U.S. CASTS A LONG SHADOW ON LATIN AMERICA

EVERY four years, Latin Americanists earnestly call on the next U.S.
administration to express and demonstrate more interest in countries
of the Western Hemisphere. The truth is, however, that the United
States does not care about Latin America, and is unlikely to do so.

I do not mean that there is no concern in this country with any aspect
of Latin America. But few in the United States are moved by arguments
regarding Latin America's general significance. Some think about Cuba,
others about Mexico, some about Peru, others about Haiti. Or they are
concerned about specific issues and problems, not places. Exporters
and investors care about particular sectors and markets.
Environmentalists worry about rain forests and coastal waters. Human
rights activists focus on places where rights are violated or
threatened. Indeed, the very term ``Latin America'' probably obscures
as much as it illuminates today.

We all know that Latin American and Caribbean countries vary
enormously in size, resource base, colonial heritage, ethnic
composition and many other dimensions. But experts also recognize that
the differences among Latin American and Caribbean countries have been
growing in at least four other ways: the nature and degree of economic
and demographic interdependence with the United States; the extent to
which the countries have committed their economies to international
competition; the relative strength and capacity for action of each
state; and the comparative strength of other political
institutions.

The regional distinctions among the countries of Latin America and the
Caribbean, in turn, affect how Latin Americans relate to the United
States. People in many countries of South America are now more
oriented toward each other and toward Europe and Asia than they are to
the United States, at least in terms of trade, investment and finance.
People in Mexico, Central America and the Caribbean are ever more
focused on relations with the United States because of increasingly
strong economic, demographic, cultural, social and political ties. And
in the Andean countries -- especially Colombia, Venezuela, Peru and
Ecuador -- there are increasingly complex and sometimes
confrontational relationships with the United States.

The fabric of inter-American relations, moreover, has a lot less to do
today with governments than it used to, and a lot more to do with
private actors of various kinds. The key people in the
investment-rating agencies have more influence on Latin America's
future than do the officials of the U.S. State Department. CNN, NBC
and the Bloomberg wire are more important for Latin America than the
U.S. Information Agency. The governors of California, Texas and
Florida are more important for Latin America today than are many
federal officials.

Four corollaries of these observations are worth considering: First,
the Bush administration should refrain from announcing a new Latin
American policy and rushing to a Western Hemisphere summit to announce
it. The summitry device has bloomed just when regionwide policies make
less sense.

Second, the next U.S. president should concentrate on Mexico, Central
America and the Caribbean -- the border region of the United States.
What happens there affects the United States enormously by presenting
a series of challenging issues (such as immigration, drug trafficking,
environmental pollution and labor) that combine international and
domestic aspects in ways that are hard for our policy-making process
to tackle.

Third, the Bush administration should be more modest than recent U.S.
governments about what it promises to achieve in the Americas. The
past two U.S. administrations have promised free trade from Alaska to
Patagonia but have been unable to deliver ``fast track'' negotiating
authority. The Clinton administration has taken credit for ``restoring
democracy to Haiti'' but without producing any lasting change. All
recent administrations have pledged to bring change to Cuba while
probably retarding that change through needlessly confrontational
approaches. And they have crowed about the triumph of free markets and
political democracy in the Americas even as disenchantment with
neo-liberal economics and democratic politics has been growing. We
need to be more realistic about how Latin America is evolving and
about the extent and the limits of our influence.

Finally, the Bush administration should be aware of how much of the
U.S. relationship with Latin America is inevitably determined by
policies that are not designed with the region in mind. Probably the
most important U.S. official for Latin Americans is the chairman of
the Federal Reserve Board, for U.S. interest rates are a crucial
determinant of Latin America's economic prospects. How the U.S.
economy does, more generally, is the single biggest factor in shaping
the economic performance of our closest neighbors.

The Colossus of the North is bound to cast a large shadow southward,
no matter which direction our policy-makers face. ``Paying more
attention'' to Latin America is less useful as policy advice than
being more aware of our own multiple impacts.