiding, he made it clear
that he would prefer to resume his life of comfort in "prison," only this
time under protection of the United Nations:

"As for the aggression carried out against us, we won't take violent
actions of any nature yet and we are willing to continue with the
peace process and our surrender to justice if we can be guaranteed to
stay at the [prison], as well as handing control of the prison to
special forces of the United Nations."

The same day he issued the statement, Escobar also spoke with two of
his lawyers during a long telephone conference call. Recording the
conversation were American electronic-eavesdropping experts from
Centra Spike, the U.S. Army unit that was secretly operating out of
the U.S. Embassy in Bogota.

What the Americans heard was Escobar's well-founded suspicions that
the U.S. government was very interested in tracking him down.

"We had information that the Americans were participating in the
operation" at the prison, Escobar told his lawyers. "I have some
information . . . that there were some gringos."

In fact, there is no evidence that Americans had any direct role in
the raid on the prison by the Fourth Brigade of the Colombian army.
But Escobar was absolutely correct when he described for his lawyers a
coordinated effort by the American and Colombian governments to
eliminate for good their mutual problems with Pablo Escobar. (Over the
next six months, the secret CIA operation in Colombia would swell to
nearly 100 people, making it the largest CIA station in the world.)

"There's a combined force. The army and the gringos looking for Bush's
reelection," Escobar said.

Escobar instructed one of his lawyers, who had been in touch with
President Cesar Gaviria's administration, to stress to Gaviria
personally just how troubled he was by these Americans.

"When you have a chance of making a statement, say that what caused
the biggest concern was the presence of the gringos," Escobar said.
"The fact that the army would be going along with the gringos. What
explanation can be given for that?"

Escobar knew that any covert intelligence or military association with
the Americans would cause severe domestic political pain for Gaviria,
so raising the issue with the president was a way of reminding him
that he was playing a dangerous game. Escobar proposed that he and
Gaviria sign "a contract" allowing him to return to his luxury prison
outside Medellin and guaranteeing in writing that he was never to be
moved without his consent.

There would be no agreement. Gaviria flatly refused to make any
concessions, and a Colombian court rejected a formal appeal by
Escobar's lawyers to have his escape ruled a legitimate action taken
in fear of his life.

His prison lifeline gone, his enemies in government allied with the
hated Americans, Escobar was now a full-fledged fugitive. But he was
still richer than his friends and more ruthless than his enemies. In
this second round of his war against the government, he would rely
once again on violence and terror, but also on his countrymen's
resentment of the United States.

To many of Colombia's poor, America was the enemy, an oppressive world
power propping up the wealthy elite in Bogota. Escobar was expert at
playing on this populist theme. He was a hero to many in Medellin's
ghettos. If America was allied with the Colombian government against
him, that was tantamount to a betrayal of the mother country. Surely
the public, his public, would not stand for it. If some Colombians did
tolerate such a blasphemy, his bombs would bring them back to reality
soon enough. It would take time, but he was sure this alliance against
him would buckle.

It had to buckle, because Escobar knew well the consequences of
remaining a fugitive, how easy it was in Colombia for a suspect to be
killed tying to escape from the police. To anyone with eyes to see,
killing Escobar appeared to be the government's plan. Pablo certainly
understood. It was a practice so commonplace throughout South America
that there was an expression for it: La Ley de Fuga. The Law of Escape.