CROSSROADS IN COLOMBIA

IN THE next few weeks, Colombia's complex conflict with guerrillas and drug
traffickers is likely to come to a head, on more than one front.

In the jungle-draped southern state of Putamayo, two new U.S.-trained
Colombian army battalions are supposed to go into action for the first time
in support of a major offensive against the plantations and labs of the
cocaine industry, marking the military debut of Plan Colombia, the
multibillion-dollar program to combat the narcotics trade.

Meanwhile, President Andres Pastrana faces a major crossroads in his brave
but feckless attempt to negotiate peace with the rebel groups that control
large parts of the countryside and the drug traffic -- including most of
Putamayo. On Jan. 31, the extended term of a huge safe haven Mr. Pastrana
granted two years ago to the largest insurgent group, the Revolutionary
Armed Forces of Colombia, or FARC, expires, and Colombians are clamoring
for the government to shut it down. But Mr. Pastrana is instead talking
about granting control over a second large chunk of territory to another
rebel group, the National Liberation Army, or ELN, which like the FARC has
proved less interested in revolution than in profiting from drugs and
kidnapping.

In short, the Colombian army may spend the next few weeks engaged in tough
fighting to take back control of one part of the countryside from guerrilla
organizations, even as the government contemplates handing over other parts
to some of the same groups.

While the military offensive may or may not work, the results of ceding
territory are clear: The FARC has used its safe haven to increase drug
cultivation, assassinate uncooperative civilians, force children to join
its armed forces in new offensives, and hold more than 450 government
police and soldiers captive in open-air pens. Meanwhile, it has refused to
negotiate peace.

This bizarre confluence of policies rests on a couple of political fictions
to which Mr. Pastrana and the Clinton administration have clung.

Despite mounting evidence to the contrary, Mr. Pastrana has stuck to the
notion that the FARC and ELN are conventional insurgent movements with
political agendas that can be negotiated -- and not syndicates whose main
interests now center on consolidating control over territory and drug revenues.

The Clinton administration, for its part, continues to insist that Plan
Colombia and the military operations that go with it are aimed at drug
traffickers, and not the insurgents -- even though the two are inextricably
mixed. The administration also continues to give strong support to Mr.
Pastrana and embrace him as a partner in the Plan Colombia project -- even
though most senior U.S. officials regard his peace initiative as misguided
and unworkable.

Both governments argue that Colombia's problems are complex and require
complicated policies.

While that is true, this month's mix of remedies bespeaks less
sophisticated complexity than simple confusion.

In fact, both governments would do better by acknowledging Colombia's tough
realities. Mr. Pastrana should shut down the safe zones for the guerrillas
and accept that while some negotiations may be useful, sweeping political
treaties will not end the conflict.

The United States, for its part, should stop pretending that it is only
supporting a campaign against the drug traffic in Colombia. If it is to
continue training and equipping the Colombian army, the new administration
cannot avoid involvement in the larger Colombian conflict.

It should have a clearer policy for it.