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News (Media Awareness Project) - Colombia: Killing Pablo - 'Tacit Support' For Tough Tactics
Title:Colombia: Killing Pablo - 'Tacit Support' For Tough Tactics
Published On:2000-12-02
Source:Inquirer (PA)
Fetched On:2008-09-03 00:37:20
MAP's index for the series: http://www.mapinc.org/drugnews/v00/n000/a251.html

Bookmark: Reports about Colombia: http://www.mapinc.org/area/Colombia

'TACIT SUPPORT' FOR TOUGH TACTICS

Despite U.S. Doubts About Los Pepes, The Group's Violent Work Continued.

Chapter 21 of a continuing serial

Concerned that the manhunt he was leading might somehow be linked to the
vigilantes of Los Pepes, U.S. Ambassador Morris Busby wrote a long, secret
memo to the State Department in August 1993.

Busby explained that he had warned the Colombian government to sever any
ties with members of the vigilante group, which had been killing as many as
five people a day.

The ambassador wasn't convinced the alleged connection was true, but there
was evidence that Los Pepes was working closely with the elite Colombian
police unit, known as the Search Bloc, which was partially funded by the
U.S. government and guided by American military officers, law enforcement
agents and CIA operatives - all of whom reported to Busby.

In his memo, Busby reported that Colombian President Cesar Gaviria had
called a meeting of his key advisers in April and ordered that any contacts
between the Search Bloc and Los Pepes be terminated at once. After that
meeting, Busby wrote, the president called a top police commander who was
not suspected of links to the death squad and ordered him to "pass the
word" that Los Pepes must be dissolved immediately.

"Gaviria's effort to send such an important message to Los Pepes via one of
his key police commanders . . . indicated that the president believed
police officials were in contact with leaders of Los Pepes," Busby wrote.

His memo went on to note that the message clearly got through: The very
next day, Los Pepes publicly announced that the group was disbanding.

But it never happened. Los Pepes soon resumed the campaign of terror
against Escobar, and evidence of a link to the Search Bloc continued to mount.

By July 29 - three days before Busby wrote his memo - the ambassador was
told by Colombia's top prosecutor, Fiscal General Gustavo de Greiff, that
there was sufficient evidence to issue warrants against the Search Bloc
commander, Col. Hugo Martinez, and half a dozen police officials. Busby's
memo said the charges included accepting bribes, drug trafficking,
kidnapping, torture and "very possibly murder."

The memo said de Greiff had told a Drug Enforcement Administration official
that the key witness against Martinez was a prosecutor who had been jailed
on corruption charges. The prosecutor said he had been paid bribes by
Martinez, with the money coming from the Cali drug cartel, Escobar's hated
rivals. Martinez vehemently denied the allegation.

Deep into the memo, Busby revealed that the fiscal general had made a
stunning allegation: Not only were Los Pepes and the Search Bloc working
hand in hand, but Los Pepes had taken charge of the hunt for Pablo Escobar.

De Greiff believed that Los Pepes, which surfaced with "harmless" attacks
against residences of Escobar's relatives, later began murdering and
kidnapping citizens whose only crime was their relationship with Escobar,
Busby wrote. The fiscal general said the police, whose "tacit support"
helped Los Pepes get started, then "went too far" and moved from simple
intelligence-sharing to violent attacks against civilians, according to
Busby's memo.

At this point, Busby quoted the fiscal general as saying: "Police officials
were probably already too deeply involved with Los Pepes to withdraw. . . .
Not only were some members of the Search Bloc and Los Pepes running joint
operations, some of which resulted in kidnappings and possibly killings,
but that the leadership of Los Pepes was calling the shots, rather than the
police."

The prosecutor supplying this evidence had worked with the Search Bloc at
its headquarters in Medellin - by law, a representative of the fiscal
general's office had to authorize all the unit's searches, seizures and
arrests - and had been charged with selling an expensive car seized during
a raid. In an effort to help his case by assisting prosecutors, he had
described torture sessions and murders committed by Col. Martinez's men.

Still, Gaviria had decided not to have Martinez arrested, for fear "the
police might not obey" the order, Busby's memo said. Gaviria was also
concerned that a public scandal involving the Search Bloc would effectively
end the hunt for Escobar, conceding another huge victory to the drug boss.

"It would be terrible, if after all the deaths and upheaval in the country,
Escobar was victorious," the memo said. But Busby also noted that de Greiff
had promised that charges would be brought against Martinez and the others
eventually, "even if they are national heroes."

Busby's memo said that he had pressed the fiscal general to act, saying
that if there was good evidence against the officers they should be
replaced immediately.

"The investigation could then proceed at its own pace and the would
maintain the integrity of the unit," Busby wrote. "Justice would be served
and the effort against Escobar kept intact. Additionally, if tainted
officers, at least one of whom was a principal contact of ours, were kept
in place, we would have no choice but to withdraw our support for the unit."

Busby then met with Colombia's defense minister, who said the allegations
had been falsely spread by Escobar. Busby said Gen. Octavio Vargas,
administrative head of the Search Bloc, promised him that Martinez would be
transferred and that charges against the colonel would he handled by a
military tribunal. Busby's memo promised that the embassy was "aggressively
pursuing this matter" and that his "thinly veiled threats to withdraw our
support" seemed to have been heeded.

Busby concluded by noting that Escobar and his assassins, who feared and
despised the Search Bloc, had every reason to try to discredit the unit by
publicly linking it to Los Pepes.

"On the other hand," he wrote, "it is not hard to believe that policemen
who have been hunting Escobar for years without success, who have seen the
bloodshed firsthand, could have been attracted to an 'easy solution' like
the Pepes. . . . The key points for us are to distance ourselves from the
accused - by having them transferred - until the matter is clarified, and
to continue to pursue the investigation."

If Busby was pressing the Colombian president to remove Martinez
immediately, Gaviria was getting a different message from Joe Toft, the
DEA's top man in Bogota. The day after the ambassador wrote his memo, Toft
met with de Greiff to encourage him to let Martinez stay. According to a
DEA cable describing the meeting, Toft and another DEA official encouraged
de Greiff to honor the president's request:

"Obviously, the impending implications and repercussions . . . would almost
certainly overwhelm the Gaviria administration," the cable said. "Also,
this type of information could potentially elevate Escobar once again to
the status of national hero. . . . The BCO has enjoyed a long and
successful working relationship with Colonel Martinez. . . . Of interest is
the fact that the Medellin cartel has been decimated and practically
brought to its knees, all under the leadership of Colonel Martinez. To
date, the BCO continues to support Colonel Martinez and his subordinates."

This was the message that got through, not the ambassador's "veiled threat"
to the president. Col. Martinez was not transferred. There were no charges
against him or any members of his Search Bloc for involvement with Los
Pepes, nor would there ever be. And American support for the unit never
wavered.

Records pertaining to U.S. actions in Colombia in 1993 remain classified.
Questioned about the vigilante group years later, former CIA Station Chief
Bill Wagner said: "I have no memory of them."

Other American principals, including Busby and Toft, now dismiss Los Pepes
as creatures of the Colombian underworld, a plague Escobar brought upon
himself, and a welcome one. Gen. George Joulwon, chief of the U.S. Army
Southern Command, said: "I only vaguely remember some of that. If there was
a connection it went expressly against my instructions."

The vigilantes of Los Pepes resumed their bloody work, sometimes with dark
panache. On July 14, a prize stallion owned by Roberto Escobar, Pablo's
brother, was stolen, its rider and trainer shot dead. The stud, named
Terremoto, or Earthquake, was worth millions and commanded a breeding fee
of $600,000.

The horse was found three weeks later, tied to a tree just south of
Medellin, healthy but neutered.

The hunt continued.
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