BARRY MCCAFFREY'S LETTER TO REP. BEJAMIN GILMAN

December 15, 2000

Dear Mr. Chairman:

This is in response to your letter of November 14 regarding the National
Drug Control Strategy. As always, we appreciate your interest in this
issue and your efforts to ensure adequate funding for our international
supply reduction programs. With all respect, however, we strongly disagree
with several points in your letter.

Importance Of Demand Reduction

First, while increased funding for international supply reduction efforts
could certainly be put to good use, it would be a serious mistake to take
funds away from our demand reduction programs to use for supply
reduction. In the early 1990s we reduced our demand reduction efforts, and
we saw youth drug use more than double. In large part due to our National
Youth Media Campaign, the number of adolescents using drugs has begun to
fall over the last two years. We must maintain that effort or risk losing
more young lives to drug addiction and the associated violence. We must
also increase access to treatment, so that we can break the cycle of drugs
and crime that costs our society more than $110 billion each year in
accidents, lost productivity, and property damage. Supply reduction
efforts cannot be successful unless we maintain an aggressive, fully funded
demand reduction program.

Colombia Assistance Package

Second, it is inaccurate to say that we are either "militarizing the drug
fight" or "shifting the bulk of our aid from the Colombian National Police
to the Colombian army," as you stated in your letter. Our Colombia
assistance package is comprehensive and multi-faceted, encompassing
eradication of illicit crops, interdiction efforts, chemical control,
alternative economic development, attacking drug trafficking organizations
and infrastructure, judicial reform assistance, and support for increased
human rights protection and training. All the elements of this strategy
must be in place if we are to be successful against the drug traffickers,
especially now that the guerrillas and illegal self-defense groups are more
directly involved in the drug trade. Importantly, our package responds to
and supports the Colombian government's national strategy for dealing with
Colombian problems. Their strategy calls for an increased military role in
counterdrug efforts because of security issues, and we believe that they
are on the right track.

Security Challenges

Security is one of Colombia's greatest challenges, especially considering
the profits to be made by the illegal armed groups that dominate the drug
producing areas. It is the main reason why the Government of Colombia
requested that U.S. assistance have a strong military counterdrug
component. Increased security alone will not solve Colombia's problems,
but without it, none of the other vital programs can be successful. As you
may know, for several years the FARC has pursued a systematic effort to
eliminate Colombian National Police (CNP) presence from areas of strategic
importance. With the military support made possible by our assistance
package, the CNP will be able to more effectively eradicate coca, destroy
laboratories, and arrest drug traffickers in areas such as the Putumayo,
which are dominated by the guerrillas and the illegal self-defense
groups. In 1996 when the CNP tried to mount eradication operations in the
Putumayo, where about 40 percent of Colombia's coca cultivation is located,
they were forced to stop almost immediately because of armed guerrilla
resistance and guerrilla-instigated social protests. Assisting the
Colombian government with training and equipment to regain lawful control
of the drug producing regions will enable it to protect and serve its
citizens as well as reduce illegal drug production. Also important, the
added security will lessen the risk borne by spray aircraft and escort
helicopter pilots who are frequently fired upon. To date in 2000,
eradication aircraft have been hit by more than 110 rounds of groundfire.

Building On CNP Support And Requirement To Expand

In most cases, as with the police, our assistance package builds on
existing programs. The Colombian National Police have received substantial
counterdrug assistance from the USG over the last decade, including more
than 40 helicopters and 20 fixed wing aircraft. From FY 1995 to FY 1999,
the police received in excess of $500 million in counterdrug
assistance. We did not take any of that assistance away from the
police. In fact, due largely to your efforts, Congress approved an
additional $115.6 million in the FY 2000 Colombia and Andean Region
Emergency Supplemental for the Colombian National Police, including a $26
million Blackhawk Helicopter package that was transferred from a larger air
mobility package proposed for the Colombian military. That $115.6 million
figure was on top of the more than $70 million in the regular State
Department FY 2000 budget for the CNP. There are no plans to decrease
assistance for the Colombian National Police. In fact, much of the
counterdrug support for the military is designed to enable the military,
particularly the army counternarcotics battalions, to provide increased
support for police counterdrug operations so that the police can expand
their operations into the areas of greatest drug trafficking.

For many years, the majority of our assistance was focused on the Colombian
National Police. They have produced tremendous results, and we hold them
in high regard. They have been both heroic and tireless. Nevertheless,
between 1995 and 1999, Colombia's coca cultivation rose 140%. Colombian
potential cocaine production rose to a record 520 metric tons in calendar
year 1999 and is likely to be significantly higher this year. Ninety
percent of the cocaine entering the United States now originates in or
passes through Colombia. Colombia's opium poppy cultivation, which had
been steady, rose significantly in 1999, leading to a 30% increase in
potential annual heroin production to nearly 8 metric tons, most of which
is shipped directly to our country. These dramatic increases in drug
production are not in any way a result of incompetence or negligence on the
part of the police. Rather, police counterdrug efforts have been
overwhelmed by a concerted effort by Colombian drug traffickers, including
some elements of the guerrilla and illegal self-defense groups, to expand
drug cultivation and production within Colombia.

The drug trade in Colombia has changed dramatically over the last ten
years, not only in terms of the volume of production, but also in terms of
the participants. We and the Colombians must also change in order to deal
with this new reality. The days of the big cartels that controlled nearly
every aspect of the business from cultivation to distribution to money
laundering are over. There is now a loose association of various groups
that specialize in one or more aspects of the drug trafficking
chain. Unfortunately, the illegal armed groups have become a dominant
force in many aspects of narcotrafficking. These groups are estimated to
have as many as 25,000 combatants who are heavily armed, well organized,
and well trained. The 2,500 members of the Anti-Narcotics Directorate of
the CNP, as professional as they are, are no match for these illegal
armies. Further, it would be inappropriate for the US Government to try
and make the Colombian police into an army or in anyway tell the government
of our sovereign democratic ally how to design or use its military or
police forces.

Colombian Military Counterdrug Efforts

Colombian military participation in counterdrug efforts is nothing
new. Specially vetted elements of the military played a vital role in the
Search Blocs that took down the Cali Cartel. The military services have
also consistently made drug seizures, destroyed laboratories, and even
manually eradicated illicit crops. In 1999, the military was responsible
for more than half of the cocaine seizures in Colombia. This year alone
(to November), the Colombian military has seized 52 tons of cocaine that
otherwise would have made it to the United States. The Police seized 28
tons in that same time frame. The Colombian Marines continue their
critical work patrolling the rivers to stop the flow of precursor chemicals
and drugs. The Colombian Air Force has been performing counterdrug air
interdiction missions since 1990. Since January 1997, the Air Force has
either shot down or destroyed on the ground 69 trafficker aircraft. They
have also conducted joint and combined operations with the CNP and police
from other nations that have resulted in the seizure of 62 trafficker
aircraft. These missions are critical components to a coherent counterdrug
strategy. Our national interest is best served by providing counterdrug
assistance to both the police and the military for their respective,
complementary roles.

Human Rights

We share your concerns about the level of human rights abuses in
Colombia. For that reason, improving human rights performance is a
prominent agenda topic in every engagement with the Colombian
Government. Further, we have a very strict vetting procedure in place to
ensure that our assistance does not go to units that have credible
outstanding allegations of human rights violations. We believe that the
Colombian Armed Forces are seriously committed to improved human rights
performance and protection.

Also, the military has made significant improvements with respect to human
rights. Less than two percent of the human rights violations committed in
Colombia can be attributed to the military and police forces. That is
still too many, and the Colombian government and military high command have
instituted reforms to address problems. The military has stopped recruiting
minors. They have changed their training regimens to stress respect for
human rights and international humanitarian law. They have reformed their
military judicial system, to include the creation of a Judge Advocate
General-like corps, increased cooperation with civilian judicial
authorities, and imposed greater accountability for human rights and
criminal violations by military personnel. In October 2000, the military
demonstrated its commitment to instituting greater accountability by
dismissing 388 military personnel for misconduct. The Government of
Colombia must regain control of its national territory so that the outlaw
groups cannot act with impunity if we hope to see a real reduction in the
number of human rights abuses because more than 98% of the human rights
violations are committed by the guerrillas and illegal self-defense
groups. Our assistance package will have a positive impact on the human
rights situation because we are helping the Colombian government regain
control of the drug producing areas that provide the funding that currently
allows the illegal armed groups to operate.

Our assistance package is based on a sound and integrated strategy. These
efforts will require long-term support to be effective. Drug trafficking
and abuse are complex problems that cannot be solved by tactics focusing on
only one aspect of the issue. The traffickers have shown themselves to be
dynamic and agile. A serious national drug control effort must work on
both the demand and supply reduction fronts, both domestically and in
concert with our regional and global allies. Only by implementing a
comprehensive regional effort against all aspects and all participants in
the drug business can we hope to achieve a real reduction in drug
production and the violence and instability it brings. Again, we
appreciate your interest in these issues.

Sincerely,

Barry R. McCaffrey Director