ROLLIN' ON THE RIVER IN COLOMBIA

The Blackhawk came in low over the water, its mini-guns chattering as two
Piranhas mounting dual 150 horsepower Evinrude outboards sped up the river,
their guns spewing lead into the foliage covered riverbanks. Yeah, get
some, get some, I thought and quickly clicked off a few photos.

The troops were screaming as the speedboat motors revved into high gear.
Muzzle flashes cut through the drizzling rain, grenades exploded in the
jungle, shrapnel rent the ground, and shell casings flew into the river.
This was heavy contact.

But it was all a set piece demonstration with a soundtrack of 70s disco music.

I had departed Bogota that morning at o' dark-thirty aboard a Casa
transport and after a refueling stop proceeded on to the Tres Esquinas base
of operations near the Putumayo River along the Ecuadorian and Peruvian
borders.

Tres Esquinas means three corners it's located at the junction of the
Caqueta and Orteguasa rivers on the border between the Caqueta and Putumayo
departments. The Putumayo River rises east of Pasto in the Andes Mountains
of southwestern Colombia and flows southeast for 980 miles, forming part of
the boundary between Colombia and Ecuador and most of the border between
Colombia and Peru. It crosses into Brazil, where it is known as the I
before it empties into the Amazon River.

This is serious guerrilla territory according to government reports.
Situated on a bend in the river Tres Esquinas was built sixty-six years ago
when Peru "invaded" Colombia during the Leticia Crisis, a boundary
conflict, between Columbia and Peru in 1932-33. The Peruvian Army occupied
Leticia, a Colombian outpost on the Amazon, and hand-to-hand combat ensued
between Colombian and Peruvian units.

The dispute was settled by direct negotiation in 1934, when Peru recognized
Colombian sovereignty over the port. Since the 1930s Tres Esquinas has been
steadily improved from a rustic border post with the addition of an
airstrip and many modern amenities.

The U.S. Department of Defense is providing assistance to the Colombian
Navy's "riverine program," specifically in the Caqueta and Putumayo
departments. It has helped the Colombian Navy organize a five-battalion
Riverine Brigade, which since mid-1999 has been based at Puerto Leguizamo,
a remote port on the Putumayo River near the Ecuadorian border.

The program's budget, which totaled between $9 million and $12 million in
1999, would be increased by about $12 million per year by the 2000 aid
package. Since I pay taxes I wanted to get a look at where some of this
money was going.

Into the Putumayo The plan was to go out on a combat mission with a routine
riverine patrol somewhere in the Putumayo watershed.

With me were two writers and a photojournalist. Stepping off the plane onto
Tres Esquinas tarmac I was assaulted by the early morning humidity and the
smell of avgas.

After much handshaking and a quick ride to base operations we were ushered
inside a prefab building surrounded by a wall of sandbags with a concrete
floor. Here in the operations center we would receive a briefing on the
mission of Fuerza de Tarea Conjunta del Sur (FTCS) Task Force South. Task
Force South covers 158,170 hectares in Caqueta and Putumayo departments
(provinces). During the late 1990s Caqueta and Putumayo showed the greatest
increase in coca cultivation. This area, where Colombian police or army
units rarely operate, has been considered FARC-controlled territory for
decades. Caqueta and Putumayo include the sites of some of the Colombian
military's most serious recent defeats at the guerrillas' hands.

Gen Barry McCaffrey (Ret.), The U.S. "Drug Czar" Testified Before A Senate
Committee In October 1999 That:

Colombian security forces are presently incapable of conducting
counter-drug operations in the Putumayo and experience great difficulty in
conducting operations in the Caqueta growing regions, the source of
two-thirds of Colombias coca, because of the dangers posed by the guerrillas

Actually at this time the Colombian Army should have been capable of
conducting counter-drug operations in the Putumayo because the American
taxpayer had just spent millions of dollars to create a unit to do just
that. In a December 1998 meeting between U.S. Defense Secretary William
Cohen and his counterpart (at that time), Colombian Defense Minister
Rodrigo Lloreda, it was decided that the U.S. would set up three 950-man
"Counter-Narcotics Battalions" within the Colombian Army. The other
services would be tossed their bones as well -- a riverine program for the
Colombian Navy and a series of aircraft and base improvements for the Air
Force. This would prepare the way for what the Pentagon was calling "the
push into Southern Colombia coca-growing areas."

By April 1999 the recruits for the first 950-man Counter-Narcotics
Battalion had been vetted (under US law on military aid to Colombia only
soldiers with clean human rights records were permitted into the battalion)
and training commenced.

The elite No. 1 Anti-Drug Battalion and the No. 4 Special Forces Battalion
(organized to combat FARC guerrillas) -- were trained by a mobile training
team from the US Army's 7th Special Forces Group at the Tolemaida military
base. The Counter-Narcotics battalions 950 soldiers and 200 police agents
completed training and were officially activated on September 14, 1999 and
in December 1999 they moved the units new headquarters in Tres Esquinas.
General Charles Wilhelm, Commander-in-Chief of U.S. Southern Command
(SOUTHCOM), commented on the Colombian Army's First Counter-Narcotics
Battalion at a June 1999 Senate committee hearing:

The battalion is a highly mobile unit, designed from the ground up to work
with the Colombian National Police, other Colombian Army units, or
independently, taking the fight to traffickers in the safe havens of
southeastern Colombia where the majority of cocaine production takes place.
SOUTHCOM is working closely with the Colombian Armed Forces providing them
guidance, advice and training. The training includes intelligence,
reconnaissance, indirect fire, light infantry tactics, medical skills and
human rights.

It's envisioned that these Counter-Narcotics (CN) battalions will conduct
offensive operations to clear guerrillas from this major drug-producing
area. The existing battalion is a highly mobile unit, designed from the
ground up to work with the Colombian National Police, other Colombian Army
units, or independently, taking the fight to traffickers in the safe havens
of Southeastern Colombia where the majority of cocaine production takes
place. The concept was designed to prepare them to operate in a known
guerrilla stronghold to take the fight to the enemy.

According to a June 1999 report from the U.S. Governments General
Accounting Office, "SOUTHCOM estimates that the battalion would require in
excess of $70 million worth of equipment and training to become fully
operational. Of this amount, approximately $60 million would be to provide
helicopters." The unit's training was estimated to cost about 3 to 4
million dollars in 1999. All of the battalion's costs uniforms, training,
equipment, transportation, and spare parts are paid for by the United
States. Without helicopters this battalion, by SOUTHCOM estimates, cost the
U.S. taxpayer $14 million.

Funds for the battalions training are authorized by Section 1004 of the
1991 National Defense Authorization Act, which empowers the Pentagon to
offer foreign counter-narcotics assistance to nations such as Colombia. It
also funded the over thirty or so military training teams (mostly special
operations personnel) which operated in Colombia in 1999. The Clinton
administration's new 2000 aid program will fund a massive expansion of this
as yet untested counter-narcotics-battalion concept.

Two more new CN battalions, which will operate in as yet undisclosed
locations in southern Colombia, will be trained and organized this year.
These new battalions are expected to receive a combined total of thirty
UH-60 Blackhawk helicopters (at about $13 million apiece) and thirty-three
UH-1H Huey helicopters, as well as reconnaissance aircraft, weapons,
training, construction of facilities, intelligence and logistics support,
and equipment. Some of the equipment the US government is providing
includes night-vision goggles, radio jamming pods, M-4 carbines, field
gear, and uniforms. The CN battalions have already received eighteen
modified, Vietnam War-era UH-1H helicopters, known as Supercharged Hueys.
In early August eighty-three Special Forces trainers arrived in Colombia to
begin training Colombia's second anti-narcotics military battalion.

The training is part of the $1.3 billion aid package recently approved by
Congress.

MEGO - My Eyes Glaze Over I Was Ushered Into The Operations Center

A prefab building on a concrete hardstand, it was surrounded by a shoulder
high pile of sandbags.

Inside a sign on the wall said: "Dios concede la Victoria a la Constancia"
God grants victory to the constant not exactly Death from Above or Swift,
Silent, Deadly. I took a seat on a folding metal chair and was handed a cup
of coffee.

The armor branch lieutenant colonel assigned to public affairs who flew
along with us sat behind me and began cracking nuts to snack on. Colonel
Ricardo, infantry, chief of staff of the Joint Task Force, introduced
himself and said their Informacion de Comando briefing would give us a
"first hand, eyewitness look at what we do -- others might try to get a
feel for it, but we're going to give you a chance to reach your own
conclusions... Yeah. I would reach my own conclusions. But not from
actually seeing these guys actually do anything.

Seated at the conference tables in the ops center with a laptop and a
screen, a staff officer punched up a PowerPoint briefing.

I was nearly incredulous. Unfortunately the preponderance of these
Microsoft engendered and worthless dog and pony shows is causing US Army
officers to leave the service in droves and we've now imported this
nonsense to Colombia. If this is what they're teaching at the School of the
Americas maybe the Pentagon should make all the Birkenstock-wearing
protestors happy, save some taxpayer dollars, and close the place.

Of course the first slide was the vision statement -- basically the usual
humma humma about "conducts joint operations in any weather or terrain"
(well except for today because it was raining...) The mission statement was
more of the same. The important info I wanted to hear I could have got in
five minutes with a few pointed questions or been provided in a few pages
of informational handouts. Indeed, most of it was available in any country
study, almanac, or gazette.

Instead we had to sit through over two hours of staff officer dronings with
a laborious word for word interpretation. I didn't really need to know that
the area was 60% Catholic or that the major health problems were intestinal
infections and respiratory problems.

We repeatedly asked for them to move it along as we understood Spanish and
could read most of the slides without too much trouble.

Worse, we were told to ask questions whenever we wanted but every time I
did I was either ignored and told to wait as they presented another slide
or given an evasive or nonsensical answer.

It was a full-blown briefing worthy of Fort Benning or Fort Bragg and by
about the second hour I was extremely unhappy. I scribbled the basic
overview in my notebook.

Basically the situation is: The Rio Caqueta is a major river and most of
Putumayo department is bordered by both Peru and Ecuador. Most travel here
is by boat; there are very few roads.

Drug trafficking and cocaine cultivation (about 75,000 hectares) is along
the major waterways.

Troop detachments are based along the river basin; the only joint unit
including the police was created in 1998 and based here. In Florencia, the
capital of Caqueta, is the 12th Brigade. The 2nd Anti-narcotics Brigade and
the 24th Army Brigade are based in Mocoa, Putumayos capital.

Each brigade has five battalions. The Southern Naval Battalion is down on
the Peru border. The Jungle Battalion also operates within the northwest
part of Putumayo, although that is largely an operations area of the police.

The JTF also conducts spraying via the U.S. State Department contract with
DynCorp. Airmobile operations are difficult because of air currents in the
river valleys and the poor flying weather.

Topography varies with elevations from 130 meters to 4,000 meters and 80%
of the terrain is soft-rolling plain with deep valleys of hot, humid
tropical jungle.

The FARC avoids border clashes with Ecuador and Peru and use the border
areas as safe-havens. There are about 1,700 FARC guerrillas in eight
separate groups or units dispersed through the area and they have strong
links to the narcotraficantes (five FARC units are co-located with
concentrated coca leaf cultivation). The guerrillas provide protection and
assist in cultivation and refining.

The autodefensas and the FARC are mainly in dispute over el negocio de la
cocaina (the cocaine business) and the indigenes (Indians) and campesinos
have no choice, economically or politically, than to engage and support the
cocaine business.

This is nothing new, as at one time the Medellin Cartel owned this region.

With milicias urbanas (FARC supporters) and drug traffickers included, the
total enemy force (the jury is out on just how willing the narcos are to
tangle with army troops) in Putumayo and Caqueta numbers about 4,000. About
US $2 billion worth of cocaine is cultivated here and this bankrolls a
serious guerrilla army. Theyve got new equipment, weapons, uniforms,
communications net, trucks, 4WD SUVs, and airplanes.

It's rumored that the FARC may buy their own helicopter fleet.

This kind of money also pays for public relations worldwide, websites,
bribes, and important to the locals: wages, roads, and infrastructure in
the Putumayo. FARC has supplanted the Colombian government here.

When we got into a breakdown of the units combat successes I had some
serious questions.

The briefer said that Plan Nuevo Horizonte 1 January 2000 to 1 May 2000
which used 13,000 FTCS troops resulted in 18 enemy KIA, 19 deserters, and
283 POWs. This in addition to 51 jungle labs destroyed, 2 crystal (powdered
cocaine) labs destroyed, over 15,000 hectares fumigated, plus 52 cars, 86
motorbikes, 88 weapons, and 104,500 million pesos confiscated. Okay, I
understood that. That would mean 320 bad guys hors de combat.

I did some more quick math. Only 88 weapons recovered.

Up north along the Venezuelan border Id seen a rusty single-shot .12 gauge
being tossed into a helicopter. Yeah, in an insurgency that counts as an
enemy weapon.

Guerrillas usually strip their dead of weapons and equipment and deserters
might not come out of the jungle with a weapon.

But I was curious how 283 POWs surrendered without weapons?

I quickly learned that not all 320 enemy were guerrillas. How many were
actually FARC? Two percent of the KIAs were FARC. I didn't understand their
math as 5% of 18 KIA = .90%. So I guess just one dead guerrilla.

Just one. The others were narcos -- meaning in many cases some poor dumb
farmer with a 3-hectare plot of coca leaf. Indeed, I was told fully 89% of
the KIAs were narcotraficantes. So we've got 5,000 crack troops in the AO,
a new 950-man elite battalion -- trained by 7th SFG (ABN) costing the
American taxpayer about US$14 million -- new Black Hawk helicopters, armed
speedboats, and classified intelligence gathering all this and they only
scored one guerrilla KIA in four months of operations? Wait a minute.

My hand shot up. I waved and waved even though there were only four of us
receiving the briefing and I was only six feet from the briefer.

Finally I just interrupted. Excuse me, sir, how many friendly casualties
did you have in the same time period?

None. No soldiers killed in action any wounded?

No, no wounded.

Given my experience I would argue that you can't move an infantry battalion
to the field with live ammo for six months and not have at least one guy
get himself killed.

I will argue that a U.S. Army infantry battalion could not deploy to the
field for six months without a casualty. So how do the Colombians manage
it, especially when they're supposed to be in combat in the hottest AO in
all of Colombia in the middle of a drug war and a communist insurgency?
Something was really wrong here. Everyone wanted more money, more toys, but
they weren't actually doing anything with it. A lot of comparisons have
been made between Vietnam and Colombia. Well heres another one. Ask any
Vietnam War ARVN advisor what he thought about the South Vietnamese Army's
will to win and where it got us.

I was having problems believing these guys were motivated and actually
carrying the fight (if there was one) to the FARC.

High Tea in Tres Esquinas Then as the briefing was winding up Colonel
Ricardo jumped up and started going on about how they could do a much
better job if they had more helicopters. I thought maybe he was talking in
general terms about the Colombian Army as a whole, but it became obvious he
meant the JTF. Wait I'd just been told that, a) helicopters weren't of much
use here; and b) all the FARC and cocaleros were located along the rivers.

It's funny that dopers call cocaine snow because I was getting one hell of
a snow job thrown at me in Tres Esquinas. Not knowing I was a former US
Army officer who'd served on three battalion staffs and a brigade staff
(and on another brigade staff in combat in another army) the Colonel was
trying to blow smoke up my fourth point of contact.

I had walked into that room supporting the new aid package (only proposed
at that time). I walked out feeling like somebody had tried to sell me a
used car.

The next stop was the officers club. We loaded into trucks for the short
ride down the street.

The club was still under construction. At the back was a patio overlooking
the river.

Coffee and cake had been laid out. Great. Like I really wanted a high-tea
social in the Putumayo. So where was the boat I was supposed to go out on
patrol in? I wandered off the patio and down the riverbank.

Just out of sight was a bunker with two soldiers all spit-shined up
standing in a bunker with a machinegun. I walked back up to the patio.

It was obvious the brass was planning some kind of presentation. Then a
lieutenant stood behind a podium and started reading a script.

Down the river came the Blackhawk and somebody turned on the stereo.

I couldn't believe it. What the hell was this supposed to show me? Wed been
mistaken for gringo periodistas who would be awed by a helicopter, speed
boats, and machinegun fire. Just then it started to rain. All the Colombian
soldiers, the colonel included, ran inside the unfinished building so they
wouldn't get wet. I stayed, got wet, and took photos of the poor soldiers
in the boats.

If they were real soldiers they were probably pissed as hell that they had
to put on this farce.

I walked around the side of the building to talk to a few soldiers and wait
for my boat ride. I couldn't help but notice the swimming pool just a
hundred yards from the river and think US$14 million and only one guerrilla
KIA. It was now time for lunch.

We had some very nice river fish and a little conversation. When I steered
the subject back to going on patrol in one of the new Piranhas (armed
speedboat) I was told, Oh, no, that is not possible, you have just eaten
and you might get sick in the boat. We all laughed at this joke. Getting
into the back of a pickup we left for what I thought would be the boat
docks but instead we stopped at the airfield. That was no joke: there would
be no riverine combat patrol for me. I would have thrown my camera at the
Avgas tanker but it was borrowed.

Colonel Ricardo wanted to shake my hand and the public affairs weenie with
armor insignia was just ecstatic to be leaving the mud and going back to
Bogota and clean sheets for the night.

He was obviously worried that hed have to stay in Tres Esquinas and do his
job if I stayed the night and hed already made sure that wouldn't happen.

So, frustrated and tired, I was going back to Bogota whether I liked it or not.

Barrancabermeja After expressing some serious dissatisfaction with my trip
to Tres Esquinas (and seeing some major string-pulling) another trip to see
Colombian riverine operations was arranged.

We took a commercial flight north from Bogota to Barrancabermeja (pop.
150,000 plus) home to a naval base on the Magdalena River. The Magdalena
rises in the Andes and flows 957 miles to the Caribbean Sea and the city of
Barranquilla, Colombias chief seaport.

With me were a freelance-journalist stringing for the Washington Times,
Robert Pelton from DPTV, and Tim Cahill from Mens Journal. We were met at
the single gate of the airport by Marine officers and loaded into taxis for
the ride to Barrancabermeja. I had read an Amnesty International report on
the massacre of 32 civilians by the paramilitaries on May 16 and 17, 1998,
in Barrancabermeja so I was already pumped up for trouble.

Then the taxi driver told me, this area, it belongs to the FARC at night.

Hmm. After checking into a hotel we proceeded to the base. We passed the
petroleum complex.

Our escort told me that the guerrillas steal petroleum from the nearby
pipeline.

Arriving at the base we were met by the executive officer of the Battalon
Fluvial No. 6., Grupo de Combate Fluvial No. 1, Infanteria de Marina
(Marine Corps), Armada Republica de Colombia and he gave us a quick
informal brief.

We made arrangements to meet with the commander in the morning and go out
on patrol.

Before we left we were warned that it was very dangerous in the city and
that four gringos were cash cows for the Gs. There was no security in the
hotel, but the police are a couple of blocks away. Fortunately we weren't
in one of the parts of the city where the cops dont go. It's so bad that
the troops wear full combat gear when entering the northern part of the
city the area near the airport, which is often under guerrilla control at
night.

It's too dangerous for the troops to wear their uniforms off base. Back in
my hotel I made sure my door and window shutters were firmly bolted before
I went to sleep.

The next morning we met Major Jorge Garcia, commanding the battalion.

I noticed the Lancero (ranger) badge decorated his right breast while on
the left he wore the Surface Naval badge.

Under his BDU jacket a .380 pistol bulged on his hip. He would give us a
more formal PowerPoint brief via computer monitor.

I was worried it would be another replay of Tres Esquinas. Fortunately it
wasnt and I was quickly informed that I would be going out on a routine
combat patrol on the Magdalena almost immediately. The translation was
handled by Lieutenant Restrepo, a surface warfare naval officer.

It hit the high points.

Mission: deny use of river to insurgents and narcotraficantes and insure
freedom of travel.

The units jurisdiction is the whole length of the Magdalena River, with an
outpost at Mompox and the Battalion Command HQ in Magangue (Bolivar). The
Magdalena rises in the Andes and flows 957 miles to the Caribbean Sea and
the city of Barranquilla, Colombias chief seaport.

Barrancabermeja was an advanced post of 250 marines and army troops and
patrol boats responsible for a patrol area from Barranquilla on the north
coast 887 kilometers south to La Dorada. A lot of territory.

The Magdalena River has a maximum depth of 8-10 meters and is 500 meters
wide at some points.

The many small craft traveling the river make it difficult to control river
traffic.

I was told that the lack of helicopters to patrol the river also makes the
job tougher.

Once again the helicopter was held up as the answer to all their problems.

Algeria, Rhodesia, and Vietnam were all counter-insurgency conflicts which
placed an emphasis on helicopters (Vietnam more so than others) and look
what happened there.

I was wondering how the communist Chinese insurgency in Malaysia and the
Huks in the Philippines were defeated without hundreds of helicopters.

There is a significant floating population of troops and boats on the river
constantly. Up to that time the battalion had conducted 43 patrol missions,
23 army escorts, 3 special escorts, 3 ground operations, and 6 joint
operations. Involved in 7 firefights they had captured one weapon and 458
rounds while confiscating money, chemicals, and 31 kilos of processed cocaine.

In Colombia this is known as one of the most conflicted zones and the many
airstrips that dot the river basin and the nearby petroleum complex
contribute to the problem.

Fighting between the FARC and the autodefensas is ongoing.

And theres a lot of infighting between groups. They sometimes fight in
civilian clothes and will use civilians as shields. The sophistication of
the autodefensas in the region is evolving. Their numbers are unknown but
they're becoming a small army unto themselves. Anyone who wants a job will
join up. The autodefensas avoid combat with the Colombian Armed Forces
their conflict is primarily with FARC guerrillas. Additionally there is the
EPL group Ramon G. Barbosa, four ELN groups, eight FARC units, three EPL,
and five autodefensas. The ELN has a significant presence along the river
while the EPL involvement is smaller.

The Cuban-inspired ELN, with an estimated 4,000 fighters, is generally seen
as more ideological and less militaristic than the FARC. Because of its
smaller size it is interested in reaching a peace agreement with the
government. All these different groups are concentrated along the Magdalena
River. A look at the Mapa Operacional noted the presence of Milicias
Bolivarianas and FARC. There were 23 identified opposition forces north to
Puerto Wilches near Cantagallo and San Pablo. It was here that the first
handful of guerrillas calling themselves the National Liberation Army (ELN)
formed in 1964. It claimed hegemony over the region known as the Middle
Magdalena for nearly thirty years until the autodefensas came in 1998 and,
according to some sources, using massacres and intimidation to impose
tight-fisted control over residents drove the ELN to isolated rural areas.

San Pablo is a conflicted area and there is a proposed Distension Zona
(DMZ) there from the Magdalena River to the west. The ELN wants San Pablo.
Why? To cultivate drugs to the west and ship them out easily. I asked if a
ceasefire or a breakdown in peace talks would effect current ops. I didn't
get much of an answer.

Noting all the little opposing forces markers on the map near Cantagallo
and Yando I realized it was definitely a hairy AO. And that's where they
were going to take me for a boat ride.

Toys for Boys I went out on an actual riverine combat patrol in a Caribe.
The marines have a variety of PBRs (patrol boat, riverine) and LPRs
(launch, patrol, riverine) armed with .50 caliber Brownings and twin .30
caliber (M60) machineguns. There are twenty-one boats, which are a real
challenge for maintenance to keep operating.

The diesel engines are often cannibalized for parts.

The Caribe Model 2 is 23 feet long and mounts two Yamaha 150 horsepower
outboards.

It mounts one Browning .50 caliber heavy machinegun in the bow, four (two
on each side) SS-77 7.62mm machineguns, and theres a South African 6-round
40mm MGL sitting near the driver for good measure. The Caribe Comando Model
1 is 26 feet long and has one Browning .50 caliber, two South African SS-77
7.62mm machineguns, and one MK 19 40mm grenade launcher.

The Pirana mounts a .50 caliber, two M60s, and carries one 40mm MGL. The
Cantidad 05 armament: is .50 calibers, M60s, and a MK3, while the Trooper
type boats mount 60mm mortars.

The Pirana and Caribe boats can move up to 30 km an hour. The Pirana is 23
feet long, and has two 150 horsepower Evinrude outboards.

Troops are armed with Galils, either 7.62mm or 5.56mm, or the odd M79
grenade launcher, and the officers all carry 9mm Argentine Hi Powers.

Additional high-speed gear includes laser range finders, PRC-77 SINCGARS
radios, and Israeli Army field radios.

Restrepo came along for the ride and seemed out of place amongst the crew
who were a very competent group of Marines. Just like the USMC these guys
were prepared to kill people and break things.

A few have that Camp Lejeune look serious professionals teach em English
and they could push boots at Parris Island. Their commander was Lieutenant
Edgar Osorio. With four years in the Marines, Osorio is a graduate of the
naval academy in Cartagena, where he took four years of Naval Science and
Civil Engineering. Now he hunts guerrillas, narcotraficantes, and bandits
with a bunch of teenaged, beady-eyed guerrilla killers and four combat
speedboats. More fun than civil engineering, that's for sure. We wanted to
see some action and Lieutenant Osorio was glad to accommodate. I helped Tim
into his Kevlar vest and helmet as the Marines loaded weapons.

After the two gringos hunkered down next to the two Israeli machineguns we
pulled out onto the river.

I eyed the .308 Galil hanging from its strap in front of me. It belonged to
the machine-gunner next to me so I knew there was a weapon handy if I
needed it. This combat patrol was a bit more than routine there were some
problems on the river. Our patrol was on the way to Yondnd Cantagallo two
villages marked for possible demilitarization. In nearby San Pablo, the
largest of the three municipalities in the planned 1,800 square mile safe
haven, the autodefensas are in charge: setting curfews and meting out rough
justice. But it was thought that it would soon be handed over to the
guerrillas. A month before the government announced it would pull military
and police forces from San Pablo and two other municipalities in
north-central Colombia to create a safe-haven for peace talks with the ELN.
The Pastrana government had already ceded a much larger piece of the
country to FARC. As I learned in MAJ Garcias briefing, this area has vast
tracts of coca cultivation which the ELN desperately wants to take it over.
Meanwhile the autodefensas who control the area dont want to hand over
territory they say they recovered for the state from the guerrillas.
Commander Juli the autodefensas commander (United Self-Defense Groups of
Colombia AUC) for the south of Bolivar, claimed: The ELN doesnt want this
area to talk about peace. They are looking for a strategic corridor to
prepare for war. The ELN has the potential to grow, funded by coca income,
into a much larger and threatening force in the region.

According to police statistics, there are more than 11,350 acres of coca
planted in the local area. The people are worried about their personal
security and freedoms and while theyd surely like to live in peace, dont
want to live in an ELN fiefdom.

The Colombian government, however, was intent on not making the same
mistakes with the ELN as it did with the FARC. In negotiations for creating
the safe haven, ELN leaders agreed to allow civilian representatives of the
government including civil prosecutors to remain.

They also approved the presence of national and international rights
monitoring committees.

Political Problems But in San Pablo the autodefensas and their supporters
had rallied the people against the demilitarization plan. They did not want
what the Distension Zona had: government by the FARC. Theyd heard of the
summary executions and the gang rapes, the corruption, the extortion of
merchants, and no law except the FARCs. The civil courts were abolished and
FARC tribunals established. The people of Yando and Cantagallo (and San
Pablo I was told) didn't want this to happen in their communities. With
demonstrations, general strikes, and roadblocks, they planned to pressure
Pastrana into reversing his decision.

Our first stop was in Yando. I wandered the streets talking to people and
taking pictures.

Two marines with Galils wandered along with me, as protection I imagine,
and also probably to keep me out of trouble.

A group of men were loading lumber in a truck and I paused to buy a Coke
from a cantina.

The marines had conducted their routine security sweep of the village and
without anything to report Osorio found me and we moved back to the boats.

With the Evinrudes tearing up a large wake and spray flying from the bow we
continued our patrol on the Magdalena. So far it was just a nice day on the
river. While the situation in Yando was somewhat subdued with life going on
as usual, things were different in neighboring Cantagallo. In Cantagallo I
witnessed an anti- Distension Zona rally near the boat docks and market..
It looked well-organized. They were waiting for us to get off the boats.
The marines tightened up visibly as it was reported that there were
autodefensas nearby.

LT Osorio issued his orders and squads of Marines fanned out through the
town to provide perimeter security.

Nobody looked lax. Walking through town I was told by one resident that: To
the ELN we are all autodefensas. Theyll come here with lists and start
picking out collaborators. A teenage girl next to him held a hand-written
sign: NO Distension Zona. Several people carried similar signs.

Walking the 300 meters from the docks to the Iglesia de Santa Rosa del
Lima, I passed through a crowd of easily 200 people.

I heard that the shop owners in San Pablo, Yondand Cantagallo had
supposedly received anonymous notices to close shop for the strike.

When the strike was lifted, protest organizers blocked the highway to the
coast.

The whole situation was very politicized. San Pablo Mayor Danuil Mancera
told journalists that he feared that if the government insisted on the
Distension Zona the local civilians could rebel.

I am a peace lover but I am sure that the people will rise up even against
the government. They will defend their space, their territory, he said in
an interview.

But the human rights activists involved in the situation said that wasnt
true. They claimed the civilian population was under pressure from the
autodefensas. Whether the people were free to say what they truly felt
about the proposed Distension Zona was unclear.

My personal opinion was these were just plain folks who wanted to be left
alone.

As the afternoon drew to a close we moved back to the boats.

The marines owned this village, at least for the day. The rest of the
patrol was uneventful, save for a bit of racing and some .50 caliber firing
to show off for the gringos, and we returned to Barrancabermeja before
dark. Just another day for the men of Battalon Fluvial No. 6., Grupo de
Combate Fluvial No. 1, Infanteria de Marina.

But it wasnt just another day for the people of Cantagallo and Yondo. They
still havent assured themselves an ELN free community in which to live.
Since our patrol the autodefensas have engaged the ELN in widespread
fighting in the region.

The marines continue to patrol the Magdalena and engage guerrillas and
narcotraficantes in combat.

Although their communities havent been turned over to ELN control at this
time, the people of Cantagallo, Yondo, and San Pablo will probably find
themselves living in a new Distension Zona. That doesnt mean the fighting
will be over. This, is Colombia, where the fighting is never over. ###

Note: Approximately 18 Black Hawks were included in the aid package as
opposed to the original 30 proposed.

A total of 60 helicopters (Supercharged Hueys making up the difference) is
intended.

Foreign Correspondent Rob Krott has reported from the worlds war zones
since 1990.